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Abstract 
The nature of the Republican constitution has been much contested by scholars studying 
the history of the Roman Republic.  In considering the problems of the late Republic, the 
nature of the constitution is an important question, for if we do not understand what the 
constitution was, how can we explain Rome’s transition from ‘Republic’ to ‘Empire’?  Such a 
question is particularly pertinent when looking at events at Rome following the assassination 
of Caesar, as we try to understand why it was that the Republic, as we understand it as a polity 
without a sole ruler, was not restored.   
 
This thesis examines the Roman understanding of the constitution in the aftermath of 
Caesar’s death and argues that for the Romans the constitution was a contested entity, its 
proper nature debated and fought over, and that this contest led to conflict on the political 
stage, becoming a key factor in the failure to restore the Republic and the establishment of the 
Second Triumvirate.    The thesis proposes a new methodology for the examination of the 
constitution, employing modern critical theories of discourse and the formation of knowledge 
to establish and analyse the Roman constitution as a discursive entity: interpreted, contested 
and established through discourse.       I argue that the Roman knowledge of the proper nature 
of the constitution of the res publica had fractured by the time of Caesar’s death and that this 
fracturing led to multiple understandings of the constitution.   In this thesis I describe the state 
of Rome in 44-43 B.C. to reveal these multiple understandings of the constitution, and 
undertake an analysis of the discourse of Cicero and Sallust after 44 B.C. in order to describe 
the way in which different understandings of the constitution were formulated and expressed.  
Through this examination this thesis shows that the expression and interrelation of these 
multiple understandings in Roman political discourse made arrival at a unified agreement on a 
common course of action all but impossible and that this combined with the volatile 
atmosphere at Rome after Caesar’s death played a major role in Rome’s slide towards civil war 
and the eventual establishment of a different political system.  
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“... perhaps I’d realise where I’m standing.  Or at least that I’m standing 
somewhere.  There is, I suppose, a world of objects which have a certain 
form, like this coffee mug.  I turn it, and it has no handle.  I tilt it, and it has 
no cavity.  But there is something real here which is always a mug with a 
handle.  I suppose.  But politics, justice, patriotism – they aren’t even like 
coffee mugs. There’s nothing real there separate from our perception of 
them.  So if you try and change them as though there were something to 
change, you’ll get frustrated and frustration will finally make you violent.  If 
you know this and proceed with humility, you may perhaps alter people’s 
perceptions so that they behave a little differently at that axis of behaviour 
where we locate politics or justice.  But if you don’t know this, then you’re 
acting on a mistake.”  
 
   Stoppard, T., (1999) The Real Thing, (London) 
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Introduction 
 
What do we mean when we talk about the constitution of the Roman res publica in the 
period that we know as the Republic?1  Over the years much thought and many words have 
been expended in the search for answers to our questions about the nature of the Republican 
constitution, the manner of its functioning, and the way in which the Republic it constituted 
came to an end.  Since Rome had no written constitution, our understanding of the political 
system of the Republic and its decline has to be constructed from the surviving evidence, 
which reflects the Romans’ own understanding of their res publica in the form of speeches, 
political thought and historical accounts of political events and actions.   What has not been 
fully acknowledged, however, is that the Romans also had to access their constitution in this 
way.  With no written constitution to guide their political behaviour, the Romans had to 
continually debate and construct their understanding of their constitution from precedents, 
laws and common knowledge in order to determine the appropriate course of action.   
                                                             
1 The terminology used in discussing the “Roman Republic” must be established at the outset.  The 
nature of a ‘constitution’, generally, will be discussed in chapter 1.1.  It is important to realise that the 
“Republic” is a description applied to Rome as it was before the rule of Augustus by later scholars.  The 
Romans referred to their political system as the res publica, and the term continued to be used to refer 
to Rome into what we refer to as the Empire.   When we refer to a Republic now, we tend to mean that 
a state has a particular kind of constitution distinguishing it as a Republic, which the Oxford English 
Dictionary describes as, “A state in which the supreme power rests in the people and their elected 
representatives or officers, as opposed to one governed by a king or similar ruler.”  We see a state as 
having a government that possesses sovereignty and that is distinct from the citizen body and civil 
sphere (Cartledge (2005), p.17-18; Skinner (1989) p.112), and a constitution as establishing this 
government.  I wish to avoid using the term state with reference to Rome within this thesis, and will 
instead refer to the res publica, and to the Roman political and social system as a polity, reserving the 
term ‘Republic’ for the temporal period we understand as the ‘Roman Republic’ and the form of 
government that we regard as ‘Republican’.   The term res publica, which can be literally translated as 
‘public thing’ (Atkins (2005) p.492), does not of itself specify a particular kind of constitution – which is 
one of the reasons why this thesis seeks to examine what the Romans understood their res publica to 
be.  In Greek politeia is the standard word for constitution or political system or ordering of the political 
structure (Schofield (2005) p.199) and referred not to a document, but the legal and social form of a 
polis (Roberts (2005) p.356).  Of course, we cannot take a politeia to be the ideal politeia of Aristotle’s 
Politics, anymore than we can understand the res publica to be that which is outlined in Cicero’s de Re 
Publica: both authors used the term for their presentation of what they thought to be the best political 
system because it was the general term for a political system in their language.   The term ‘polity’, which 
the OED defines as: “1. a. Civilization; civil order or organization; civil society. Now rare; b. 
Administration of a state; a process of civil government or a constitution. Now rare,” seems to be the 
best way to refer to the res publica as political entity in English.  It indicates a political system, without 
defining its type or organisation, and without implying it has a written foundation or racial basis.  It has 
also, as the dictionary definition indicates, fallen out of widespread usage, and thus carries less modern 
baggage than the other terms discussed above.   
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Through a process of debate and decision-making the constitution of the res publica was not 
only interpreted but also constructed, as each decision made became one of the authorities 
that might be called upon in future debates.   The way in which people understand their 
political system bears directly upon their arguments and actions within that system, and so the 
Roman understanding of the nature of the constitution of the res publica had a direct impact 
on Roman action.    While narratives and analyses of events provide us with a picture of what 
happened, looking at actions and events alone is not enough: to fully understand what 
happened to the Roman Republic in the first century B.C. we need to look at what the Romans 
thought, said and wrote about their res publica, and how this influenced their actions.  
If a Roman had been asked to define the res publica or its constitution in a formal, legal 
manner, there was no single document to which they could refer.    Political and personal 
behaviour and action was regulated by a nexus of authorities: the statutes passed by the 
people, the decrees issued by the Senate, the interpretations of jurists and the edicts of 
magistrates, precedent, custom and equity.2  These authorities did not offer a single coherent 
representation of the constitution, nor were they intended to.  They were elements in a legal 
and political discourse about its nature that could be used to defend or condemn political 
actions and personal behaviour by those who supported or opposed it.     As such, discourse 
provided a forum in which ideas about the res publica were expressed: what it was, how it 
should function, and the responsibilities of the citizens who belonged to it; and through it we 
can access the Roman understanding of the constitution.3   This discourse was part of Roman 
political life, opinions about the constitution providing the justification for proposals for action, 
with decisions made through a process of debate and voting.    It existed in the spaces 
between the institutions and practices of Rome, holding them together and explaining them as 
parts of a functioning res publica.  In all spheres of Roman life, discourse enabled the 
negotiation and construction of the res publica, constituting it as a political system and 
informing the lives of the citizens within it.  In this way it also enabled the evolution of the 
constitution over time as arguments about the nature of the res publica were formulated in 
                                                             
2 Cic., Top., 28; Harries (2007) p.2; Fox (2007) p.153.  Cicero here refers to the ius civile, which was but 
one element in the complex legal system governing political praxis in the Republic; however, the sources 
of authority are largely the same when considering appropriate action within the res publica as a whole, 
with the ius civile taking its place as an authority guiding such action.  
3 As the doctor says to the political prisoner in Every Good Boy Deserves Favour, “Your opinions are your 
symptoms.” (Stoppard (2009) p.28).  In Rome, opinions about the res publica were symptomatic of 
understandings of its constitution.  
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response to ongoing events, directing Rome’s response to them at the time, and setting 
precedents for future debate and action.4    
In order to understand the way this process worked and access the Roman understanding 
of the constitution, it is necessary to describe the discourse in which claims about the nature 
of the res publica were made, and examine the way in which these claims were formulated, 
expressed and related to various courses of action in order to create an argument about what 
Rome was and what action Rome should take in a given situation.   To this end, this thesis will 
describe the way in which the process of interpreting, understanding and constructing the 
constitution occurred at Rome after the assassination of C. Julius Caesar.   A new methodology 
for reading Rome’s unwritten constitution will be developed and employed to analyse the 
Roman discourse about the nature of the res publica in the late 40s and consider the effect it 
had upon the events that followed Caesar’s death and the reproduction of the constitution.   
Such an analysis will show the way in which Roman discourse about the res publica was shaped 
by contemporary events as individuals formulated arguments and ideas about the res publica, 
responded to Caesar’s assassination and engaged in the struggle for the future of Rome that 
followed.  It will also reveal that there was no one unified Roman understanding of the 
constitution of the res publica, but rather a multiplicity of understandings, overlapping and 
diverging from each other in their conceptions of various elements of the res publica; existing 
in parallel and in competition with each other; out of which the constitution was debated and 
reformulated through discourse and debate.  The existence of these multiple and contested 
understandings dictated the behaviour of Rome’s citizens as each sought to establish their 
understanding of the constitution in practice at Rome and affected the attempt to ‘restore’ the 
Republic as negotiation failed and the struggle between different citizens and groups who 
understood the res publica in different ways descended into violence and civil war as each 
tried to defend their position and their res publica.  
I have chosen to focus on the discourse of the period following Caesar’s assassination for 
two reasons.  Firstly, Roman thinking about the constitution was not purely theoretical, but 
was formulated in response to events and sought, in turn, to shape events in future.  By 
focusing on a period of crisis for the res publica, we can clearly see the way in which 
constitutional discourse was formulated and the impact that it had upon the polity.   Caesar’s 
dictatorship marked a break in the governance of the res publica, his dictatorship overriding or 
                                                             
4 The Romans understood that their constitution had evolved over time, with Cicero (Rep., 2.2) claiming 
it as one of the strongest elements of the res publica. Cf., Polyb., 6.9, 10-; Lintott (1999) p.2.   
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altering many of the normal practices and processes of the res publica.  Rome itself had not 
been successfully stabilised after the civil war – the political system, which had been held 
together by the force of Caesar’s personality and his personal power, fell into turmoil again 
after his death.5   At this point it was unclear what would come next for Rome.  Would the 
conspirators succeed in re-establishing their idea of the res publica? Or would one or other of 
Marcus Antonius or Octavian exact revenge upon the assassins and establish himself in some 
position of sole authority in Rome?  If the res publica were to be ‘restored’, what form would it 
take?   The proper nature of the constitution was of critical importance: the future of the res 
publica was uncertain, yet all proposals for action had to be presented as being taken for its 
benefit and future security.  The way that Romans understood the constitution of their polity 
set the terms for the debate over its future.    
Secondly, a study of the texts of a limited time period that respond to specific events and 
which incorporates the work of more than one thinker (something that can be difficult when 
considering the late Republic, given the almost overwhelming presence of Cicero)6 provides 
the opportunity to test a new methodology and examine the constitution of the Roman res 
publica in a different way.  This thesis will apply modern critical thought about the nature of 
discourse and the construction of knowledge to Roman discourse about the nature of the res 
publica in order to reveal the way in which Roman understandings of the constitution were 
formed.   A core of texts comprising Sallust’s monographs and Cicero’s two final works allows 
for the comparison of two different thinkers’ considerations of the constitution in response to 
the same events.7  This will enable us to establish whether they held the same understanding 
of the res publica and if there can be said to be a ‘common knowledge’ of the nature of the res 
publica in Rome, and will show that whilst there was a core political vocabulary that appeared 
to make up Rome’s Republican ideology, the meanings associated with these terms varied  
depending upon the speaker and his audience, and reflected his personal understanding of the 
constitution.  
                                                             
5 See chapter 2.1 for a brief discussion of the impact of Caesar’s dictatorship on the res publica. 
6 Fox (2007) p.19.  
7 It is important to note that Cicero and Sallust were not the only Romans who held and expressed 
understandings of the res publica in this period, but as their works are the major surviving texts from the 
immediate post-Caesarian Rome, they provide a valuable (and easily accessible) source of Roman 
thought about the res publica.  As we will see in chapter two, the words and deeds of all the other major 
players can also be examined in terms of the understandings of the res publica that they express.  Such 
an undertaking is beyond the scope of this project, although they will be considered briefly, in order to 
set the scene for the work of Cicero and Sallust. 
 
 
5 | P a g e  
 
The methodology for the examination of the constitution of the res publica as a discursive 
entity will be established in chapter one.  Here possible definitions of a constitution will be 
discussed, and an overview of previous approaches to the Roman constitution will be given.  
This chapter will establish what is meant when we describe the Roman constitution as a 
discursive entity and highlight the importance of examining Roman discourse about the res 
publica in order to understand the constitution and its development through time and 
discourse.   A detailed process for analysing Roman political and constitutional thought will be 
presented, drawing primarily on the early work of Foucault, but also on subsequent thinkers 
including Althusser, Laclau, Giddens, Lessig and Sunstein and which will establish a method not 
only to provide a descriptive account of Roman discourse, but also an analysis of what this 
discourse meant for the Roman Republic.    
The second chapter will introduce the historical background to the texts under 
examination, describing the political discourse that took place after the assassination of 
Caesar.   From March 44 onwards, various voices took to the stage, responding to events and 
fighting for, and over, the future of the res publica.    These voices – most prominently those of 
the conspirators, Antonius, Octavian, Cicero, the Senate and the People of Rome – all 
expressed different understandings of the constitution of the res publica.    This chapter will 
look at the words and deeds of these individuals (with the exception of Cicero) and show the 
way that Roman knowledge about the constitution had fractured, giving rise to different 
versions of the constitution that came into conflict with each other and competed to be ‘the’ 
understanding that was established at Rome.  The interactions between these voices and the 
conflict between the constitutional understandings that they expressed contributed to the 
progress of events throughout 44-43 and the establishment of the Roman res publica in a new 
form.   They also provide the context within which Cicero and Sallust spoke and wrote, and an 
account of them will enable us to fully understand their entries into the political discourse of 
the day, the way in which they understood and formulated their expression of their 
understanding of the constitution and the impact this had upon events at Rome and the future 
of the res publica.   
Chapters three and four will present a two-part study of the Roman understanding of the 
nature of the res publica as displayed in the texts of Cicero and Sallust.  This will test the 
methodology on the most complete surviving texts of the period, describing the way in which 
each author’s representation of the res publica and its constitution was constructed in their 
speech and writing and  the way in which these formulations were influenced and shaped by 
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the situation in which each found themselves.    Cicero’s post-Caesarian work shows the way in 
which an individual understanding of the constitution was formulated and expressed in Rome, 
and the way it interacted with the wider discourse; while Sallust’s historiography reveals the 
multiplicity of understandings of the constitution and places Cicero’s voice as one amongst 
many, implicating him in the breakdown and civil strife that occurred after Caesar’s death.   
From Cicero’s understanding of the constitution, the arguments he based upon it in Rome’s 
political discourse and Sallust’s representation of the danger of multiple, conflicting 
understandings of the constitution, we can see the way that the fracturing of Rome’s 
constitutional knowledge was expressed in discourse and destabilised the res publica.  
    Chapter three will consider the post-Caesarian work of Cicero, describing the way that his 
expression of the constitution was shaped by his dislike of Caesar’s dictatorship, his fear that 
Antonius sought to follow in Caesar’s footsteps and his desire to prevent this and restore the 
res publica as he understood it.   Cicero’s presentation of the res publica emphasised the 
importance of good citizenship and of concordia between Rome’s various political bodies in 
creating a stable res publica and expresses the belief that this harmony is maintained by the 
good behaviour and speech of Rome’s citizens; something that his discourse shows he did not 
always manifest in practice.    De Officiis offered a philosophical discussion of the duties of the 
good citizen within the res publica, focusing on the individual and arguing that the citizen must 
submit his own interests to those of the polity, whilst the Philippics expressed more of Cicero’s 
understanding of the role of the political bodies of the Senate and People within Rome, as he 
sought to persuade them to act, and reveal his belief in the importance of good citizenship 
within Rome’s institutions.   The Philippics also showed Cicero’s understanding of the flexibility 
of the constitution and his willingness to exploit it in support of his own ends, which, when 
seen in the context  of the wider discourse discussed in chapter two, can be seen to have an 
impact upon the res publica.  They did not contribute to concordia, however, but were part of 
the escalating crisis in Rome.  
  Chapter four will focus on Sallust’s Bellum Catilinae and Bellum Jugurthinum, and the 
historian’s presentation of the constitution within these texts.    Although writing about earlier 
events, Sallust’s understanding of the res publica, as expressed in his work, was affected by his 
knowledge of and opinion about the events that had followed those he narrated. Sallust 
described a res publica that was failing, its political and constitutional decline both explaining 
and explained by the ongoing passage of events, with the Second Triumvirate under which he 
wrote being the end result.  Like Cicero, Sallust saw good citizenship as being of critical 
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importance in the maintenance of the res publica, his historical narratives drawing a parallel 
between a decline in morality and a rise in factionalism and civil strife.   However, Sallust’s 
understanding of the constitution is not the only one revealed in his work.   As a historian 
Sallust was able to showcase a number of different understandings of the constitution held by 
the characters that feature in the narrative.   His historiography reveals the divisions within 
Rome’s political discourse, critiquing them and showing the danger which the existence 
multiple understandings of the constitution posed to a stable polity.   Through this he responds 
to the ideas and arguments expressed by Cicero after Caesar’s death, making it clear that some 
of them, particularly those regarding the legitimacy of Octavian’s claim to power and 
imperium, contributed to the re-disintegration of Rome into civil war.     
These two chapters will show that at first glance, there appears to be considerable overlap 
in terms of the aspects of Roman politics Cicero and Sallust focus upon and the terminology 
they employ in their discussions, suggesting a common understanding or knowledge base 
about the constitution of the res publica. However, their depictions of Rome’s political 
institutions and ideals also show that there were divisions in the Roman understanding of the 
res publica and that this caused problems for the Republic.   Chapters two to four will show 
that there were several understandings of the constitution extant in Rome and that these were 
reflected in political debate and action.   Roman knowledge about the nature of the res publica 
was fractured and contested, with multiple understandings of the constitution being put 
forward and contested by the participants in the discourse.  Throughout the course of the 
Roman Republic the constitution was continually being formulated and negotiated out of 
these understandings, evolving through this process.  However, at times this process was not 
always peaceful. Throughout the last century of the Republican era, and in particular in the 
crucible that was Rome after Caesar’s death, this debate moved beyond rhetoric and verbal 
discourse into violence, with participants turning to military force in order to compel 
acceptance of their understanding of the res publica. 
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Chapter One: The Nature of a Constitution  
 
Before laying out the approach this thesis will take to the study of the constitution of the 
Roman res publica, it is important to be clear about what we mean when we talk about a 
constitution, and to consider the way in which our understanding of constitutions has guided 
previous study of the Roman Republic.   From this it will become apparent that we need to 
rethink our current understanding of the constitution of the Roman Republic and the approach 
we take to the study of it.   This chapter will argue that the constitution of a polity incorporates 
not merely a set of rules and institutions but also the civic community and political culture of 
that polity, and that the nature of this constitution is created and understood within the polity 
though a discursive process.  In order to analyse this process, we need to establish what we 
mean when we talk about discourse, and the way in which discourse ‘works’ in formulating 
knowledge and ideas.   From this it will be possible to establish a new methodology for the 
study of the Roman constitution through an analysis of political discourse.  
 
1. The Roman Constitution 
Employing the term ‘constitution’ in relation to any ancient city or polity is problematic, 
since to the modern mind it often implies a written document detailing the way in which a 
political system or government must function, something to which legislators and judges may 
refer back when carrying out their duties.1  Such all-encompassing documents were absent in 
the ancient world, and we need to divest ourselves of our modern idea of a single established, 
textual constitution when dealing with the political system of the Roman Republic.  Instead, we 
must ascertain what might make up a constitution: that is, what facets a constitution 
possesses and what it gives to a polity.  
In the modern era we have developed a certain understanding of what we expect a 
constitution to look like.  In particular we assume the existence of defined structures and 
institutions that work in a set and predictable manner in order to uphold the political system 
of the state in question.2    However, although it does require certain established rules of 
public behaviour and an institutional structure for the implementation of law, this is not all a 
                                                             
1 Roberts (2005) p.356.   
2 North (2006) p.257.  Although he acknowledges that the constitution may be the rules and principles 
of daily life as well as the political system, North himself still looks for an established, objectively 
accessed constitutional system. 
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constitution is.3  Lawrence Lessig has described a constitution as, “An architecture, not just a 
legal text, but a way of life – that structures and constrains social and legal power, to the end 
of protecting fundamental values.”4   In such an understanding the constitution of a polity 
consists not just of the institutions and structures within which political activity takes place, 
but also of the political culture that enables this system to function, including a voluntary 
willingness to follow the rule of law in the majority of the population and the values and 
principles that may be said to make up the idea of citizenship within a particular polity. 5    Such 
constitutional principles are rarely written down in a document, but they are standards that 
are generally understood by the citizens to exist and to be important to the maintenance of 
their polity, although their exact nature may be contested.    Both institutions and principles 
may change, not only through the formal processes established by some constitutional 
documents (such as article five of the constitution of the United States), but also through the 
passing of laws and legal judgements and as public opinion and knowledge changes over time.6  
This is not a negative process that destroys the constitution, but one that alters it, meaning 
that we cannot simply see a constitution as a static monolith, but rather as an entity whose 
architecture has to be constructed and interpreted.    To use an architectural metaphor – a 
constitution cannot be seen as a single building in a city but rather should be seen as the 
whole urban space.  
Within the study of ancient history there have been two main approaches to the study of 
the political system and life of the Roman Republic: the first focusing on the practicalities of 
daily political life and its activities, including the functioning of the institutions, the role of the 
magistrates and the place of the people; the second considering political thought and the 
nature of the ideas and ideology that were important within the Republic.  In recent years 
recognition of the flexible nature of Roman political ideas and their importance within the 
political structures and discourse at Rome has become established, leading to a more nuanced 
understanding of Roman political life and its practices.   However, our understanding of the 
constitution of the res publica remains wedded to the concept of it as a system of institutions 
in which speech and discourse play an important but subordinate role.  
                                                             
3 Gwyn (1995) p.5; Ober (1989) p.9; Polin (1998) p.3.  
4 Lessig (2006) p.4. 
5 Gwyn (1995) pp.vii-viii, 2 & 5.  A fictional Lessig, in an episode of The West Wing, notes this, saying: 
“The document is just a beginning. A constitutional democracy succeeds only if the constitution reflects 
democratic values alive in the citizenry. Which is why our most important job is to instil those values in 
their leaders through discussion and debate.” Schmidt and Singer (2005). 
6 Sunstein (2009) p.3.  
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The core texts in the scholarship on the Roman constitution as a whole are Mommsen’s 
Römisches Staatsrecht and Lintott’s Constitution of the Roman Republic.7   Although the 
accounts of the nature and workings of Roman institutions presented in the two works show 
the developments produced by a century of research into the details of Rome’s institutions 
and legal processes, the fundamental approach has not changed: both focus on the 
constitution as something that existed in the balance of these structures.   In such a reading 
the constitution is a fixed entity, a system within which politics and political discourse happen.  
The political culture is seen as an important part of the res publica but not part of the 
constitution of Rome, which stands above the fray as an arbiter of what is legal and proper and 
what is not.     Such an understanding misses a key element of the definition of a constitution 
put forward above: the importance of the fundamental values of a polity as part of the 
constitution.  This lack has lead to a rigid interpretation of the Roman constitution as a fixed, 
carefully balanced, system of government.  
Given such an understanding of the constitution the study of the political life of the 
Republic has often tended to focus on institutions, magistracies and the law, and the way 
Roman governance functioned.    In depth examinations such as those carried out by Ross 
Taylor on Rome’s voting assemblies, Bonnefond-Coudry on the Senate, or Brennan on the 
praetorship present detailed accounts of the workings of the Republic and of the way its 
institutions and their processes changed over time.8   However without a full consideration of 
the way in which these political bodies were conceived and discussed by the Romans and the 
impact that this had upon their workings and upon the constitution of the res publica, change 
becomes a negative, something imposed by external factors such as the expansion of Rome 
and the behaviour of its citizens rather than the result of the innate flexibility of the 
constitution as it was constructed at Rome.   
The narrative history of the political life and growth of empire in the late Republic has also 
been discussed primarily in terms of a static, institutional understanding of the constitution of 
                                                             
7 Mommsen (1952-69); Lintott (1999).  
8 Taylor (1966); Bonnefond-Coudry (1989); Brennan (2000).  Other examples of this approach include 
Greenidge (1901) on Rome’s legal system, Meier (1966) on the organisation of the political life of the res 
publica, Nicolet (1980) on the world of the citizen (see especially pp.383, 388 for his description of the 
‘system’), Stewart (1998) on the way in which the lot was used to divide up the roles of public officials; 
the work of Wiseman (1971) on the entry of new men into the Senate and Hopkins (1983) on the 
membership of the Senate as a whole.  
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the res publica.9   Accounts of the events of the first century are presented in terms of the way 
they unfolded within the constitution and the impact they had upon it; the actions of 
individuals and groups being analysed regarding their relations to the institutions. Political 
groups and associations, including the nobilitas, optimates, populares and factiones, have been 
assessed for their place in political life as it took place within the constitution.10   The same is 
true for the study of Rome’s prominent citizens: the rise of individually powerful figures in the 
late Republic has previously been considered in terms of their positive or negative impact upon 
the ‘proper’ constitution.11   In such a reading behaviour and actions are seen as things that 
uphold or undermine a constitution rather than as indicators of the nature of that constitution 
in their reflection of its fundamental values.    
In recent years consideration of the nature and role of ideology and political ideas in the 
daily political life of the late Roman Republic has grown, leading to increasingly sophisticated 
discussions not only of the Roman understanding of ideas in the abstract and in political 
philosophy, but also the place they had in political action.12  Scholars including Dugan, 
Gildenhard, Fantham and Connolly have read Cicero’s philosophical and rhetorical treatises as 
works of serious political philosophy, examining them for his thinking about Roman politics, 
focusing in particular on the person and the role of the orator and citizen in the res publica.   
Even the works of Sallust, whilst generally under-represented in the criticism of Roman 
historiography, have been the subject of work on the use of political language and on the 
relation between history and memory in Roman public life.13   Others have considered the 
place of ideology and political ideas in the practice of at politics in Rome, for example the work 
of Millar, Mouritsen and Morstein-Marx in their works considering the role of the populus in 
                                                             
9 See for example the historical narratives of the Late Republic provided in Crook, Lintott and Rawson 
(1992), Syme (1939), Crawford (1992), Gruen (1995) and Tatum (2006).  
10 See Gelzer (1912); Brunt (1982); Shackleton Bailey (1986) on the nobilitas; the essays on Amicitia, 
Clientela and Factions in Brunt (1988); and Taylor (1949) for the role of political groups and associations.   
11 Biographical studies of the prominent figures of the first century have been produced by Gelzer 
(1912); Meier (1996) and Goldsworthy (2006) (Caesar); Seager (2002) (Pompey); Keaveney (1982) 
(Sulla); Shackleton Bailey (1971); Stockton (1971); Mitchell (1979) and Mitchell (1991) (Cicero).  
12 See Wirszubski (1950); Brunt (1988), Arena (2007a) and Arena (2007b) on the nature of libertas, and 
Earl (1967), Balmaceda (2005), Gildenhard (2007) and Schofield (2009), and the debate between 
McDonnell (2006) and McDonnell (2007)and Kaster (2007) on the nature of virtus and other Roman 
virtues.  
13 Dugan (2005); Fantham (2006); Gildenhard (2007) and Connolly (2007) on Cicero.  Batstone (1988a); 
Batstone (1988b); Batstone (1990) and Batstone (2008); Grethlein (2006a) and Grethlein (2006b) on 
Sallust.    
 
 
12 | P a g e  
 
the res publica.14   However, none of these have yet escaped from the idea of the constitution 
as a fixed entity within which politics, including political thought, was done rather than an 
architecture constructed through discursive processes.  
However, if we take the definition of a constitution as it was proposed above, we should 
see the constitution of the Roman res publica as incorporating both Rome’s political culture 
and her institutions.     There were certain institutions and locations in which political activities 
and processes took place and there was a set of political values to which both the elite and the 
populus en masse officially subscribed.   The constitution itself was woven out of these 
elements; the institutions, locations, processes, activities and ideas through which Rome 
functioned as a polity; and constructed through the political discourse of the Roman Republic, 
in which the nature of these various elements and the relationships between them were 
deliberated upon in interpretations of the constitution.  Roman politics took place through 
discourse, in speech and debate in the forum, the Senate and the law courts (amongst other 
locations), with this discourse guided by the Roman understanding of the constitution – both 
the nature of the institutions and the important political ideas – and directing political action 
through the decisions that resulted from it.15    
To understand the nature of the constitution of the res publica and the decline of the 
Republic, therefore, we must examine the way the Romans talked about it.  The political 
discourse of the Republic tells us how the Romans conceived of the various elements of the 
constitution: which institutions and political processes were seen to be important, why, and 
how they were believed to function; the most important ideas and ideals of the Republic; the 
way the various institutions and processes were thought to relate to each other and to the 
ideas the Romans believed should be upheld.  Such an analysis will not only enable us to access 
the Roman understanding(s) of the constitution of the res publica, but also to understand the 
way in which the nature of the constitution contributed to the decline of the Republic.  It will 
emphasise the inherent flexibility of the constitution and its interpretability within Rome’s 
decision-making processes, allowing us to see the impact Roman understandings of the res 
publica had upon the Republic.  
 
                                                             
14 Millar (1995); Millar (1998); Mouritsen (2001) and Morstein-Marx (2004), Cf., Brunt (1982) and 
Shackleton Bailey (1986) on the ideas of nobilitas and novitas; McDonnell (2006) on virtus; Stone (2005) 
on optimates; Whitehead (2005) on viri clarissimi.  
15 See Giddens (1982) p.8-10 on the ‘recursive’ nature of the organisation of social practices, and 
chapter 1.3 below. 
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2. The nature of discourse 
 According to the Oxford English Dictionary discourse is the, “Communication of thought by 
speech,” which may include, “A spoken or written treatment of a subject, in which it is handled 
or discussed at length.” In linguistics it is, “A connected series of utterances by which meaning 
is communicated, especially forming a unit for analysis; spoken or written communication 
regarded as consisting of such utterances.”16  Samuel Johnson defined discourse as “Mutual 
intercourse of language… the act of understanding, by which it passes from premises to 
consequences.”17   Howarth and Stavrakakis have described discourse as a social and political 
construction that establishes a system of relations between objects and practices while 
providing (subject) positions with which social agents can identify.18   This broader definition, 
which incorporates behavioural practices as well as verbal utterances into discourse, draws on 
the work of late twentieth century scholars who have studied the way in which discourses are 
formulated and formulate meaning and knowledge within societies and cultures.  These 
include Laclau and Mouffe, who present discourse as, “The structured totality resulting from 
the articulatory practice,” in which an articulation is any practice – spoken or performed – that 
establishes a relation between two elements and results in a modification of their identity, and 
also Foucault, who proposed the idea at the end of The Archaeology of Knowledge, and argued 
in the History of Sexuality that sexual identities and the knowledge of a society about them are 
formed out of behaviour as well as out of verbal representations.19   These definitions of 
discourse all show that although the ideas put forward by modern proponents of discourse 
                                                             
16 OED, “Discourse” 
(http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50065473?query_type=word&queryword=discourse&first=1&max
_to_show=10&sort_type=alpha&result_place=1&search_id=8H9W-nX37ql-3151&hilite=50065473 
accessed, 23-01-2007).   
17 Johnson (1805). Cf., OED, “Discourse.” 
18 Howarth and Stavrakakis (2000) p.3.  
19 Laclau and Mouffe (1985) p.105 (see Barrett (1994) for a critique of their presentation of discourse 
and ideology); AK p.213.  See also Althusser (1971), who argues for practice as reflective the ideas and 
understandings of people, and that these practices form the ideology of a society; Ricoeur (1973) pp. 97-
102, who argues that action is fixed through objectification as verbal discourse is fixed by writing, 
making ‘doing’ a type of utterance; and Giddens (1982) pp.31-32, who argues that ‘knowledgability’ 
(what subjects know about a particular topic or society) works on discursive and practical levels. Chartier 
(1997) p.19 takes issue with this, arguing that the rules governing production of discourse are different 
from those ruling conduct and actions.  However, as Clark (2004) p.119 & 152 notes Chartier takes 
discourse to refer strictly to language, whereas for Foucault and others it is a ‘strategic field’ linked to 
force and productive of effects not limited to language.  Robert Morstein-Marx’s book, Mass Oratory 
and Political Power in the Late Republic took up this description of discourse for his examination of 
contional oratory in Rome, calling discourse “An interrelated series of utterances and practices 
embedded in a specific political context and linked to a certain type of social action.” (Morstein-Marx 
(2004) p.15).    
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analysis sound more complex and use more technical terminology than the dictionary 
definition, what we are essentially talking about, when we refer to discourse, is a network of 
statements, verbal and behavioural, through which ideas and arguments are communicated 
between a group of people, creating a body of knowledge.  
However, whilst these may be the ‘essential’ basics, discourse is more complex than such a 
brief summary allows.  Whilst the codification of a topic within discourse leads to an 
objectification of language and suggests the possibility of coherence and normativity, 20 
discourse - both in linguistic and behavioural forms - is fundamentally unstable and 
uncontrollable.  Pocock has described language as a game, in which no one can have ‘the last 
word’ because each ‘player’ can discern unexpected possibilities in the others’ use of 
language.21   Discourse is the same, with participants responding to each other in dialogues, 
many of which overlap, challenging - or even ignoring - the statements, ideas and practices of 
others, with no one individual ever able to control the situation.   This means that the nature 
of language and knowledge is continually being refined, redefined or fractured within and in 
response to the ongoing discourse.     For Foucault, discourse and the knowledge it produces 
are powerful entities that have a profound impact upon societies, polities and their cultures, 
and his archaeological and genealogical methods sought to examine the way in which 
discourses formed within a society and affected its development over time.   In The 
Archaeology of Knowledge he aimed to, “Uncover the regularity of a discursive practice,” to 
establish the rules by which discourses emerge and form a system of knowledge about a 
topic.22   With genealogy, as first put forward in ‘The Order of Discourse,’ he sought to 
understand how knowledge, and particularly ‘subversive’ knowledge, is formed in discourse 
despite the limitations imposed on discourse within society, an idea linked with Foucault’s 
concern with the history of the other. As such it complemented and filled out the archaeology, 
rather than superseding it.23     
Foucault sought to understand how discourses were formed and developed by situating 
them within their context, acknowledging the various ‘enunciative modalities’ and power 
relationships that govern their formulation.  In The Archaeology of Knowledge he argued that a 
discourse about any given topic is formed out of a number of statements that create a network 
                                                             
20 Bourdieu (1990) pp.78-79.  
21 Pocock (1984) p.41 uses the example of the Red Queen in Alice Through the Looking Glass to discuss 
an understanding of language that puts the speaker in the power of the listener who discerns the 
meaning (pp.31-32).  
22 AK p.161.   
23 OD p.71.  
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of objects, concepts and strategies (or arguments), and that these statements are governed by 
various elements including the speaker or writer, their location, status in society and 
audience.24      By building up a picture of the way in which these elements are formed and 
uttered he presented an understanding of the way in which a discourse is shaped and uttered, 
and becomes the body of knowledge about its topic within a society.25     
Foucault examined the meanings that are associated with particular objects, tracking the 
emergence of the objects  and the ways in which they are discussed in a discourse, and 
identifying the authorities that govern their appearances in these locations.26  The way in 
which objects are brought together by speakers and writers creates the concepts and 
strategies or themes that exist within a discourse.  Formed from statements distributed 
throughout a discourse, concepts present inferences, implications, reasonings or descriptions, 
in which one statement succeeds and depends upon another, with ‘types of dependence’ 
including the rhetorical, logical, critical or descriptive.27   Strategies, meanwhile, are, 
“Organisations of concepts… regroupings of objects… types of enunciation, which form… 
themes or theories.”28  By looking at strategies, Foucault aimed to describe the discourse as a 
whole, creating a picture of its major themes and strands of thought and the way in which they 
emerge from objects, enunciative modalities and concepts.   There may be more than one 
strategy within a discourse but, he argued, there generally is one primary strategy that is 
constituted as the knowledge of a society about a particular topic, against which other 
‘subversive’ forms of knowledge must struggle.29    Statements articulated within a discourse 
form a historical archive which in turn forms the knowledge base within a discourse and 
contributes to the formation of all future statements on the subject.30      Foucault argued that 
                                                             
24 AK pp. 23-85, 121 & 130.  
25 See also White (1987) pp.2-3, who argues that discourse is the ground on which it is decided what 
shall be counted as ‘fact’ and calls the process of discourse constituting objects the “tropics” of 
discourse. 
26 AK pp. 46-47 & 54-58;  OD pp.52-53 
27 AK pp.63-66. 
28 AK pp.71.  
29 AK pp.201, 206-212.  ‘The Order of Discourse’ explores this idea of subversive knowledge, which the 
genealogical exploration of discourse seeks to uncover (pp.69-71).  Sunstein (2006) pp.9-11 notes that 
human knowledge, both that of the individual and of the group, accumulates over time and that 
deliberation allows multiple ‘particles of reason’ to emerge within the society.  At the same time, what 
he calls the ‘Common Knowledge Effect’ (p.84) tends to hold sway: knowledge or information held by 
most members of a group tends to exert the greatest influence over deliberative processes, often 
through ‘cascades’  in which the authority of the powerful or the majority hold sway and prevent those 
who think differently from voicing their dissent (see Sunstein (2001) pp.16ff for a fuller description of 
cascades). 
30 AK pp.144-146; OD pp.56-61.    
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the relationship between statements and the archive was two-way: it being possible for the 
archive to be either respected or rejected by a speaker in their statements, allowing both the 
continued existence and the continued modification of the rules that characterise discursive 
practices.31  This modification, while not always negative, has the potential to introduce 
contradictions and fractures into the archive, which can create conflict in the discourse.  
One of the key elements Foucault saw as governing the formation of discourse, in terms of 
the objects, concepts and strategies that might be discussed in different places and different 
times, was power.  He believed that power and knowledge were interdependent; power 
demanding a field of knowledge in order to form relationships in which one party had 
dominance over another.32    For Foucault power forms relations and functions within a field of 
knowledge, both elements working together as factors upon the enunciation of a statement, 
directing who can say what, and when.  As such power relations have an impact upon the 
ongoing formation of knowledge and ‘truth’ within a discourse.   This is not an absolute truth, 
but rather a Norm, that is formulated through discourse and affected by the power relations 
within that system, and which spreads through power relations as a ‘truth’.  In ‘Truth and 
Power’, Foucault expressed it thus: ‘Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue 
of multiple forms of constraint… Each society has its regime of truth, its “general politics” of 
truth – that is the types of discourse it accepts and makes function as true.’33   
 
3. A discursive constitution 
This thesis posits that Roman knowledge about the constitution of the res publica was 
formed through discourse; the combination of objects and concepts creating strategies and 
finally knowledge about the nature of the res publica and its constitution; and seeks to 
examine the fracturing of this knowledge in the late Republic through the proliferation of 
multiple strategies or understandings of the constitution which competed in Rome’s political 
                                                             
31 In HS p.100 he claims that, “One must conceive of the double conditioning of a strategy by the 
specificity of possible tactics, and of tactics by the strategic envelope that makes them work .” 
32 DP pp.27-8. In ‘Power and Strategies’ Foucault put forward an argument about the way in which 
power exists and functions, seeing it as a fluid force existing in the balance of relationships which is not 
simply repressive but also conditioning and enabling (P/K pp.134-46).  Detel (2005) pp.2 & 45 refers to 
Foucault’s concept as ‘regulatory power’, a power that is not necessarily repressive but productive in a 
definable way, particularly in the production of truth, and sees him as examining its workings on three 
levels: (i) local power relations, in terms of specific historical forms and structures; (ii) the dynamics of 
power and their historical shifts – in narrative terms; (iii) forms of confinement and systems that play 
roles as ‘props and strategies’ embedded into the power base.  Skinner (1989) p.22 describes this as the 
social vocabulary and the social fabric mutually ‘propping each other up’ and legitimating each other.  
33 TP p.131. Cf., P/K p.93, and DP pp.183-4 in which such ‘truth’ is referred to as the norm. 
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discourse to be regarded as the ‘truth’.  To do this, I will employ some of the critical 
approaches discussed here in a description of the understanding of the constitution of the 
Roman res publica as it existed after Caesar’s death, in order to reveal the way in which Roman 
knowledge about the constitution emerged from discussions about proper political action and 
arguments about the ideals that were important and the way in which political structures 
should function.  By looking at the way Cicero and Sallust expressed their ideas about the 
cultural and institutional elements of the res publica it will be possible to gain a picture of the 
way in which Roman discourse about the constitution was formulated and the knowledge of its 
nature established. By situating their work within the period in which it was produced we will 
be able to see not only how the writers’ and speakers’ statements were influenced by their 
context (the ‘enunciative modalities’) but how they, in their turn, influenced subsequent 
statements.   They became the context for the ongoing discourse, shaping the interpretation 
and expression of others’ understandings of the constitution and, through Rome’s decision-
making processes, shaping the Roman constitution itself.    In this regard, the constitution of 
the res publica can be said to be a discursive entity; interpreted, experienced and altered 
through discourse.  
When considering the formulation and expression of political and constitutional knowledge 
in discourse it can be helpful to think in terms of ideology.  We are familiar with the argument 
that the knowledge that makes up ideology is not a set of absolute truths but a scheme of 
ideas, usually political, whose normativity is supported by its expression by those in positions 
of power.   Studies of ideology since the latter half of the twentieth century have shown that it 
cannot be understood as a unified block of thought imposed upon the people by their rulers, 
but as a contested entity mediating between the rulers and the ruled. 34  Althusser’s 
‘Ideological State Apparatuses’ (political and societal institutions) are important in the creation 
and dissemination of ideology, which ‘hails’ individuals to identify themselves as subjects 
                                                             
34 Connolly (2007) pp.38-39 gives an overview of recent thinking about ideology.   Althusser (1971) is a 
proponent of the traditional view arguing that ideology is propagated from the top down through state 
apparatuses (institutions including the courts, prisons, government, the police and the army) and what 
he calls ‘Ideological State Apparatuses’ (ISAs), including the church, schools, family, political parties, 
media and culture, which educate and reproduce the ideology of the society.   Connolly cites Gramsci 
(1991) as a turning point in thinking about ideology from Althusser’s rigid terms towards a more fluid 
understanding of ideology as a combination of elements, which may be successfully articulated by a 
group seeking hegemony within a society in order to appeal to others.  This idea is echoed by Laclau and 
Mouffe (1985) who argue that ideology is a political relationship that exists in a constant state of change 
and cannot be conceived as ‘the irradiation of effects from a privileged point’ (p.141), and by Žižek 
(1994b) pp.3 & 6 who sees the idea that we can critique ideology as something exempt from the turmoil 
of social life as part of ideology.  
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within it but this process does not work solely in a top down fashion.35  Euben has argued that 
the meanings with which people identify are arrived at through dialogue – a process of 
negotiation which Laclau and Mouffe have described as ‘suturing’, a continual pulling together 
of the body politic.36    Ideology emerges from a discursive process involving debate and 
negotiation, but it is rarely uncontested or universally accepted by all the members of a polity.  
The production of constitutional knowledge occurs in the same way. The understanding of 
any constitution is formed discursively, out of the things that can be and are said about it.  
Cass Sunstein has noted that constitutional understandings are a product of political processes 
carried out over time, arguing that the meaning of a constitution is made, rather than found, 
through a process of interpretation.37   This ‘meaning’ or understanding of a constitution arises 
from discourse about it as various participants make claims as to its nature and the proper 
course of action under it within the political process. These processes lead to the 
establishment of an understanding of the constitution through negotiation and decision-
making: for example in elections, debates about legislation, or court cases.    As with ideology, 
this process of interpreting and understanding a constitution is rarely uncontested: there is 
more than one constitutional strategy or understanding in any discourse: although there may 
be one dominant strand there are others that subvert, counter or compete with this and which 
may, in time break through, leading to a fracturing in the political knowledge of a polity or to 
the formation of a new knowledge or ‘truth’, if the participants in the discourse find a way to 
negotiate between their  competing claims.  
The process by which constitutional knowledge is formulated within a polity has an impact 
upon the constitution of that polity.   Giddens has discussed the idea of ‘knowledgeability’, by 
which he means, “All those things the members of the society know about that society, and 
the conditions of their activity within it.”38  This knowledge is not entirely cognitive or 
                                                             
35 Althusser (1971) p.47; Morstein-Marx (2004) p.15.  
36 Euben (1997) p.145; Laclau and Mouffe (1985) p.88 n.1 notes that the idea of the suture implies that 
something is lacking, at the same time as it attempts to fill-in the gap, cf., Barrett (1994) p.249. 
Morstein-Marx (2004) especially pp.14-16, and Connolly (2007), p.43 have examined the creation of 
ideology in the late Roman Republic, noting its formation points in the discourse of the contio and in the 
presentation of rhetorical theory, and emphasising that Roman republican ideology was not simply a 
case of the elite pandering to the masses, but that what Connolly calls the ‘extrahegemonic.’  The voice 
of those who were not members of the elite, was a critical element in the creation of the ideology. 
37 Sunstein (2009) pp.3, 23.  He argues that even when there is a written constitution its meaning, for 
the polity, must still be interpreted.  A Constitution of Many Minds explores the way in which this takes 
place in the United States, and follows on from his work on the creation and dissemination of opinion 
and knowledge in general. 
38 Giddens (1982) p.9. 
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conscious but reflexive within the continuity of human action and discourse; sometimes self-
conscious and discursive (in which the agent can give account of his actions) and sometimes 
unselfconscious, reflecting a tacit, practical knowledge employed in action but which the agent 
is not able fully to explain.39  It is this ‘knowledgeability’ and the human actions – both verbal 
and behavioural – that are rooted in it that are responsible for the reproduction of society in 
Giddens’ theory of structuration.  ‘Structuration’ is concerned with the reproduction and 
changing of social practices across space and time, and the conditions that govern this 
process.40   He argues that this reproduction and constitution of society is the accomplishment 
of its members, albeit in a manner they do not wholly intend or comprehend through the 
‘unintended consequences’ of their actions.41  This idea can also be applied to the 
reproduction of the constitution of a polity, as the citizens’ knowledge about it guides their 
actions and reproduces it within their society.    
 
4. The discursive constitution of Rome 
Roman political discourse had a dual role in the res publica: it created knowledge about the 
constitution and thence the constitution itself, and also made use of this knowledge in the 
political decision making process.42  Roman knowledgeability about the constitution expressed 
in political discourse shaped what the res publica would do and what it would become as 
particular arguments attached to an understanding of the constitution, guided action and 
became  precedents for the future.  In such a situation, the constitution itself is a discursive 
entity, evolving over time through political decision-making processes that depend upon 
argument and discourse.  A change or fracture in the understanding of the nature of the 
constitution could rapidly become part of the discourse and a precedent (part of Foucault’s 
‘archive’ or Giddens’ ‘knowledgeability’) for future discourse and decisions.   In such a situation 
the contest between different understandings of the constitution becomes not just a struggle 
for true knowledge about the nature of the constitution, but also a struggle for the future 
development of the constitution and the future of the polity as a whole.    
                                                             
39 Giddens (1982) p.31; Giddens (1984) pp.1-14.  In an examination of discourse, such as was outlined 
above, the actions arising from both kinds of knowledge are statements in the discourse.  
40 Giddens (1982) p.35; Giddens (1984) pp.1-14.  
41 Giddens (1982) pp.8-10, 32; Giddens (1984) pp.1-14; Giddens (1976) pp.102-113; Giddens (1979) 
pp.59-73. 
42 See Giddens (1982) pp.8-10 & Giddens (1979) pp.59-73 on the duality of the structure of society and 
its recursiveness (by which he means that the structure is the medium and the outcome of the 
reproductive practices).  
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In Roman political discourse, both that enacted in the very public sphere of the forum and 
the Senate and that taking place in the more restricted spheres of philosophy, historiography 
or letter writing, the objects under discussion included those elements that made up the res 
publica – its institutions, its values and its citizens.43   Through this discourse the meanings, 
functions and roles of these objects were interpreted and negotiated to form understandings 
of and knowledge about the constitution.    The discourse described and informed events and 
actions as part of the political process, but also created and perpetuated perceived truths and 
natural parameters of political action.44   At its more theoretical end, it also sought to 
understand and refine the processes in which citizens made decisions and consensus was 
forged – the way in which public knowledge was formed.45   However, the discursive process 
was not always successful, in terms of leading to a unified and universally accepted 
understanding of the constitution, and this created problems for the res publica.      
In looking at Roman political discourse it is necessary to examine the statements made by 
writers and speakers about the res publica and its constitution in order to uncover the key 
objects that existed and major strategies and positions with which individuals and groups were 
encouraged to identify.    In order to break down the discourse and establish the ideas and 
arguments that made up Roman understandings of the constitution we need to start by 
identifying the themes that existed in Roman thinking about the res publica and its 
constitution.  Sallust’s argument that the decline of morality had contributed to the decline of 
Rome is such a theme, as is Cicero’s claim that the best interests of the res publica and the 
best interests of the citizen could not be separated. These understandings and arguments may 
                                                             
43 While there was a concept of public and private in Rome, the division between them was not black 
and white but rather multi-layered. It would perhaps be better to say that there was a sliding scale of 
action from public to private, ranging from the words of the orator speaking in the forum or the deeds 
of the consul at the most public end to the retirement of an individual from Rome to sit at home and 
disengage from politics – which in itself could be seen as a political act. ‘Private’ activities, such as 
philosophy or the writing of history, which technically took place out of the public eye, were not held to 
be irrelevant to public political life; hence Cato’s claim that one should give an account of one’s leisure 
time as well as one’s business ( Cat., Orig., fr.2P; 1.2C).    In a polity where the majority of those vying for 
promotion or office, knew or knew of each other, no communication could be truly private and 
apolitical, and with the character, lifestyle and behaviour of aspiring political figures an accepted point 
of discussion in campaigns and legal cases there was no aspect of life that could be considered truly 
private.  To hold the status privatus, was not to have privacy, as we understand it today, but rather it 
was to not hold the legal status of a magistrate. See, for example, Cicero (Leg. Man., 61) describing 
Pompeius as having been an “adulescentulus privatus” when he raised an army on Sulla’s return to 
Rome.  
44 Morstein-Marx (2004) p.14.   He discusses contional speeches, but this claim applies for all Roman 
discourse.  
45 Connolly (2007) p.3.  
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be equated to Foucault’s idea of ‘strategies’ and are the easiest element of a discourse to pick 
out, for they are the major political themes that emerge as Cicero and Sallust express their 
understanding of what was happening and had happened to the res publica.     
From this point we can work almost in reverse as regards to Foucault’s presentation of 
discursive elements in The Archaeology of Knowledge.46   Once we have established the 
strategies that exist within the discourse, we can begin to analyse the various concepts and 
objects from which they are constructed.  In order to do this we must identify the key terms in 
the political discourse which signify the ideas and institutions that the Romans understood as 
being critical to their res publica.47  These elements include institutional bodies such as the 
Senate, the popular assemblies, and the magistracies, and political ideas including libertas, 
virtus and gloria.  From this point it will be possible to analyse the ways in which they are 
understood and examine the ways in which they are related to each other within in the 
discourse in order to express the speaker/writer’s understanding of the constitution.  
To gain further insight into Roman understandings of the constitution we must also 
consider what was said, where and by whom, establishing the context and parameters of 
discourse within which objects, concepts and strategies were defined and knowledge about 
the res publica formed.  This means asking who made the statements being examined, when 
and where they made them, what their position was, and why they uttered the statement.  It 
is here that an assessment of the power relationships in which Sallust and Cicero stood will be 
important, as these, which marked their positions at Rome,  will have been a factor influencing 
their contributions to the discourse.    These enunciative modalities, as Foucault calls them, 
guided the expression of thought about the constitution in discourse.  However, although they 
did present qualifications as to what might or might not be said for an argument about the res 
publica to be successfully received, they were not simply a limiting factor as they also provided 
                                                             
46 AK pp.23-85 
47 Williams (1976) p.21 argued that a study of variations and confusions of meaning may help improve 
our understanding of history, by taking words at the level at which they are generally used and 
examining the changes in their meanings over time.  Skinner (1989) pp.7-8 & 20-22 also argued that  
studying vocabulary could give insight into changing social beliefs, theories, perceptions, values and 
attitudes, but sought to clarify the importance of looking at political concepts, not just words, arguing 
that use of the word does not presuppose understanding of the concept and vice versa.   This is also true 
of Rome: Cicero’s definition of one of his four cardinal virtues as, “(That concerned) with the 
conservation of organised society, with rendering to every man his due and with the faithful discharge 
of obligations assumed,” is hardly a concept attached to one specific word, although those he 
predominantly associates with it are iustitia (justice) and benevolentia (kindness) – nonetheless, it 
remains a political concept. However, the majority of concepts discussed in this thesis are tied to 
specific terms, although not all understandings of these concepts are the same.  
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the arguments that the writers under discussion wished to critique and counter. They were an 
inspiration, as well as a restriction.48   
   An analysis such as that outlined above will show the way in which strategies emerged 
and were employed in discourse, and reveal the existence of different understandings of the 
constitution.    The danger of such fractured knowledge about the constitution can be seen if 
one considers what a hegemonic knowledge or a coherent ideology offers a society.   As was 
noted above, Laclau and Mouffe have referred to the creation of knowledge from discourse as 
a suture holding the society together, and Giddens has noted the importance of discourse in 
the reproduction of societal systems.   More bleakly, Pocock and Žižek have both argued that 
the formulation of ideology is driven by a human fear of failure, isolation and death, and the 
search for a sense of partnership, completeness and virtue. Without it, the citizens of a polity 
are not truly part of a community that can be sustained through discursive processes.49    If the 
suture splits, fault lines emerge in the understanding of the constitution of the polity, leading 
to tensions between its members as each pursues actions in accordance with their 
understanding of the constitution.  The friction between these understandings affects the 
formulation and reproduction of knowledge about the constitution as each side makes claims 
in support of their point of view, creating further fractures in the common understanding of 
the res publica. The fracturing of constitutional knowledge means that the constitution will not 
be reproduced perfectly, but will be reinterpreted and will change.  This change is not 
necessarily negative; the way it is understood depends upon the commentator’s point-of-view.  
However, as we will see, both Cicero and Sallust saw the changes that took place in Rome’s 
constitution as negative and detrimental to the res publica. 
  A discursive analysis of the work of Cicero and Sallust and the situation in Rome in 44-43 
also reveals the problems that these different understandings of the constitution created for 
the res publica.  Practically speaking the political discourse of the Roman Republic, post-
Caesar, was part of the ongoing struggle for political power and the government of Rome.  The 
process of discourse, through which audiences were encouraged to identify with particular 
positions and understandings of the constitution, was important as it directed the behaviour of 
                                                             
48 Cicero’s Philippics are particularly important in looking at the effect of enunciative modalities upon 
discourse as they were presented variously to the Senate and the people, and in the case of the second, 
in pamphlet form with a possibly limited distribution (see Manuwald (2007) pp.59 and Ramsey (2003) 
pp.157-159 on the publication of the Second Philippic).  As such they reveal the way in which the 
utterance of statements about Roman politics was influenced by factors external to the speaker and 
how different understandings of the constitution emerged at Rome.  
49 Pocock (1972) pp.87-88; Žižek (1989) pp.5, 124-125. 
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its subjects as they participated in politics, and had a practical impact upon events. The 
fracturing of Roman knowledge about the constitution meant that the citizens were driven in 
different directions depending upon which arguments and understandings they accepted, 
splitting Rome.   A shared understanding of the constitution of the res publica could not be 
negotiated, and eventually the discord turned violent and the Republic succumbed to civil war.     
This process can be seen particularly clearly when looking at Cicero’s arguments about the res 
publica in the Philippics in which he seeks to convince his audiences of the truth of his 
understanding of Rome and to follow his proposals for political action against Antonius.  His 
arguments played an important role in driving events onwards; his refusal to negotiate with 
Antonius contributing to Antonius’ being pushed out of the res publica and towards military 
action.     
 
In conclusion 
The adaption and employment of modern theoretical approaches to discourse and to 
political thought and action enables a new appreciation of the Roman constitution as a 
discursive entity, created, directed and maintained through discursive processes which 
employed understandings of the constitution as arguments for action.    It also enables us to 
put forward a new answer to the question of why the Republic was not restored after the 
death of Caesar. Christian Meier has asked, “How is it possible for an order to collapse when all 
who have a share in it regard it as a proper order... how is it possible for it to be destroyed by 
those who have a share in it, in the absence of any extraneous influence – to be destroyed 
when no one wishes to attack it, to be annihilated when no one repudiates it?”50   He argued 
that the downfall of the Republic resulted from the contradiction between the forms of the 
communal state and the exigencies of a world empire, and claimed that in this ‘crisis without 
alternative’ there was no conflict about the order, but about the price of the order.51  This 
account will argue that there was conflict about the nature of the political order.  Once we 
understand that knowledge about the nature of the Roman constitution was formulated 
through the discourse about it and could be changed through the same process, it becomes 
clear that the constitution was not simply a collection of static institutions but also the values 
and practices that allowed them to function, and did not exist in a monolithic form but was 
                                                             
50 Meier (1996) pp.349-350.   
51 Ibid. pp.353, 354.  The idea of ‘crisis without alternative’ is explored in Meier (1966), especially 
pp.201-207.  
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discussed and contested by the citizens of the res publica.  The contestation of the nature of 
the constitution, of what the ‘proper order’ ought to be split Rome.   In the end, it became 
impossible to ‘restore’ the Republic, because there was no unified understanding of what its 
constitution should be.  The multiple, fractured understandings of the nature of the res publica 
that existed in Rome after Caesar’s death prompted conflicting proposals for action from the 
various participants in the discourse that led, in the end, to armed conflict.  
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Chapter Two: The Struggle for the Republic 
 
  Marincola has noted of historiography that, “Form and content cannot be divorced from 
the context within which the work was produced.”1   The same may be said of political 
discourse, which is shaped by the events, situations, arguments and ideas to which its 
statements respond.    In Rome in 44-43 the participants in the discourse all responded to each 
other, as well as to the critical event - Caesar’s death.   All of the statements made after his 
assassination had an impact upon those that followed: each understanding of the constitution 
affected the statements of those who held it, which in turn had an impact upon the words and 
deeds of those with whom they engaged in discourse, forming events and influencing the 
responses to them.  In order to establish the reasons behind the failure to restore the Republic 
after the assassination of Caesar, it is necessary to describe the way in which the constitution 
of the res publica was expressed by participants in the discourse in order to reveal the 
different understandings of the constitution that were held and the impact they had upon 
events in Rome.    To this end, this chapter will examine the verbal and behavioural discourse 
of the major players at Rome immediately after Caesar’s death, with the exception of Cicero, 
looking at their statements about the constitution.   
  That the Republic was not restored was not wholly the result of the conspirators’ own 
indecision and failures or the better decision-making or more cunning manoeuvring of other 
men; it was also the consequence of a contested understanding of the constitution of the res 
publica in Rome at large.  There was no unified sense of the ‘true nature’ of the constitution: 
the understandings of the two Brutii and Cassius conflicted with each other, as well as with 
those of Cicero - not to mention those of M. Antonius, Octavian or the other senators who 
played a role in shaping events.  This conflict was reflected in the decision-making processes of 
Roman politics and had a knock-on effect upon the events that followed.    This chapter will 
first look at Caesar’s dictatorship and the understanding of the constitution that it expressed, 
as it was to this as well as to Caesar’s assassination that Rome’s political discourse responded 
in 44-43.  Then we will turn to the events that followed Caesar’s death, looking at them 
through the discourse – verbal and behavioural - of the conspirators, Antonius, Octavian, the 
Senate and the People, and examining them for the understandings of the constitution that 
they expressed.   From this, we will be able to see some of the multiple understandings of the 
                                                             
1 Marincola (1999) p.309.  
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constitution that existed at Rome and understand the impact that the fracturing of Roman 
knowledge of the constitution had upon events.  
   
1. Caesar’s Dictatorship 
Caesar’s dictatorship was a moment of difference for the governance of the res publica, in 
the Republican era.2  His victory over Pompeius in the civil war gave put him in an exceptional 
position of power, with which many of his fellow Romans struggled to come to terms, and 
which affected Rome’s political discourse about the proper nature of the constitution.3   
Caesar’s dictatorship was taken up at first to give him an official role in Rome in 49 and then 
set aside before being taken up again after his defeat of Pompeius, and then reiterated, 
initially for ten years, before being turned into a dictatorship for life.4    Mommsen argued that 
from 46 Caesar’s title was dictator rei publicae constituendae and that his ‘function’ in this 
office was to restore or settle the res publica.5   For Caesar, however, the dictatorship seems to 
have been as much a way of legitimising his extraordinary power within the res publica, as it 
was an office with a function for him to fill, and its long-term endowment smacked of regnum 
to many in the Senate.6    Meier notes that the Senate, in granting powers and praises to 
Caesar, gave him nothing he could not have taken for himself.  This was a problem for many of 
those who had been and felt they ought to be his peers: Caesar governed Rome as he had led 
his army, without debate or reference to others.7     
The life and career of Caesar shaped Roman discourse about the nature of the res publica 
after his death.8  His dictatorship created a rupture in the res publica, establishing a new 
                                                             
2 The idea of ‘différance’ established in Derrida (2001) pp.36-76 plays on the fact that ‘différer’ means 
both ‘to defer’ and ‘to differ’.  Caesar’s dictatorship was both different from what had gone before and 
deferred the processes that many associated with the ‘normal’ processes and ideals of the governance 
of the res publica.   
3 Cicero’s writing during the period shows him struggling to come to terms with Caesar’s dominance at 
Rome and decide upon his own course of action in response to it.   See, for example Dugan (2005) and 
Gildenhard (2007) for readings of some of the texts Cicero wrote during Caesar’s dictatorship.   
4 MRR 2.256, 272, 286, 294, 305 & 317-318; Caes., B Civ., 2.20-21; Suet., Iul., 35, 37, 41-43; Plut., Vit. 
Caes., 37, 49-52, 57, 61.3; App., B Civ., 2.47, 90-95, 106; 3.11; Dio 41.24.1, 36-38; 42.20.3, 21.1, 41-56; 
43.1.1, 14.3-4; 44.4-6.    
5 Mommsen (1952-69) p.328; Cf., Syme (1939) p.52; Badian (1990).  Meier (1996) p.437 argues that 
Caesar had not been charged with the task of restoring the res publica but that the responsibility lay 
with him – something (p.439) he notes that Cicero pointed this out, using the terms ‘rem publicam 
constituere.’ (Marc., 27.1). 
6 Rawson (1992a) p.463 
7 Meier (1996) pp.434, 448. 
8 Goldsworthy (2006) p.3 suggests that the condition of the Republic may have been terminal in the 
period this thesis considers because of Caesars’s own actions.  The existence of the dictatorship itself, as 
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understanding of the constitution in Rome’s political discourse, one in which individual 
dominance was both possible and acceptable.     Meier has argued that Caesar did not seek to 
establish a ‘new’ res publica, because there was no dissatisfaction with the old order.9   
However, Caesar’s dictatorship and the response it drew show that although there was no 
desire to abandon the res publica, there was debate over the constitution of Rome.  Caesar’s 
behaviour before and during his dictatorship shows a particular understanding of the res 
publica’s constitution, which came into conflict with that held by others in the Senate.   Caesar 
claimed to be seeking to free Rome from a small faction (factio paucorum) and to be defending 
the rights of Rome’s tribunes.10   However, his behaviour showed an understanding of the 
constitution that revolved around his own rights as a citizen of Rome.   Suetonius quoted 
Caesar has having said, after the battle of Pharsalus, “I after all my victories, would have been 
condemned in the courts if I had not sought the aid of my army.”11  For Caesar, the 
constitution of the res publica should respect and preserve the dignitas and honour a citizen 
could earn through the holding of office and the performance of great deeds and in which the 
citizen whose dignitas was slighted could defend his position.12  This illustrates Caesar’s 
emphasis on the importance of the individual citizen in the res publica.  Meier argued that 
Caesar thought in terms of individuals and was not sensitive to the political institutions and 
processes of Rome, as others were.  The Senate, as a body meant nothing to him, unless they 
obstructed him; he dealt with and competed with individual Senators as friends, neutrals and 
opponents.13  Thus, while he claimed to be defending the rights of the tribunes in 49, he was 
willing to override them when they obstructed him.14  
Caesar’s dictatorship overrode the competitive aspects of Roman politics.  He could 
nominate his preferred candidates for the magistracies, and even if he did not generally 
exercise this, he oversaw elections and influenced them by the presence of his power. 15   With 
Caesar as dictator there was no equality of opportunity for success in Roman politics.   In 49 
Caesar had emphasised his need (and right) to defend his dignitas as a justification for his 
march on Rome, but his determination to maintain his position at the top of the tree denied 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
much as any of the measures Caesar passed or the things that he did, created a rupture with what many 
seem to have understood the res publica to be (see Syme (1939)  p.59). 
9 Meier (1996) pp.471-472.  
10 Caes., B Civ., 1.5-7, 22. 
11 Suet., Iul., 30.4, claiming to repeat Pollio’s direct quote (Rawson (1992a) p.433). 
12 Caes. B Civ., 1.7.1, 7; 1.9.2.   
13 Meier (1996) pp.358-359, 449.  
14 Caes., B Civ., 1.32-3; Dio 41.15-16; App., B Civ., 2.41; Cic., Att., 10.4.8, 10.9a.1. Rawson (1992a) p.430. 
15 Meier (1996) pp.432, 434. 
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others the opportunity to shine and engendered resentment.  Caesar’s claim to mercy 
emphasised this, for his exercise of it set him apart from his fellow citizens.  It was a quality 
that some of his peers and rivals felt that he had no right to exercise for it implied his 
superiority over them.16   Under Caesar’s dictatorship success in Roman political life came to 
be based on one’s relationship with the Big Man, as much as on any other qualifications.   Nor 
would any other man be able to attain even temporary pre-eminence in Rome, without 
defeating Caesar or removing him from the political equation in another way.   
 Caesar’s dictatorship provided an object against which other understandings of the res 
publica could be formulated: understandings in which there should and could be no one 
dominant individual, or in which the Senate held the balance of power through its auctoritas 
and the people were not as important as they had been as a power-base for Caesar.  Rawson 
has suggested that Cicero was so concerned with Caesar’s “cavalier way” with Republican 
forms that he did not try to understand the measures he passed.17  However, for Cicero – and 
for others – the very fact of the dictatorship’s existence was enough: it did not matter what 
Caesar did with his office, its presence and his dominance went against the constitution of the 
res publica as they understood it.   It also provided a model for an understanding of the res 
publica for other ambitious individuals who did seek pre-eminence; an example of how the res 
publica could, and perhaps should, be which could be echoed (for example by Antonius) or 
refined (as by Octavian).  Caesar’s dictatorship also influenced Rome’s discourse in more direct 
ways, for it was Caesar who had established Antonius as his lieutenant and consular college, 
Lepidus as his magister equitum, Dolabella as suffect consul (for when Caesar would leave for 
the east), and Octavian as his heir.    These individuals all played an important role in Roman 
politics after Caesar’s death, able to participate in discourse and influence events from 
positions of authority in which they had been put by Caesar.  
 
                                                             
16 Caes., B Civ., 1.6; Plut., Vit. Cat. Min., 58-70; Rawson (1992a) p. 425; Weinstock (1971) pp.233-243 on 
clementia argues that it was a traditional virtue, one of two possible answers of what to do with the 
vanquished, and that it was rare in political usage until the civil war, when Cicero began to apply it to 
Caesar with a vengeance.  Whilst Caesar referred to his own misericordia and lenitas (Caes., B Civ., 
1.72.3, 74.7, 84; 3.98.2), Cicero referred to Caesar’s clementia (Cic., Marc., 1.5, 18.5; Lig., 6.4, 10.1, 15.5, 
19.10; Deiot., 8.8; Att., 8.9a.2; 9.16.1; Fam., 15.15.2), making a virtue of the res publica into a personal 
quality, and a negative one. Cicero later criticised Brutus for saying he would show clementia (Cic., Brut., 
2.5.5; 1.2a.2).  This is in contrast to the later Yavetz (1983) p.175, who expresses doubts that clementia 
was defined as the leniency of a superior towards an inferior in the 40s.  The concept does not have to 
be clearly defined for the resentment to be felt – and such an understanding must begin its formation 
somewhere.  
17 Rawson (1992a) p.439.  
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2. The Conspirators 
As the assassins of the dictator, the conspirators’ understanding of the constitution was 
naturally formulated and expressed in reaction to Caesar.   Their words and deeds did not 
express an understanding of the constitution as something that needed to be re-established; 
rather they seem to have seen it as something concrete that had been suppressed for a while 
but which would return to life once the suppressing force was removed. 18  The cautious 
behaviour of the conspirators and their reluctance to impose their will upon subsequent 
events has been seen as a mark of their lack of preparation and a failure to anticipate the 
problems that would follow Caesar’s removal.19   This may have been true, but it also reflects 
an understanding of the constitution.  Their understanding of the constitution allowed free 
competition between members of the Roman elite and placed the Senate at the core of the 
decision-making process, expecting them to guide the populus and the populus to follow the 
Senate’s lead.   In their perception of the situation at Rome, Caesar’s dominance was 
unconstitutional and had suppressed Rome’s proper constitution, but once he was removed it 
would be able to function as it should.  Nonetheless, their behaviour does reveal a lack of 
recognition that theirs was not the only understanding of the res publica that had currency at 
Rome, and that they would need to engage in further discourse in order to restore the 
constitution as they wished it to be.    They failed to realise fully the necessity of arguing for 
their vision before their fellow citizens, a failure that handed the initiative in subsequent 
events to others.    
The understanding of the constitution expressed by the conspirators in the immediate 
aftermath of Caesar’s death seems to have been guided by the voice of M. Brutus.20  As the 
alleged descendant of L. Junius Brutus, the Expeller of Kings, he was the inheritor of what may 
be called a discourse of liberation, in which the claim of saving the res publica was tied to the 
call for libertas and freedom from tyranny.   Cicero implied as much in the Brutus, a text that 
begins with L. Brutus as the first Roman orator and establisher of the res publica and ends with 
Cicero’s grief over the early termination of Brutus’ career as an orator due to the death of the 
res publica, and which offers a definition of virtus that includes the imitation of the example of 
                                                             
18 As Syme (1939) p.97 said: “They had no further plans – the tyrant was slain, therefore liberty was 
restored.” 
19 Ibid. p.97ff.  See Rawson (1992b); Osgood (2006); Manuwald (2007) pp.9-31 for full narrative accounts 
of events at Rome in 44-43 B.C,  the key sources for which are Cicero’s letters and speeches, Appian’s 
Bellum Civile, Dio books 44-46 and Plutarch’s lives of Cicero, Antonius and Brutus. 
20 Rawson (1992b) p.192.  
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one’s ancestors, something which for Brutus, his interlocutor and dedicatee, requires direct 
action.21  Appian’s report that Brutus had rejected the suggestion that Antonius should also be 
killed by saying that it would be the act of partisans of Pompeius suggests he understood the 
res publica as a polity in which it was only acceptable to set aside the legal prohibition upon 
murder in the case of a tyrant in order to liberate the res publica.22    Such an understanding of 
their action in relation to the constitution may explain the conspirators’ eschewal of violence 
and their reluctance to ensure the res publica was reordered according to their understanding 
of the constitution; they did not want to dominate the res publica or be thought to be 
establishing another oppressive regime.23   
That Brutus had to (or was said to have had to) reject the assassination of Antonius shows 
that there were differences of opinion between the conspirators about the action it was 
legitimate to take in defence of the constitution.   Whatever any other member of the group 
considered the safest and most effective course of action, Brutus’ argument that their action 
must be justifiable as an act of liberation from a tyrant seems to have been accepted.   
However, as the constitutional understandings and ambitions of Antonius and Octavian started 
to threaten the initial settlement of March 44, the conspirators had to respond in order to 
defend themselves and the res publica, as they held it to be.  In the different courses of action 
that they took, their different understandings of the constitution become plain to see, and 
each had its own impact on events at Rome and on the ongoing political discourse.24 
Decimus Brutus was the first to take direct action in defence of his res publica, his refusal to 
surrender Cisalpine Gaul proclaiming his rejection of Antonius’ alteration of the provincial 
allotments.25   His stand against Antonius was encouraged by Cicero, who pleaded with 
                                                             
21 Cic., Brut., 53, 331ff. Dugan (2005) pp.173-243 explores the relation between Cicero and Caesar in the 
Brutus, noting that in the text the evolution of oratory, and thus the survival of Rome (for oratory is the 
lifeblood of the res publica), depends upon successful imitation of exemplary predecessors.  A similar 
call is made to Brutus in the Tusculan Disputations (see Gildenhard (2007) pp.93-4 on Cicero’s use of 
literature to bring Brutus round to his political viewpoint). 
22 App., B Civ., 2.115; Cf., Plut., Vit. Ant., 13. 
23 While the account of events provided by Dio cannot be taken as accurate his comment (44.19.2) that 
the conspirators feared being accused of slaying Caesar to gain supreme power suggests that such a 
concern would not be considered surprising or irrational.  
24 With M. Brutus and Cassius having left Rome for safety reasons soon after Caesar’s funeral, and D. 
Brutus taking up his proconsulship in Cisalpine Gaul, the three most prominent conspirators were 
unable to speak in Rome and thus affect events through verbal discourse. In this situation, their 
different understandings of the res publica were revealed through their actions more than their words, 
and their actions revealed slightly different understandings of the res publica.  
25 Decimus, who was praetor in 45 (MRR 2. 307, 328) had been appointed to Cisalpine Gaul by Caesar 
(App., B Civ., 2.214).  Antonius called an assembly on 2 June 44 B.C., which Rawson (1992b) p.474 
describes as, “Trebly irregular,” and at this meeting effected legislation to exchange his province of 
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Decimus to, “Liberate the res publica for ever from despotic rule.”26  Whether Decimus’ stand 
against Antonius stemmed primarily from an understanding of the constitution which held 
Antonius’ manipulation of the Senate and the provincial allotment to be illegal or from self-
interest must remain speculation, but it does show that he believed his stance was justifiable 
as a defence of the constitution.  His behaviour shaped Roman discourse about the 
constitution and the future of the res publica as it provoked Antonius to further action and to 
the expression of statements about the nature of the res publica (as quoted by Cicero in the 
Thirteenth Philippic), and helped shape Cicero’s expression of his conception of the legitimate 
action of the citizen within the res publica – arguments that also helped give Octavian a legal 
position of power. 
M. Brutus and Cassius left Italy in the summer of 44; Brutus heading to Greece whilst 
Cassius temporarily disappeared off the map, eventually reappearing in Syria where he had 
served as quaestor, holding the province after Crassus’ death at Carrhae.27   As Octavian and 
Antonius raised armies in Italy and began to threaten the conspirators with reprisals Brutus 
and Cassius also began to raise support.   However, they proceeded in different ways, 
reflecting different understandings of the constitution.    Brutus took control of Macedonia 
from Q. Hortensius peacefully and though he went on to capture C. Antonius, he treated him 
with careful propriety until after the formation of the second triumvirate, when he ordered his 
execution.28   His position as proconsul in Macedonia was swiftly legitimised by the Senate, on 
Cicero’s motion.29   Brutus seems to have held an idealistic understanding of the res publica: 
efficacy, even in defence of the constitution, was not enough justification for action.  He wrote 
to Cicero from Greece, declaring that, “What the Senate has not yet decreed, nor the Roman 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Macedonia for Cisalpine Gaul.  Cic., Phil., 1.6 describes this meeting, emphasising the use of violence 
and the popular assembly over the Senate.    For Cicero’s account of D. Brutus’ actions see Fam., 11.5-
11.6 and the Third to Sixth Philippics. Cf., App., B Civ., 3.49, 51 and Dio 45.14. 
26 Cic., Fam., 11.5.   Cf., Fam., 11.7.2.   
27 Cic., Fam., 12.4.2; 5.1; 11.1 reveal the uncertainty of Cassius’ location.  Broughton calls Appian’s claim 
that Caesar had assigned Syria to Cassius and Macedonia to Brutus, “A mistaken assertion” (MRR 2.321). 
Rawson (1992b) p.475 says that Appian’s statement (B Civ., 3.8) was probably a justification of their 
later seizure of these areas. 
28 Ibid. p.481.   Cicero and Brutus discussed the fate of C. Antonius in a series of letters (Cic., Ad Brut., 
1.4.2; 2.3.2; 2.4.3; 2.5.5), with Cicero initially advocating custody and then comparing all three Antonii to 
Dolabella, who had been declared a hostis by the Senate. Brutus disagrees with Cicero over his 
classification of the Antonii as hostes, arguing that only the Senate or people can pass such judgement.  
See Plut., Vit. Brut., 26.3-5; Vit. Ant., 22.4; App., B Civ., 3.79 and Dio 47.25.1 for the later execution of C. 
Antonius.  
29 Cic., Phil., 10.   
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People ordered, I do not take it upon myself to prejudge, I do not make myself the arbiter.”30  
In a free res publica (such as he believed Rome was, after Caesar’s death), the individual could 
not act as he saw fit with impunity, but must wait for the Senate and people of Rome to direct 
him.  Cassius’ understanding of the constitution, on the other hand, was more pragmatic.     
Although his position in Syria was not legalised until after Mutina, despite Cicero’s proposal in 
the Eleventh Philippic,31 he did not wait to move against those he saw as the enemies of Rome, 
proceeding to raise an army and pursue Dolabella without being authorised to do so by the 
Senate or people.32  As with Decimus Brutus we cannot distinguish the self-interest of the 
individual from his understanding of the constitution in their deeds – it is possible that Cassius 
saw his actions as the best way of securing the conspirators’ safety from Antonius and 
Octavian and also as a legitimate defence of the best interests of the res publica.33 
 Despite the differences between the conspirators’ understandings of the constitution with 
regard to constitutional action, their statements regarding their activities continued to express 
a consistent theme: the service of Rome, and the liberation and securing of the res publica 
from tyranny in order to uphold the constitution – a constitution under which no one citizen 
could dominate the res publica.  Their behaviour changed over time in response to the words 
and deeds of others, forced into further action in order to protect themselves and, as they saw 
it, to defend the res publica against the potential tyranny of Antonius.   This revealed their 
different understandings of what this constitution should be contributed to the ongoing 
discourse about the constitution as it provoked responses from the other political actors about 
the nature and future of the res publica, both in support and in opposition to them.   It is 
indicative of the fracturing of Roman knowledge about the nature of constitution that, even 
amongst men with a shared ambition to free the res publica from the domination of an 
individual, there was no uniform vision of what that polity should be.     
 
3. Antonius 
In contrast to the conspirators, Antonius’ understanding of the constitution of the res 
publica resembled that of Caesar in premising a polity in which the individual citizen could and 
                                                             
30 Cic., Brut., 1.4, Cf., 1.2a.2. 
31 Cic., Phil., 11.21-23, 26f; Fam., 12.7.1; Shackleton Bailey (1986) p.269. The Senate instead approved 
Calenus’ proposal that the consuls should take up the command against Dolabella once Antonius was 
defeated at Mutina.   
32 Cic., Phil., 11.28; Fam., 12.7.2; 12.2-4 and 13.3-4. App., B Civ., 3.74; Dio 46.40.1; Joseph., AJ., 14.271-
275 & BJ., 1.218 – 225; Pelling (1996) p.6; Rawson (1992b) p.483.  
33 At Cic., Fam., 12.12.2 Cassius declares that he has, “Declined no risk or labour for the country’s sake.” 
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should be able to accede to a position of pre-eminence if their achievements merited it, and in 
which a man of dignitas (echoing Caesar’s conception of the term) had the right to defend his 
position from attack.   The assassination of the consul and dictator was illegal, in Antonius’ 
view, though he was prepared to negotiate with the conspirators as long as it did not endanger 
his position.  His actions after the assassination showed an understanding of the constitution in 
which the Senate possessed authority, the people power, and in which the political processes 
were flexible and adaptable, all of which could be used to support one’s position.34   However, 
the emergence of Octavian destabilised the fragile balance of the relationship between the 
conspirators, the Senate, and Antonius as he challenged Antonius’ grip on one of Caesar’s most 
important legacies: his popularity amongst the people and the army.    As the situation in 
Rome changed, Antonius’ discourse (verbal and behavioural) altered but continued to show a 
consistent understanding of the res publica and the place he believed he should hold within it.       
In the immediate aftermath of Caesar’s death Antonius worked with and through the 
Senate, treating Brutus and Cassius as legal magistrates of the res publica. 35    He understood 
that the body was commonly accepted as playing a key role in the governance of the res 
publica and that they had a powerful position in Rome through their ability to offer advice and 
pass decrees.   He never entirely abandoned his relationship with the Senate, continuing to 
negotiate with them whilst he besieged D. Brutus in Mutina, aware that their support of 
others, such as M. Brutus, Cassius or Octavian, or declaration of him as a hostis officially de-
legitimising his position, could endanger him.36   His understanding of the constitution granted 
the Senate a major role; however, his behaviour also demonstrated that he saw the Senate as 
less powerful in the constitution than the people.   Antonius’ understanding of role of the 
populus Romanus in the constitution appreciated the importance of the people within the 
political ideology of the res publica as well as their practical power in the voting assemblies 
                                                             
34 Whether he had ambitions to succeed to Caesar’s position of supremacy within Rome from the outset 
is a matter for debate. Rawson (1992b) p.473 suggests that Antonius’ moderation may have been a 
temporary expedient as by April he was making use of his access to Caesar’s papers, funds and veterans, 
and argues that Cic., Fam., 11.1 shows D. Brutus’ early distrust of Antonius. However, Syme (1939) 
pp.105ff argues that Antonius was prepared to negotiate with the conspirators and did not seek 
supremacy as long as he remained secure, seeing the arrival of Octavian on the stage as the turning 
point in terms of Antonius’ relationship with both the conspirators and the Senate, whilst Wistrand 
(1981) p.288f has suggested that it was the desire of Cicero and other supporters of the Republic to 
renege on the agreement of March 17th that provoked Antonius.  
35 Plut., Vit. Ant., 14; App., B Civ., 2.127-129 show Antonius playing on the concerns of the Senate to 
secure his own position. 
36 This can be seen in the Philippics and Cicero’s regular responses to Antonius’ claims in the Senate.  
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and as a mob.37   He interacted with them more, and with greater success, than did the 
conspirators, reassuring them that Caesar’s memory would not be dishonoured even whilst 
the Senate was meeting to discuss the settlement after the assassination.38  He also used the 
people to secure his position.  Seeking to protect himself by remaining close to Rome once he 
took up his provincia, he arranged to change the provincial allotments, securing Cisalpine Gaul 
for himself, using the people to pass his proposal.39   In Antonius’ understanding of the 
constitution, the Senate could give him authority but the support of the people would give him 
power.     
Octavian’s arrival in Rome posed a challenge to the influence Antonius wielded through his 
control of Caesar’s papers and finances and his position as Caesar’s lieutenant and for the 
loyalty of the people and the army.   Antonius’ resultant actions reveal much about his 
understanding of the constitution of the res publica, emphasising his perception of the power 
of the people as more important than the authority of the Senate.  He opted not to turn to the 
Senate to dismiss someone he could have portrayed as an upstart seeking a position he had 
not earned, but instead he sought to maintain the support of the people and the veterans.    
Antonius began to attack the conspirators, and publicly reconciled with Octavian at the 
demand of the veterans in order to maintain their support.40      Such an understanding of the 
way in which the constitution functioned had an impact upon events at Rome.  Antonius’ 
denouncements of the conspirators and appeals to the people shaped Cicero’s arguments 
against him, allowing the orator to claim that Antonius was setting himself up as a tyrant and 
to propose action against him.  They also caused Octavian to turn towards Cicero and the 
Senate for support, a move that eventually resulted in his appointment as a propraetor.   
Antonius, meanwhile, reiterated his right to defend his position and took action accordingly, 
using the people, the Senate and his army as far as he could in order to do so.  
Antonius’ attitudes towards both the Senate and the People and his behaviour in 44-43 
reveal the self-interestedness of his conception of the constitution: he had no sense that the 
                                                             
37 Millar (1998), North (1990a) and Morstein-Marx (2004) discuss the place of the people in Roman 
political thought and rhetoric.  
38 App., B Civ., 2.130ff. The most famous instance of Antonius’ engagement with the people is Caesar’s 
funeral, at which he gave the oration, rousing the crowd to fury and violence (Plut., Vit. Ant., 14; App., B 
Civ., 2.143-148). 
39 Rawson (1992b) p.474. See section 2, above, for Decimus Brutus’ response to this.  
40 Ibid. p.475.  
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res publica mattered, in the collective terms in which Cicero and Octavian understood it.41   He 
did not share the view of the conspirators that Caesar had been a tyrant nor Cicero’s 
understanding of the relationship between the individual and the res publica, in which the res 
publica must come first and the individual who endangers it may be legitimately removed.42  
Like Caesar, he emphasised the importance of the position of the individual citizen’s well-
being, and was concerned for his position and his dignitas, seeing personal defence of one’s 
honour as legitimate within the res publica.43  This was expressed in the letter he wrote to 
Lepidus and Octavian, in which he sought to counter Cicero’s arguments, and which Cicero 
quoted at length in the Thirteenth Philippic.44   The letter expressed his satisfaction at the 
death of Trebonius, whom he described as a parricide, and his dismay at the outlawing of 
Dolabella, regarding the punishment of parricides as the will of the gods. 45   In Antonius’ res 
publica loyalty to friends was required and his outrage at Caesar’s death stemmed less from a 
sense of damage done to the res publica than from the betrayal of his friend and mentor.46    
Caesar had earned his position in Rome with his defeat of Pompeius, and as such, his position 
ought to be protected.  Likewise Antonius’ own position as consul, which he was willing to 
protect by any means necessary.  This led Antonius to an understanding of the res publica in 
which factions were normal as reflections of these loyalties and in which security came from 
the defeat of one’s rivals and enemies.  It was in this spirit that he urged Lepidus and Octavian 
to join with him against what he called, “Pompeius’ camp.”47    
Unlike Brutus or Cicero, Antonius was not idealistic about the nature of the res publica; he 
was more concerned about his own survival than the form of the polity in which he lived.  He 
also lacked Octavian’s understanding of the strength of such idealism and his ability to 
enunciate it successfully.    He understood that the Senate and the popular assemblies were 
important bodies in the governance of Rome and that he, as a citizen and a magistrate, needed 
                                                             
41 Harries (2006) p.222ff. She also suggests that Antonius also failed to lack the sense of Rome as a 
community defined by its history, law and institutions, to which Cicero subscribed.  
42 Cic., Off., 1.2; 2.5, 25, 27, 115, 117; Off., 3.19. See chapter 3.2(c) below.  
43 Cic., Phil., 12.4 refers to Calenus’ comment that Antonius is concerned with the maintenance of his 
dignitas.  
44 It is only here that Antonius’ own words come down to us, quoted by Cicero in order to turn them 
against him.   It is possible that Cicero misquoted Antonius for his own ends, and certainly we should 
assume that he selected the arguments and characteristics that he believed most damning, however it is 
probable that Antonius’ letter was an open one and that any clear misquoting would have been 
noticeable.  Shackleton Bailey (1986) p.321 and Ramsey (2007b) and Ramsey (2007c) have argued that 
Cicero preserves Antonius’ verba ipsissima in this speech. 
45 Cic., Phil., 13.22-23, 36.  
46 Cic., Phil., 13.26, 32, 33, 34 38-39. 
47 Cic., Phil., 13.26. 
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to work through them if he was to have authority and power, but they were tools he could and 
did use for his own advantage. He dealt with the Senate, the people and the army as an 
individual, his abiding principle for political action being that it should protect his position and 
interests, and whilst he sought to follow, or appear to follow, traditional and legal procedures, 
he was prepared to bend or, in Cicero’s view, break the rules in order to safeguard himself and 
to overcome by conquest when persuasion failed.    Antonius’ expression of his understanding 
of the res publica in this way was one of the major factors influencing the enunciation of 
constitutional discourse after Caesar’s death.  It is especially notable in Cicero’s formulation of 
ideas and arguments in the Philippics, which dealt with Antonius directly, but it also affected 
the words and deeds of the conspirators and Octavian, shaping not only the arguments made 
about the constitution of the res publica but also the acts and events of 44-43 which altered it.  
 
4. Octavian  
Octavian’s understanding of the res publica may seem contradictory at times: he saw 
magistracies, the Senate, legal authority and unity as important to its continuation as a 
political community, yet at the same time was intent on becoming the dominant figure within 
this community and raised an army to give him the backing that would allow him to achieve 
it.48  This tension lies in the discrepancy between Octavian’s acknowledgement of the power of 
the understanding of the res publica as a communal polity free from the domination of any 
individual or small group, and his recognition of the flexibility that existed in the 
understandings of Rome’s political ideas and in the relationships between the institutions of 
the res publica that could create instability at Rome and which he used to support his own 
desire for dominance.  
Octavian was aware that an understanding of the res publica as a political system in which 
dominance by an individual or a few was unconstitutional was prevalent at Rome, particularly 
amongst the Roman elite whose ambitions Caesar’s dictatorship had stifled.  Such an 
understanding, like those of Cicero or the conspirators, focused on the freedom of Senate and 
the people to act in the governance of the res publica, although the understanding of the 
balance of power in the relationship between the two varied.  Octavian also recognised that an 
understanding of the constitution with the Senate at its political centre had currency at Rome, 
especially amongst those who would be able to help him forge a good relationship with that 
                                                             
48 Cic., Att., 16.15.3 reports on a speech of Octavian’s in a contio as referring to his desire to attain his 
father’s honours.  
 
 
37 | P a g e  
 
body.  He recognised the Senate as the council of the res publica with the ability to direct 
public affairs and to confer authority upon an individual, or to deny it to them. 49    Given that 
he was too young to be elected to any magistracy, he needed the Senate’s support for his 
position and his attack on Antonius, and from late 44 he presented himself as the servant of 
the res publica and the student of Cicero, and was, in time, granted the propraetorian 
imperium that legitimised his unorthodox position.50   He served alongside the consuls of 43 in 
a junior capacity and ‘allowed’ Cicero to speak in his favour before both the Senate and the 
People until a gap emerged in the established order with the deaths of the consuls.    
Yet Octavian refused to rely on the Senate alone: like Antonius he recognised the authority 
they could give him but also understood the power the people held at Rome. He knew that the 
pre-eminence he sought ran contrary to understandings of the res publica as a polity that 
should be free from dominant individuals or that saw the Senate as the key political body in 
the direction of Roman politics and sought to use the support of the people and army to 
protect himself.   On his return to Rome he applied for control of Caesar’s finances as his 
adopted son and heir so that he could pay the bequests Caesar had made.51  When Antonius 
refused, he began to sell his own property so that he might fulfil these obligations.  This 
enabled him to begin to challenge Antonius for popularity with the people and the army.  Like 
Antonius, he also approached Caesar’s veterans, touring Campania to gain their support, and 
sending agents to Brundisium to suborn the troops Antonius was bringing over from 
Macedonia, claiming that he had shown more loyalty to Caesar’s memory than Antonius. 52   
Finally, he used the support of the people and the army to gain the consulship after the deaths 
of Hirtius and Pansa, marching on Rome with his army to demand the consulship.   The Senate, 
faced with open hostility and lacking the forces to defend themselves (for Decimus Brutus was 
still dealing with Antonius, and M. Brutus had turned eastwards to join up with Cassius after 
receiving news of the victory at Mutina), offered Octavian the consulship.53    
Both Antonius and Octavian saw that the institutions, processes and connections of the res 
publica were flexible and could be used to their own advantage, but each proceeded in 
                                                             
49 This could be done through the declaration of individual citizens as hostes.  
50 App., B Civ., 3.48; Cic., Phil., 5.46ff. The quid pro quo here is implicit, not explicit, but Octavian knew 
how to get what he wanted by behaving with Good Form. 
51 Rawson (1992b) pp.471-2. 
52 Ibid. p.478. App., B Civ., 3.40 & Dio 45.12.2 offer slightly different accounts of Antonius and Octavian’s 
activities in southern Italy, showing the complexity of the situation but also the importance that this 
group of citizens in Roman understandings of the constitutions. 
53 Ibid. pp.484-485.  
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different ways, understanding the constitution of res publica differently.   Antonius did not see 
the res publica as a collective entity, and failed to understand the force such a conception held 
for others; Octavian saw the popularity and power of this idea and the importance of 
concordia to a stable res publica – and to the security of an individual who wished to rule.   He 
recognised that neither his own personal position nor the res publica could be secured by 
conquest alone, and that if he sought to dominate he must have a legitimate legal position as 
well as popular support, hence his desire for the consulship.     He seems to have been able to 
employ the idealism of men like Brutus and of Cicero in verbal discourse, whilst simultaneously 
employing the pragmatism of men like Cassius and Antonius in his actions.  Although Octavian 
saw the value and the usefulness of the Senate, he also knew that having the support of the 
people and of an army would allow him to force himself into the positions he sought to attain.   
His understanding of the constitution incorporated the power of the people, the authority of 
the Senate and the need for public unity, emphasising the community of Rome. Octavian’s 
espousal of both ‘senatorial’ and ‘popular’ themes about the res publica influenced the 
ongoing political discourse about the constitution of the res publica, seen notably in Antonius’ 
letter, Cicero’s Philippics, which argued for Octavian’s grant of imperium, and Sallust’s critique 
of both Octavian and Cicero.  Unlike that of Cicero or the conspirators, however, his 
conception of the res publica reinterpreted the constitution, including a dominant position for 
the powerful individual who could hold these elements together.   
 
5. The Senate and People 
The individuals considered above all acted and reacted to events in relation to each other, 
and to the positions of the Senate and People at Rome.54   Neither of these last bodies was 
                                                             
54 The nature of entity that was ‘the people’ in Roman politics is subject to argument, and may be seen 
in different ways.  There was the people as the sum total of the citizenry of Rome, the populus of the 
Senatus Populusque, but it was not possible in the Late Republic for the whole of the populus to be 
present at Rome (see Mouritsen (2001) for a full discussion of this).  There was also the crowd, or mob, 
at Rome, the citizenry who attended contiones and voting assemblies, and participated in Roman 
political life.  However, it is necessary to see the members of the populus physically in the assemblies in 
Rome as standing in a synecdochical relationship with the populus as the citizenry as a whole (see Ober 
(1989) p.147 on the existence of such a relationship in Athens) when talking about the participation of 
‘the people’ in political events. Such a relationship appears to have been assumed/called into being by 
orators when they addressed the attendees of contiones as “quirites”, calling the crowd in front of them 
to stand for the citizenry as a whole. See Laclau (2005) pp.65-172, who argues that the formation of “the 
people” as a political entity is a discursive process (he then proceeds to deconstruct this process).   
Morstein-Marx (2004) discusses the place of contiones in Roman politics and the way in which speakers 
guided or manipulated the responses of the crowd,  in particular see pp.160-278 on debate and 
ideology.   With regard to the events at Rome in 44-43, the ‘people’ should be considered as coming 
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united in their make-up or response to Caesar’s death, or in their understanding of their place 
in the res publica.  However, as political bodies each group had a voice in the political 
discourse of Rome, their communal understandings of the res publica can be seen through 
their decision-making and actions. 
There was no immediate popular enthusiasm for the assassination of Caesar and it was 
Antonius rather than the conspirators who proved more effective at securing the support of 
the people.  As Wiseman has noted, Cicero’s description of the popular response to Caesar’s 
assassination does not coincide with the narrative of events provided by Appian and Dio. 55  
Immediately after the assassination the people were shocked and did not respond to the 
conspirators’ proclamations of freedom with acclamation.56   At Caesar’s funeral violence 
broke out, the crowd responding violently to the conspirators after the public reading of 
Caesar’s will and to Antonius’ funeral oration.57  After these events Brutus and Cassius left the 
city, concerned for their own safety, but at the same time they abandoned their chance to win 
over the people.  Instead it was Octavian who challenged Antonius for the support of the 
people and the veterans, selling his own property in order to pay Caesar’s bequests, and 
hosting the ludi Victoriae Caesaris.58    The response of the people to the death of Caesar 
shows a loyalty to a man they believed had given them much.59   Their understanding of the 
constitution seems to have centred on themselves and their place in the constitution – both in 
terms of their powers and the benefits they should receive as citizens.  This understanding of 
their potential power within the res publica and their willingness to express their support of 
those they favoured and who they believed supported their interests  led all the participants in 
the events of the period to engage with them, and their reaction contributed to the events 
that took place, and shaped the nature of the constitutional discourse.   
                                                                                                                                                                                  
from those who were present in Rome, and who attended contiones, and participated or were caught 
up in events, incorporating all those who were not Senators and magistrates.  Linked to this loose 
grouping were Caesar’s veterans, some of whom were in Rome, and some of whom were still with the 
legions which were roused by Antonius and Octavian.   Clearly they were not a homogenous group who 
all thought and acted alike; however, they could and did act as a crowd, beyond their individual 
opinions, called into being as “the people” through a series of discursive and rhetorical acts, generally by 
those addressing them (see chapters 3.2(b)i and 4.2(b)ii on this). 
55 Cic., Off., 3.19 ; App., B Civ., 2.118-4.3; Dio 44.20-45;  Wiseman (2009) pp.211-234. Cf., Dyck (1996) 
p.519 and Atkins and Griffin (1991) p.107. 
56 Dio 44.20-1; Plut., Vit. Caes., 67; Vit. Brut., 18; App., B Civ., 2.120. Yavetz (1969) pp.63-64.  
57 App., B Civ., 2.130.  Dio 44.35-52; Plut., Vit. Ant., 14 and App., B Civ., 2.144-148 recount Caesar’s 
funeral.  Rawson (1992b) p. 470 notes that it was not until Caesar’s will, which left benefactions to the 
Roman people, was made public that the mood amongst the crowd turned towards violence. 
58 Ibid. pp.472, 478.  
59 Yavetz (1969) pp.63-65. 
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Like the people, the Senate also failed to respond to the assassination of Caesar with great 
joy, but rather fled in terror and waited to see what would happen next.60  It is unknown who 
spoke in the Senate meeting Antonius called, but as a body they voted for the compromise he 
proposed.   At the time of Caesar’s death there were few consulars or strong leaders in the 
Senate, which may have made it easier for Antonius to gain endorsement for his proposals, 
there being no one to counter him effectively.61  Gradually, though, the Senate rediscovered its 
voice, or set of voices, in Rome’s political discourse, discussing proposals for action and being 
involved in events as a council, rather than a mere endorser of any individual’s policies.  
Clearly, it was not a homogenous unit, with some senators inclined to follow Antonius’ lead, or 
at least unwilling to stray from it, whilst others supported the conspirators, and still others - 
particularly after Antonius’ departure from Rome – maintained a position between the two, 
urging negotiation and seeking peace.62  The Senate came to stand upon an understanding of 
its position in the constitution as the central council of Rome with the responsibility to guide 
the res publica and its people, and to counsel its magistrates.  It was a role Cicero encouraged 
in the Philippics, though it backfired upon him in that he failed to persuade the Senate to 
follow many of his proposals.  Other men came to the fore in the Senate, apparently arguing as 
convincingly as Cicero, amongst them L. Calpurnius Piso, who spoke out against Antonius in 
August 44, Q. Fufius Calenus, and Lepidus.63  These men, along with Cicero were part of the 
discourse about the res publica as it took place within in the Senate, as well as on the wider 
Roman stage and influenced the direction events took in Rome.    We know of their arguments 
primarily from Cicero’s Philippics, where they can be read as “opposition discourse” – inspiring 
Cicero’s responses and expression of the res publica, and stimulating events at Rome.   
Lepidus’ had been Caesar’s magister equitum and had lent his support (including troops) to 
Antonius in the aftermath of the assassination.  He remained in communication with Cicero 
and the Senate, as well as with Antonius after his departure for Narbonensian Gaul.  Lepidus’ 
understanding of the nature of the constitution is unclear, but Cicero clearly regarded him as a 
potential threat to the restoration of the res publica, as he saw it, seeking to detach him from 
Antonius by proposing honours for him at the beginning of 43 and praising his citizen 
                                                             
60 Rawson (1992b) p.468.  
61 Cic., Phil., 1.6 claims that Antonius began to ignore the Senate.  
62 Cic., Phil., 3.20. Phil., 7.1-7 attacks those Cicero sees supporting Antonius, including Calenus, although 
it is important to remember that this is Cicero’s portrayal of events.  
63 See Cic., Att., 16.7; Fam., 12.25.3; Phil., 1.7ff for reference to Piso’s speech.  Phil., 11.15 notes Calenus’ 
regular opposition to Cicero, and Phil., 13 engages with Lepidus as well as Antonius.  
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qualities.64   He does not seem to have succeeded, for in the Thirteenth Philippic he responded 
to a letter sent by Lepidus to the Senate in which the proconsul proposed that peace be made 
with Antonius and warned him of what he described as an uncharacteristic arrogance.65  
Lepidus’ final declaration in favour of Antonius suggests that he may have shared elements of 
his understanding of the position of the individual in the res publica or at least to have 
disagreed with Cicero’s understanding of the constitution.  His decision to join Antonius was 
one of the major factors leading to the creation of the Second Triumvirate.   
The most prominent of Cicero’s opponents in Rome itself was Q. Fufius Calenus, father-in-
law of the consul Pansa.  He was the first Senator to be called on at meetings throughout 43, 
and Cicero regularly sought to counter his proposals.66  Judging from Cicero’s responses, 
Calenus appears to have been in favour of negotiating with Antonius through embassies as a 
fellow citizen and a magistrate, as opposed to Cicero’s insistence on regarding Antonius as a 
public enemy and a man with whom negotiation was not possible.67  Calenus also disagreed 
with Cicero over the Senate’s attitude towards Brutus and Cassius, proposing that M. Brutus 
be ordered to give up the forces he had raised in Greece and Macedonia because he was not 
legally entitled to them, and that the consuls should draw lots for the provinces of Asia and 
Syria and pursue Dolabella, once the situation at Mutina had been resolved, rather than giving 
Cassius the command.68   Calenus’ understanding of the constitution seems to have centred 
upon the importance of upholding the legal positions of magistrates: his defence of Antonius’ 
position as consul and unwillingness to legalise Brutus and Cassius’ positions in the east 
indicating that he did not accept Cicero’s argument that the good of Rome was the highest law 
and that he saw the creation of legal commands on such grounds as dangerous to the res 
publica.     The opposition of Calenus and Lepidus to the arguments of Cicero and to the 
conspirators makes it clear that there were different understandings of the nature of the 
constitution amongst the Senators.  His success – for by and large it was the point of view of 
Calenus and others whom Cicero described as supporting Antonius69 that was accepted by the 
                                                             
64 Cic., Phil., 5.38-41.  
65 Phil., 13.13. MRR 2.341.  The Senate meeting that day had been called to consider this letter and 
another received from Munatius Plancus, the governor of Transalpine Gaul, advocating peace 
(Shackleton Bailey (1986) p.321). 
66 Manuwald (2007) pp.38-39, 538.  
67 Cic., Phil., 8.18. Cicero also disagreed with L. Caesar on this matter (Phil., 8.1-3) 
68 Cic., Phil., 10.4; 11.21. Cicero’s arguments about the legitimacy of Brutus and Cassius’ positions in the 
Tenth and Eleventh Philippics were uttered in opposition to these proposals 
69 Cic., Phil., 5.6; 8.1-3.  Given Cicero’s stance on the subject of Antonius, anyone who disagreed with his 
own point of view might well be considered an Antonian. 
 
 
42 | P a g e  
 
Senate during 44-43 - shows that some elements of Cicero’s understanding of the constitution 
were unusual and hotly contested by his peers who sought to defend their res publica.    
The responses of both the Senate and People to Caesar’s death and to the various 
proposals for action that followed it both reflected different understandings of the 
constitution and affected the discourse that took place at Rome in 44-43, with the key 
individual participants all seeking to win the support of both parties.   This process was 
affected by these individuals’ understandings of the roles of the Senate and the people within 
Rome’s constitution and by these groups’ understandings of their own positions.  Both of these 
influenced the arguments and behaviour seen in Rome’s political discourse and the measures 
that were taken at Rome as a result of this discourse.  These multiple understandings reflected 
the fracturing of Roman knowledge about the nature of the constitution and contributed to 
the civil strife at Rome as the political players struggled to establish their understanding of the 
constitution in the res publica.  
 
In conclusion 
The fracturing of Roman knowledge about the nature of the constitution of the res publica 
can be seen in the variety of arguments and claims that were made about res publica in the 
aftermath of Caesar’s death by those with a stake in its future.  The conspirators, Antonius, 
Octavian and senators such as Calenus all expressed different understandings of the nature of 
the constitution and the way in which it should function, and as we shall see, Cicero’s 
understanding was different again.  As each statement about the nature of the res publica was 
made it shaped the various responses to it, including those of Cicero, becoming a factor in the 
procession of events.   Sallust, writing after the formation of the Second Triumvirate, 
responded to this discourse and these events, his understanding of the constitution of the res 
publica and its fate influenced by the outcome of the struggles that followed Caesar’s death.    
He also revealed the effects that the clashing of these different understandings could have 
upon the constitution and the damage this could do to the res publica through the discursive 
processes that reproduced the constitution.  The following chapters will describe the texts of 
both Cicero and Sallust in order to uncover the nature and formation of some of the different 
understandings of the res publica and the way in which they were rooted in varying 
conceptions of the individual elements of the res publica, examining how these understandings 
and the expression of them by various individuals were shaped by ongoing events, and the way 
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in which this affected the constitution of the res publica and the stability of the Roman 
Republic.  
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Chapter Three: Cicero’s res publica 
 
Cicero’s speeches and texts of 44-43 were part of the post-Caesarian discourse about the 
nature of the constitution that, over time, decided the future of the res publica.  This chapter 
will examine the understanding of the nature and constitution of the res publica expressed by 
Cicero in de Officiis and the Philippics, describing the way in which these understandings and 
expressions were affected by the situation in which he found himself and the impact that they 
had upon the political discourse and events taking place at Rome.  As such it will act as a case 
study for the methodology established in chapter one, analysing one specific understanding of 
the constitution of the res publica and discussing the way in which it was formulated within 
the discourse of Rome at the time.   It will show that individual understandings of the Roman 
constitution were formulated in response to other statements and strategies in the discourse 
and based on certain key objects including the virtus of the citizen, the quality of speech and 
the political institutions of Rome, and the relationships that the speaker argued existed 
between them.   It will also reveal that the expression of the constitution at Rome varied 
depending on the location in which the statements were made and that this was both 
influenced by and added to the fracturing of Roman knowledge about the constitution.  
  Cicero’s statements about Rome’s political system in this period do not constitute a 
programmatic description of the constitution, rather they are representative of his 
understanding of it as they form the backdrop to the arguments he made about the future of 
the res publica.  For Cicero, the constitution of the res publica was the foundation of Rome’s 
success and so, at a time when he believed the polity was failing, he sought to convince his 
fellow citizens of his understanding of what the res publica was and the way they should act 
within it. The primary strategy or theme of his understanding of the constitution was that the 
res publica as a community of citizens was the most important aspect of Rome as a polity and 
must be maintained by any action necessary.     Cicero’s construction of the constitution 
centred upon the character of the Roman citizen, making the relationship of the citizen with 
the res publica as a political community the basis of a successful, stable polity.   His argument 
was formed in reaction to the dictatorship of Caesar and the potential threat he saw in 
Antonius, and expressed his support for the cause of the conspirators.  However, while he 
sought to restore the constitution, as he understood it, and stabilise Rome, Cicero’s fervent 
expression of the threat Antonius posed drove Antonius to take steps to defend his position.  
 
 
45 | P a g e  
 
  The first section of this chapter will describe Cicero’s position and activities after Caesar’s 
death in order to establish the way in which events impacted upon him and influenced his 
utterances as enunciative modalities.  Cicero supported the assassination of Caesar as justified 
tyrannicide, but came to believe that the conspirators had not done enough to restore the res 
publica after his dictatorship and dreaded the prospect of Antonius becoming the dominant 
figure at Rome.   He sought to intervene in the chaos and crises of 44-43 and to influence 
Roman politics in the best interests of the Roman polity – as he understood it.   His formulation 
of the good citizen and of the citizen-civitas relationship engaged with the political positions of 
men such as Caesar, Antonius and Calenus, as well the actions of Brutus and Cassius, and 
argued that the good citizen must always put the res publica first.  However, Cicero was not in 
a powerful position in comparison with Antonius, with no magistracy or imperium to support 
his actions and no loyal army.  He had to rely upon his auctoritas and his rhetorical abilities in 
order to influence affairs, which led him to try to reclaim and redefine Rome’s political 
vocabulary in order to express his vision of the Roman res publica and convince his audience of 
its truth.   
The second section of the chapter will describe the way that Cicero expressed his 
understanding of the constitution of the res publica, the concepts and objects that were 
important to him and the way in which he connected them in formulating ‘the constitution’.  
Section two will look at Cicero’s definition of the character of the good citizen, something he 
had identified as important in de Republica when he declared that the mixed constitution was 
unlikely to become unstable, “Unless, that is, the politicians are deeply corrupt.”1   The 
character and behaviour of the individual citizen became more important in Cicero’s political 
thought as the political systems and processes of Rome began to break down during the civil 
strife of the last years of the Republic.   Without good citizens, the constitution could not be 
upheld and the res publica would cease to exist.     Section three will examine Cicero’s 
understanding of the processes and institutions that the good citizen should uphold.  Cicero’s 
statements about the institutions and structures of Rome’s political system placed particular 
emphasis on the roles of the Senate and the People within the constitution and the attributes 
they should possess.    They also reveal the importance of the good citizen to the res publica, 
as without proper citizen behaviour the roles and attributes of the Senate and people within 
the polity could not be maintained.  
                                                             
1 Cic., Rep., 1.69.  
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It is Cicero’s connection of the good citizen to the civitas that will be the focus of the third 
section of this chapter, in an analysis of his understanding of the way in which citizens must 
uphold the res publica of Rome.   In 44-43 he focused on two main ways in which the good 
citizen should support the res publica: by behaving appropriately, and by speaking properly.  In 
making these arguments Cicero enunciated an understanding of legality and legal action in 
which the best interests of the res publica were the highest form of law, making this the 
marker for what was legitimate and legal in Roman politics.  He also emphasised the 
importance of a political vera vocabula to the citizen’s understanding of the nature of this 
appropriate behaviour and their ability to act properly within the res publica.  Cicero argued 
that it was critically important that words be used in the right way in order that citizens could 
understand and fulfil their duties, acting appropriately in support of the constitution.   It was 
through language and discourse that relationships between Rome’s citizens and political 
institutions were established and maintained, and through them that decisions were made.   If 
citizens used language inappropriately, falsely using recognised terms for desirable qualities to 
describe illegitimate behaviour, then the processes of the res publica would be compromised, 
and the best interests of Rome might be overlooked or ignored.  
It was with these arguments that Cicero made his greatest impact upon the political 
discourse of the period as they were the basis of his opposition to Antonius, who he argued 
misunderstood the true nature of the good citizen and his relationship with the res publica, 
and whose actions Cicero used to define his conception of illegitimate behaviour.   However, 
Cicero’s employment of these themes raises questions about the way in which proper 
behaviour and language are defined in political life and the way in which Cicero himself acted 
and spoke.    As we will see in chapter four, Sallust critiqued Cicero’s understanding of the res 
publica, picking up on his arguments about legitimate behaviour and vera vocabula, 
highlighting the tension between Cicero’s enunciation of them and his own behaviour, and 
suggesting that Cicero’s own words and deeds in 44-43 damaged the res publica.  
 
1. Saving the res publica: Cicero in 44-43 
Cicero was in Rome at the time of Caesar’s death and, although he was not included in the 
conspiracy, he was amongst those who went up to the Capitol to congratulate the 
conspirators.2    Two days later he spoke in favour of the compromise that was proposed in the 
                                                             
2 Rawson (1992b) p.468.  
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Senate, although he later told Atticus that this was because he had already realised that the 
conspirators’ cause was lost.3  This letter, sent barely a month after Caesar’s death, suggests 
that Cicero came rapidly to believe that the res publica, as he understood it, could not be 
restored whilst Antonius was active in Rome.4  Cicero’s political discourse after the 
assassination of Caesar was shaped by his long dislike of Caesar’s dictatorship and his desire to 
ensure that the res publica never suffered under the tyranny of an individual again.   However, 
the way in which he made his response was affected by his position at Rome: hostile to 
Antonius and without much active support from the conspirators or other Senators, it was 
safer and possibly more effective for him to discuss the nature of the res publica outside the 
forum and curia, using philosophy and personal contact with particular individuals to win 
friends and influence people. 
Antonius, as consul, was in a stronger position of power than Cicero, the orator, in the 
public political life of Rome and, so, after playing his part in the immediate resolution of the 
crisis following Caesar’s death, Cicero removed himself from public activity in Rome.  Cicero’s 
decision to absent himself from practical activities in Rome was not solely due to a personal 
fear of Antonius or a belief that nothing could be done until Antonius’ consulship expired.  It 
also reflected a particular understanding of what his role in the res publica should be: the wise 
consular and senior statesman who advised and educated his juniors to follow in his footsteps.  
He returned to his philosophy and his correspondence with and education of younger 
senators, including the new consul Dolabella, the consuls-designate, Hirtius and Pansa, and 
eventually Octavian, whom he hoped to guide away from the example of his adoptive father 
and into a proper relationship with the res publica.5   Cicero had a long-held concern with the 
education of young men at Rome; his dialogues showing prominent statesmen passing on their 
                                                             
3 Cic., Att., 10.1. Cf., Plut., Vit. Cic., 42; Dio 44.23-33, who suggests that Cicero’s theme was the 
importance of concordia in Rome.  Cf., Cic., Phil., 1.1 in which Cicero says he argued that the civitas 
should seek to remove discordia. Cic., Att., 10.1 justifies this move as being the only option available to 
him. 
4 Rawson (1992b) p.476 has suggested that this belief was one of the reasons Cicero decided to depart 
for Greece.  She argues that Hirtius was also concerned by Antonius’ activities soon after Caesar’s death.  
5 Cic., Att., 14.11.2; 14.17.4; 14.21.4; 14.22.1; 16.8; 16.9 and Fam., 9.1; 7.2 show the depth of his 
concern with the events going on around him, and the role he sought to play bringing individuals who 
had ties to Caesar into a working relationship with the conspirators for the benefit of Rome.  See Van 
der Blom (2003) for a discussion of Cicero’s actions in mid-44.  She argues (p.291) that Cicero did not 
intend to be involved in the restoration of the res publica and suggests that he may have felt too old for 
this fight, reading de Senectute as an expression of his desire for retirement.      
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advice to the younger men around them, and, through Cicero, to the readers of the dialogue. 6  
Dyck has suggested that he wanted to strengthen his influence in order to secure his 
posthumous fame, but Cicero was also concerned with the stability and future of the res 
publica, and he aimed to win adherents not only to himself but also to his vision of the res 
publica, hoping to guide Rome from behind the scenes though his protégés.7   In such a role 
Cicero could exercise power in Rome’s political discourse, his authority giving him influence 
over younger men who had practical power in the res publica.    
Both de Officiis and the First Philippic cast Cicero as the elder statesman offering advice to 
younger men rather than as an active politician pushing proposals for Rome’s future.8  The 
                                                             
6 In de Oratore Crassus and Antonius, and Q. Mucius Scaevola (the Augur) are shown in discussion with 
C. Aurelius Cotta and P. Sulpicius Rufus, whilst in de Republica Scipio, Laelius, Philus, Manilius and Sp. 
Mummius engage in discussion with the younger Q. Aelius Tubero, P. Rutilius Rufus, G. Fannius and Q. 
Mucius Scaevola. The presence of Scaevola in the role of a student in de Republica and a teacher in de 
Oratore provides Cicero with a sense of continuity in Roman education.  This is increased through his 
association of his own education with the ideas of Crassus and Antonius (de Or., 2.2) and his training 
with Scaevola (May and Wisse (2001) p.7)  and gives him the legitimacy to proffer his own advice now 
that he is a senior consular in Rome (see Rawson (1991) pp.25-29 on Cicero’s  employment of Crassus as 
an example of how to speak and to behave at Rome).  Steel (2005) pp.83-114 argues that Cicero used 
letters, speeches and treatises to create a series of communities that articulated and maintained the 
network necessary for a public career at Rome, compensating for his lack of family background.  Cicero’s 
creation of this network also justifies his understanding of the constitution by claiming that he learnt 
about the proper nature of the res publica from men like Crassus and Scaevola, who had learnt from 
Aemilianus and Laelius. In 44-43 de Officiis saw him seeking to pass this knowledge on to his juniors. 
Fantham (2006) p.21, 78-101 discusses Cicero’s presentation of the training of the young orator.  The 
theme of the elder statesman educating the younger is also prominent in the treatises Cicero wrote 
during Caesar’s lifetime, for example in De Finibus (5.6, 5.76.), Brutus, Orator and the Tusculan 
Disputations.   For discussion of the didactic element of this last, see Gildenhard (2007), who notes 
(pp.62-63) that Cicero endowed his otium with his political discontent under Caesar, and argues that he 
sought to present philosophical studies as a suitable activity for the Roman senator, offering a 
comprehensive program of civic instruction.   That the Tusculan Disputations were dedicated to Brutus 
(Tusc., 1.1) was not, he argues (p.98) merely happenstance or politeness.  The Brutus, too, can be read 
as a text intended to educate younger Romans, notably M. Brutus, for the service of the res publica. 
Dugan (2005) p.234ff discusses the way in which the Brutus creates the idea that Brutus is Cicero’s heir 
both oratorically and politically.       
7 Dyck (1996) p.10.  At Phil., 2.113 Cicero comments that he is counting on the adulescentes nobilissimi.  
Ramsey (2003) p.328 has noted that Cicero used adulescentes elsewhere to describe men just over 
forty, including Brutus and Cassius (at Phil., 1.22): he is not only speaking to Marcus’ generation.   
8 Cicero’s de Officiis was composed in late 44 B.C., at the same time as he was working on the second 
Philippic.  His first reference to the work in a letter comes in late October 44, and the last in mid 
November, whilst he reports the completion of the first two books to Atticus in early November. (Dyck 
(1996) p.19. Cic., Att., 15.13a.2; 16.11.4; 16.14.3-4.)  He had given the first Philippic in the Senate on 2 
September 44 and the third on 20 December.  The second Philippic was composed in the period 
between late September, after Antonius’ attack on him in the Senate on the 19 th of that month, and 
November.  He sent a first draft to Atticus on 25 October, urging him to publish it at his discretion when 
the time was right  and invited him to share it with at least one trusted friend in early November ]Cic., 
Att., 15.13.1-2; Ramsey (2003)]. Cf.,  Manuwald (2007) and Shackleton Bailey (1986) on the composition 
of the Philippics.     
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First Philippic, more moderate in tone than the speeches that followed, was given by Cicero on 
his return to Rome after his abortive trip to Greece.  Cicero seems to have hoped that Antonius 
might prove malleable after the emergence of Octavian and offered him advice, urging him to 
eschew violence in favour of negotiation within the Senate.9  Even so, Cicero chose to miss the 
Senate meeting called by Antonius on the first of September, appearing the day after to deliver 
his advice to the consuls in order to avoid any direct confrontation.   Meanwhile, he was 
writing the philosophical de Officiis, which, whilst addressed to his son Marcus alone, 
functioned as a guidebook to the proper duties and behaviour of a citizen of the Republic, for 
all those junior to Cicero who would have a part to play in the rebuilding of the res publica.10   
He discusses the nature of concepts such as virtus, sapientia, iustitia, liberalitas, beneficia, 
                                                             
9 Cic., Phil., 1.8; Att., 16.7.1; Ramsey (2003) p.101; Rawson (1992b) pp.475-476 discuss Antonius’ 
inconsistent attitude towards the conspirators at this time.  
10 Cic., Off., 1.1-3. Dyck (1996) p.12 notes that de Officiis was partially intended to replace Cicero’s 
aborted trip to Athens, passing on the guidance he would have offered, and explaining the reason why 
Cicero, faced by conflicting personal and political officia had chosen to return to Rome.  Before reading 
de Officiis as a Roman political text we must consider the relationship of Cicero’s work to the original 
work of Panaetius on which de Officiis was based (Cicero Att., 15.13a.2; 16.11.4; 16.14.3-4 was open 
about his use of Panaetius’ original text), in order to establish the extent to which de Officiis can be read 
as a representation of Cicero’s own thought rather than Greek philosophy translated into Latin with 
Roman exempla. In his Commentary on de Officiis Dyck (1996) p.19 argues that Cicero probably followed 
Panaetius fairly closely, owing to the speed of his composition (the work seems to have been written in 
October and November of 44, (Cic., Att., 15.13a.2; 16.11.4; 16.14.3-4), for the first two books, before 
turning to Posidonius, Hecato and an Academic work for his critique of the Epicurean view of pleasure 
(Dyck (1996) p.487).  Cf., Dugan (2005) p.6 who makes this case somewhat less strongly, saying 
Panaetius was ‘undoubtedly’ the source for Cicero’s model of the self in de Officiis, although its views 
implicitly bear Cicero’s endorsement.  However, the positing of a Greek source, or several sources, for 
the philosophical elements of de Officiis need not require the reader to see a complete lack of originality 
or independent thought on Cicero’s part. Through the process of reading the texts, Cicero will have 
absorbed the ideas they put forward into his own thought. As Atkins (1990) p.285 has argued, originality 
on its own is not the be all and end all of political or philosophical thought, what matters is the extent to 
which Cicero meditated upon the ideas that he was using and made them his own.  The novelist, 
Jonathan Lethem (2007) p.61-64 has described this process of absorption as follows: “Most artists are 
brought to their vocation when their own nascent gifts are awakened by the work of a master. That is to 
say, most artists are converted to art by art itself. Finding one's voice isn't just an emptying and purifying 
oneself of the words of others but an adopting and embracing of filiations, communities, and discourses. 
Inspiration could be called inhaling the memory of an act never experienced. Invention, it must be 
humbly admitted, does not consist in creating out of void but out of chaos. Any artist knows these 
truths, no matter how deeply he or she submerges that knowing … Active reading is an impertinent raid 
on the literary preserve.”   Clearly, Cicero had read, absorbed and engaged with the work of Panaetius 
and of other Greek philosophers, but he made them his own in de Officiis through his simultaneous 
restatement of them and personal engagement  with Roman political life.  He notes points at which he 
diverges from Panaetius (Cic., Att., 16.11.4; Off., 1.7-8, 152; 2.86; 3.7-12) and his discussion of the 
citizens’ duties is carefully constructed to convince his readers that their primary duty is to act in the 
best interests of the res publica.    Panaetius was part of the ‘literary preserve’ that Cicero had been 
raiding for years, adopting and making his sources his influences, turning them to the service of his own 
literary and political ambitions and the service of the res publica.    
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magnitudo animi, decorum, dignitas and gloria and the role that they play in the continuing 
successes and failures of the Roman res publica, formulating his discussion in response to the 
positions of Caesar and Antonius.  He explains why the res publica must be the first care of the 
citizen and the reasons why, in fact, it is not in the interests of any citizen to behave 
otherwise.11   
De Officiis was Cicero’s last philosophical text.   At the same time as he was working on this 
treatise he was also writing his reply to the personal attack Antonius had made on him in 
response to the speech we know as the First Philippic.    Insulted, and convinced that there 
could be no negotiation with the consul Cicero composed the Second Philippic.   Although this 
speech was never publicly given, only circulated,12 it nonetheless marks a change in Cicero’s 
political discourse from the philosophical “private” sphere to the very public world of political 
oratory and action in Rome.   Once Antonius and Dolabella had left Rome the balance of power 
shifted, and it became safer for Cicero to utter his opinions in the Senate and the forum, 
especially those that were directly critical of them, and he returned to the public stage to 
speak in support of the conspirators and in defence of his res publica.   The Philippics show 
Cicero at his most powerful, his oratorical skills enabling him to influence opinion and events.  
Even so the Philippics also show that he could not exercise as much power as he might have 
liked.  He was not invited to speak first in the Senate by the consuls of 43 and could not set the 
tone of the debate.  He always had to respond, arguing against the proposals of Calenus and 
against Antonius, fighting to be heard and heeded, not always successfully.   
Through these speeches, Cicero responded to the unfolding of events, rephrasing and 
adjusting his argument as necessary as the situation changed.13  Although each speech has its 
own arguments and subtleties, thinking about the corpus in terms of groups of speeches 
enables the reader to see in a simple manner the way in which Cicero’s political discourse and 
                                                             
11 Schofield (2009) p.208, who notes that, “In short, de Officiis accepts the need to develop an argument 
for and about the values Cicero had been trumpeting for decades, not just to reiterate them… In the 
process… something new in Roman discourse is forged.” 
12 Manuwald (2007) p.59 notes that Cicero sent it to Atticus with permission to pass it on to friends.  
Shackleton Bailey (1986) p.31 suggests that it might have been given a wider circulation after Antonius’ 
departure from Rome.  
13 Manuwald (2007) pp.19-31, 74-86 & 92-93 provides a detailed discussion of the context for each of 
the speeches in the series.  She argues that the speeches, as arranged in a corpus, reflect important 
stages in the conflict, claiming that Philippics Three to Fourteen are the Philippics ‘proper’, imitating the 
twelve Demosthenic Philippics, and Cicero’s own twelve orationes consulares, with Philippics One and 
Two functioning as prequels to the main struggle.  Within the group of twelve, she sees three 
subgroups: Philippics Three and Four, from the end of 44; Five to Nine, focusing on the embassy to 
Antonius; and Ten to Fourteen, first dealing with events in the East and the military conflict with 
Antonius. 
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discussion of the res publica was shaped by events.   The first two Philippics responded to the 
events that took place between Caesar’s death and September 44, with Cicero focusing on 
Antonius alone, initially advising him to return to a republican position, then berating him for 
failing to do so and attempting to establish him as an enemy of the res publica.  The speeches 
from Philippic Three onwards were given after armed conflict had broken out: Octavian had 
marched against Antonius, although without success, and D. Brutus had refused to give up 
Cisalpine Gaul and was besieged in Mutina by Antonius.  Three and Four presented proposals 
related to these events to the Senate and the People at Rome, Cicero arguing that Octavian 
and D. Brutus had served Rome by their actions.  Five to Nine follow swiftly upon these: given 
over the course of barely more than a month, their concern was with the response of the 
Senate to Antonius and the issue of the embassy that was sent to him.  Cicero argued ever 
more strongly that Antonius was an illegitimate proconsul and a hostis, and should not be 
treated with through negotiation and diplomacy, but must be defeated in war.14      Philippics 
Ten and Eleven dealt with the issues relating to the positions of M. Brutus and Cassius in 
Greece and Asia: Cicero proposing that both men be legally established with imperium in 
Macedonia and in Syria in order that they could serve the res publica and confront the dangers 
posed by C. Antonius (in Macedonia) and Dolabella (in Syria).  Twelve and Thirteen returned to 
the situation in Cisalpine Gaul, with Cicero arguing against sending another embassy to 
Antonius and again claiming that war was the only way to get rid of the danger that he posed.  
Finally, the Fourteenth Philippic responded to the defeat of Antonius at Mutina and proposed 
the honours Cicero thought appropriate for the commanders responsible for the victory.  The 
need to respond to these events and issues guided Cicero’s enunciation of his key arguments 
and themes, particularly those concerned with the nature of the good citizen and legitimate 
action, which he expressed in relation to the various individuals whose actions and positions 
were under discussion.   
After Mutina Cicero’s position in Rome changed again.  He appears to have continued to 
engage with events until the establishment of Octavian as consul, although Appian suggests 
that he did not attend the Senate.15  That said, Antonius had, finally, been declared a hostis 
and initially appeared to be as good as defeated; perhaps Cicero felt, initially, that his job was 
done.    Cicero did write to plead with Brutus to return to Rome to defend the res publica, in 
                                                             
14 The Fifth Philippic presents Cicero’s argument in a series of Senate meetings that began on 1 January 
43, and the Ninth was given c. 4 February, in a meeting proposing honours for Ser. Sulpicius Rufus (Ibid. 
pp.23, 25, 63 & 536-540).  
15 App., B Civ., 3.89.  
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the absence of consuls, and seems to have continued to try to guide Octavian.16  However, 
defeat came with Octavian’s refusal to pursue Antonius, his demand for the consulship, and, 
with the establishment of the Second Triumvirate whose designated role was rei publicae 
constituendae – the reorganisation of the res publica.17  Part of this process was the revocation 
of Caesar’s policy of clementia and the establishment of proscription lists that would enable 
the triumvirs to raise money and land for their troops, and also rid them of dangerous enemies 
- amongst them, Cicero.18  Cicero might be regarded to have failed in his bid to restore his res 
publica.  However, Antonius’ determination to remove him shows how dangerous the triumvir 
believed the orator’s understanding of the constitution and approach to political action – not 
to mention his rhetorical skills – to be to his position and his understanding of the res publica.  
As a series of speeches with a definite aim – the removal of Antonius from Roman political 
life – the Philippics offered a very public expression of Cicero’s political thought.   With the 
exception of the Second they would have had an instant reception from their audience and 
needed to have an immediate impact on them in order to elicit a response.19    As such, 
although the Philippics reflect the same fundamental understanding of the constitution as de 
Officiis, Cicero’s expression of some of the political concepts on which he founded his 
constitutional strategy changed as he fit them to the new location and audiences of his 
discourse.    These reformulations were intended to have a different kind of impact upon the 
constitutional discourse, as Cicero sought to persuade a wide audience of his argument with 
an immediate effect.   In this last, at least, Cicero was successful, for while Antonius could 
choose to ignore the comments and arguments of de Officiis he could not ignore those of the 
Philippics.  Both the Philippics and Antonius’ response to Cicero had an immediate effect on 
events at Rome.  They did not, however, have the effect Cicero intended, as he failed to 
convince his audience that Antonius should be declared a hostis until after the battle of 
Mutina.  He was not able to convince the Senate and people to act against Antonius, even as 
his attempts to do so shaped Antonius’ discourse.    In the end, Cicero’s discourse did not 
restore the constitution of the res publica as he understood it, but it was an important part of 
                                                             
16 Cic., Ad Brut., 1.10.3-5; 12.1; 15.10,12.  
17 MRR 2.337. 
18 App., B Civ., 4.8-11 gives a version of the edict. Rawson (1992b) p.486. 
19 Of course, the speeches as we possess them are the result of Cicero’s publication of them. See 
Manuwald (2007) pp.54-90 for a discussion of the publication of the Philippics and the potential 
difference between the originals and the surviving versions.   She argues for a basic similarity between 
the delivered and published versions, with the changes being stylistic rather than argumentative. 
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the discourse that renegotiated the constitution after Caesar’s death and which led to the 
establishment of the second triumvirate in a reinterpreted constitution. 
 
2. Constructing the res publica 
Cicero’s formulation of the constitution in 44-43 was directed by his understanding of the 
res publica as a community of citizens; a discursive strategy that he sought to see constituted 
in Roman political knowledge as the understanding of the constitution.   In expressing this 
theme, Cicero’s discourse focused on two main aspects of the constitution: citizenship and 
Rome’s political institutions and practices, the key concepts out of which he formed his 
understanding of the constitution being virtus, honestum, gloria, good speech, the populus 
Romanus, the Senate and Rome’s magistrates.  He drew these concepts together in describing 
an understanding of the constitution in which the proper functioning of Rome’s institutions 
depended upon the maintenance of good relationships between them, these being dependent 
upon the good character and behaviour of the citizen, exemplified in speech.   This section will 
break down Cicero’s depiction of the constitution to show the way in which he formulated his 
understandings of these concepts.  It will look first at the character of the good citizen, which 
was the foundational concept of his res publica, before turning to Rome’s political 
constitutions and the relationships between them.  This will illustrate the importance of good 
citizenship in Cicero’s res publica, an idea to which we will return in considering Cicero’s 
expression of the relationship between the citizen and the civitas, focusing on his conception 
of the importance of good speech as the centrepiece of this relationship and the key element 
in upholding the constitution at Rome. 
 
(a) Political Behaviour: The importance of the Good Citizen 
Cicero’s concern with the nature of the good Roman citizen had been apparent throughout 
his earlier political, philosophical and rhetorical treatises, and it only increased during the 
years of Caesar’s dictatorship, as Cicero came to see Caesar himself as the major problem 
destroying the res publica. Texts such as the Tusculan Disputations, Brutus, and de Senectute 
reflect this in their focus on the nature and role of the good citizen from his education as a 
young man, through his career as a politician, to his old age.20   Cicero continued to express his 
                                                             
20 For example Cic., Rep., 1.69 on the potential for bad citizenship to damage the constitution, and de 
Republica as a whole as a work, “de optimo statu civitatis et de optimo cive,” – on the best condition of 
the polity and the best citizen, with book five focusing on the character of the ideal statesman.   De 
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belief in the importance of good citizenship to the res publica after Caesar’s assassination, 
determined to ensure that no individual would attain powers like Caesar’s again.  The 
description of the good citizen and the duties he should undertake to be regarded as 
honourable was the focus of de Officiis; the core argument of which was that the citizen could 
only be good if his deeds benefited the res publica.   Cicero’s formulation of the good citizen 
and his place in the res publica brought together his conceptions of several ideas, including 
beneficentia, animi magnitudo, decorum and, most importantly, iustitia.  The combination of 
these positive characteristics, Cicero argued, spurred the citizen towards the performance of 
certain duties, the discharge of which supported the constitution, enabled Rome’s institutions 
to function properly, and qualified the citizen to be regarded as a man of virtus and honestum.   
These ideas recurred in the Philippics as Cicero attacked Antonius, portraying him as a bad 
citizen whose victory would mean the final destruction of the res publica.  Here however, he 
expressed them in a different way, adapting to the different location and audiences and using 
virtus as a ‘tag’ to describe individuals he wished to praise and promote rather than as 
complex philosophical virtue, reflecting the different modalities of political oratory.     
There has been much discussion in classical scholarship as to the meaning of virtus in Rome.  
Often translated as ‘courage’ or ‘virtue’, while it is widely accept that virtus is, etymologically, 
fundamentally that quality which is the proper characteristic of a man, opinion as to the nature 
of the characteristic is divided.21  The key debate is about the ‘original’ meaning of the term, 
the development of its ethical connotations and the influence of Greek thought upon the 
Roman understanding of virtus: that it had, by the late Republic, developed a network of 
potential meanings is generally accepted.22   McDonnell has argued that the original Roman 
understanding of virtus was of martial prowess and courage in the face of the enemy, and that 
a more ethical understanding developed in later in the Republic, stemming from Greek 
influence as Roman thinkers adopted ideas from the Greek idea of arête.23   Kaster has 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Oratore, too, was concerned with the character of the best citizen, in this case the citizen-as-orator.    
See Gildenhard (2007) pp.2-4, 63, 90 on Cicero’s articulation of the importance of the citizen and civic 
education in the face of the tyranny of Caesar in the Tusculan Disputations, Dugan (2005) pp.172-332 on 
citizen behaviour, virtus and ingenium in the Brutus and the Orator, and Van der Blom (2003) p.291 and 
Powell (1988) pp.1-4 on Cato Maior de Senectute.  
21 Cic., Tusc., 2.43; Hellegouarc'h (1963) p.485. 
22 See for example Earl (1961) and Earl (1967); Barton (2001); Balmaceda (2005); Kaster (2005); 
McDonnell (2006); Kaster (2007).  
23 McDonnell (2006) suggests that one of the problems of the late Republic was a contest between these 
two different understandings of virtus, personifying this contest in the figures of Caesar, who he argues 
continued to see virtus as military prowess (Caes., B Civ., 3.59.1-3), and Cicero, who he presents as co-
opting Greek ideas about virtue (pp.9-10, 110). 
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disagreed with this idea that virtus’ meaning changed under Greek influence, suggesting that 
the different kinds of virtus (military and moral or ethical) originated in Rome’s division 
between the military and the civil spheres.24    Others, including Barton, Earl and Balmaceda 
have argued for a community-orientated understanding of virtus, the last claiming that 
courage and military prowess was not entirely focused on the individual but also on the 
defence of the community.25    It is not my purpose here to provide an in-depth discussion of 
the nature or development of the concept of virtus at Rome, but to show that are numerous 
possible readings of the meaning and uses of the term.  Indeed, the inability of modern 
academics to wrestle virtus into a single coherent concept seems to stem from the way that 
the Romans came to understand political concepts such as virtus through a discussion of what 
they might, or might not, incorporate.    
In 44-43 we can see Cicero grappling with this problem as he discussed the virtutes and 
virtus of the Roman citizen, using virtutes to describe individual positive qualities and virtus as 
a general cover term for such qualities, including military valour and the defence of the res 
publica, and also as a defining quality of the good citizen.   This section will examine Cicero’s 
construction of the good citizen and the nature of the qualities he argued that this individual 
should and should not possess. These objects include wisdom, decorum, beneficentia, animi 
magnitude and justice. Whilst objects in Cicero’s formulation of the good citizen, these 
elements were also concepts in themselves, expressed in terms of the objects in relation to 
which Cicero understood them.   Justice was the most important, described by Cicero as the, 
“Sovereign mistress and queen of all the virtues,” 26  which guides all the qualities of the good 
citizen and directs him towards his duties as a member of the res publica.27 The importance of 
the res publica in directing the nature and duties of the good citizen will become clear in this 
section, and will be returned to again in section 2(c) in discussing Cicero’s understanding of the 
individual citizen’s place within the res publica.  
Cicero’s conception of justice is based on two core principles: (i) that one should not harm 
another person unless unjustly attacked, and (ii) that communal property serves communal 
interests and private property private interests.28   Both elements depend upon citizens 
maintaining good faith (fides) and fairness (aequitas), which require the honouring of 
                                                             
24 Kaster (2005) p.54.  Cf.,  McDonnell (2007) and Kaster (2007).  
25 Barton (2001) pp.36, 88-130, 281-283; Earl (1967) pp.21, 113; Balmaceda (2005) pp.21-58.  
26 Cic., Off., 3.28.  
27 Cic., Off., 1.26, 31, 43-44, 62-64, 94. Atkins (1990) pp.258, 260 & 266.   
28 Cic., Off., 1.20.  
 
 
56 | P a g e  
 
agreements and promises and the treatment of others with kindness, and both had their 
origins in Roman legal culture.29 In de Officiis Cicero quoted Q. Mucius Scaevola, the Pontifex, 
as having said that bona fides was the key element in a transaction, emphasising the 
importance of mutual responsibility in relationships as being at stake.30    He also cites the 
example of Regulus to underline the traditional importance of fides in the Roman constitution. 
Regulus’ behaviour upheld the constitution, and is contrasted with that of Dolabella in 44-43, 
which shows the problems that could result from its breaking.31  Cicero took these legal 
arguments and precedents and interpreted them in relation to the wider world of the res 
publica, with fides becoming not only an important aspect of legal connections, but also of the 
relationship between citizens in the constitution.32   This connection between Cicero’s 
understanding of justice and Roman law was also an important element in Cicero’s 
presentation of the relationship between the citizen and the res publica, to which we will 
return in section 2(c). 
Also important to Cicero’s conception of justice are those negative elements that the 
citizen should avoid: the things that might tempt one away from justice, and those that are 
unjust in themselves.  The latter include cunning, malice (malitia) and fraudulent 
interpretation of the law, and constitute injustice because they break fides.33   Pretence and 
concealment are also considered unjust: to seem to be a vir bonus when really behaving falsely 
is said to be the worst injustice, because it deceives one’s fellow citizens.   Meanwhile, the 
main temptations that may lead one astray and into such behaviour are avaritia and the desire 
(cupido) for imperium, honos and gloria, which Cicero includes amongst the things man gains 
by chance, rather than by nature.34    Since these things are not man’s natural possessions and 
must be earned or won, the way in which a man chooses to try to gain them is important, and 
determines whether he is to be regarded as a man of honour.  A sense of justice guides the 
behaviour of the citizen, drawing them away from these temptations and directing their 
duties.  
                                                             
29 Harries (2006) p.54 & 71 notes that Cicero understood aequitas to be a principle of proportional 
fairness that might be phrased as ‘rendering to each his own.’ 
30 Cic., Off., 3.70.  
31 Cic., Phil., 9.10; 11.5; Off., 1.15; 3.104, 111.   
32 Cic., Off., 1.15, 23, 45, 50, 64.  Harries (2006) pp.23-25, 54 & 71.  
33 Cic., Off., 1.28, 33, 62; 2.14; 3.96.   
34 Cic., Off., 1.64; 115; 2.71. It is important to note that Sallust, too, saw the rise in avaritia, and ambitio 
and cupido for such things as imperium and gloria as part of the explanation for Rome’s decline as 
examples. 
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In de Officiis, justice is integrally associated with the guiding of the citizen’s service of the 
res publica.  It enables the citizen to balance his own interests with those of the res publica: 
the personal desire for knowledge against the need to serve the res publica; the ambition for 
success and glory against the stability of the polity that gave these things meaning. Such 
personal interests and desires originated in man’s character, in qualities that might either be 
regarded as ‘good’ or ‘bad’, depending on whether they manifested themselves in acts that 
were beneficial to the res publica or not.     Without a sense of justice Rome’s citizens could  
not make these judgement calls and might come to put their own interests, or those of a group 
or factio, ahead of the res publica, leading to civil strife35   
 Caesar exemplified the damage that Cicero believed the citizen’s divergence from justice 
might do to Rome.  In de Officiis Caesar is described as having perverted the laws in order to 
gain sovereign power, his desire for gloria, potentia, honos and imperium having led him in the 
wrong direction – that is, to focus on self-interest rather than on the interests of Rome.    
Cicero went so far as to say that the loss of fides that comes from a citizen’s decision to gain 
power and authority through fear rather than love had caused the res publica to be lost 
forever.36   In saying this he attacked not only Caesar, but also Antonius and Dolabella, whom 
he later accused of having broken faith with the people of Rome.37  Caesar’s behaviour 
emphasised to Cicero the importance of justice in grounding all the duties of the citizen and 
also the importance of training and guidance in keeping a citizen on the right path.38  To 
behave without justice, as he believed Caesar did, was to forfeit true honestum/honestas and 
                                                             
35 Cic., Off., 1.85-86.    
36 Cic., Off., 2.29.  
37 Cic., Phil., 3.30; 11.5.  
38 Connolly (2007) pp.78, 114-115 has noted a tension in Cicero’s thought between the role of nature 
and the role of culture and choice in the creation of the ideal citizen: while his formulation emphasises 
the importance of man’s natural reason in good citizenship (Off., 1.11-15; 3.74-75), the good citizen is 
only fully formed through the (natural) restraint of their natural desires and through cultural processes, 
in particular through oratorical training.  Although Cicero seeks to tie his formulation of the honourable 
citizen to nature through reason, he cannot escape the fact that men need to be trained or guided to 
the understanding that it is natural to act honourably and in the best interests of the res publica.   
Nature alone is not enough: although it forms man by giving him reason, man also needs training and 
guidance in order to recognise and cultivate those things that are naturally good.  Men do not always 
naturally follow their reason; sometimes they are unreasonable and act dishonourably.  The way to 
counter this, and ensure that man follows the path of his natural goodness, is through training and 
education – the cultural element of the formation of the citizen and the res publica.   Cicero’s texts and 
speeches in 44-43 aimed to provide such training and guidance, instructing his fellow citizens in good 
behaviour and persuading them of the proper relationship between citizen and res publica, and the right 
course of action to take to save the res publica strife.  
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also to damage and possibly destroy the res publica.39  Antonius and Dolabella, in Cicero’s 
eyes, had the potential to do this, and he sought to warn his audience/students of it.  
Throughout de Officiis Cicero emphasised the way in which justice mediates the other 
qualities and characteristics required by the good citizen.  It is justice that ensures that the 
search for knowledge and wisdom does not get separated from practical political activity, 
becoming “Lame and defective,” for it prevents the citizen becoming all consumed by his study 
and from injuring the res publica by withdrawing his knowledge and wisdom from the 
community.40    Cicero believed that the good citizen required knowledge in order to make the 
right decisions for himself and the res publica.41   Cicero cited the example of Servius Sulpicius 
Rufus to show the importance of these citizen qualities to the constitution. His knowledge gave 
him an understanding of justice and jurisprudence that Cicero describes as being almost divine 
in nature, and which enabled him to serve the res publica through the interpretation of Rome’s 
statutes and civil law and the settlement of disputes.42  This depiction of Sulpicius was in stark 
contrast to the character of Antonius, with whom Cicero was implicitly comparing him, and 
who possessed, in Cicero’s view, little justice or wisdom. Cicero argued that Antonius’ 
behaviour revealed him to be someone who did not understand Rome, its traditions, its 
magistrates, or its gods, and who could not act properly within the res publica.43 
                                                             
39 Cic., Off., 1.26,  Cf., 1.64 where Cicero says that men who seek to be princeps, as he said that Caesar 
did, refuse to be restrained by any argument or public and lawful authority (publico ac legitimo iure) and 
often turn out to be bribers or agitators (largitores et factiosi) who seek supreme power in order to be 
superiors by force than equal by justice.   
40 Cic., Off., 1.63, 153; Pl. La., 197b;  Men., 246c.   See Dyck (1996) p.104 on the relationship between 
Cicero’s cognitio and Panaetius’ division of the honourable, and p.340-344 on the logical problems of 
Cicero’s attempt to retain cognitio as the first virtue whilst making clear that social obligations are the 
more important officia.    
41 Cic., Off., 1.13, 155. In de Oratore Cicero has the character Antonius describe Crassus’ presentation of 
the best orator as follows: “He seemed to me to extend the single function and title of orator over all 
subjects and arts” (de Or., 1.213).  Although Antonius decries this, defining the orator as, “Someone 
who, in cases such as commonly arise in the forum, is able to employ language pleasant to the ear, and 
thoughts suited to persuade,” Cicero’s understanding of the ideal orator as revealed throughout de 
Oratore demands the level of knowledge outlined by Crassus in book one, and by Antonius in book two, 
after he admits that he had previously sought only to refute Crassus and entice his pupils from him 
(2.40).   In de Officiis the search for knowledge is directly associated with philosophy and the Greek 
philosophers (1.155), but Cicero also expressed the sentiment that the good citizen must have the 
requisite knowledge for the career he chooses, be it philosophy, civil law or oratory (1.115).  It is 
philosophy, however, that leads the individual to an understanding of such qualities as justice and 
prudence.  
42 Cic., Phil., 9.10. Sulpicius’ service to Rome is resonant of Cicero’s discussion of the duty of the citizens 
in relation to their individual natures and talents and career choices at Off., 1.114-119, where he 
described it as a duty to do one’s best in the field that one has chosen and discussed the honour that 
accrues from this.  
43 Cic., Phil., 1.12-13, 33; 2.19, 81; 3.9-10, 30;  5.7, 10. 
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Justice also mediates the citizen’s behaviour by enabling him to understand the true nature 
of decorum and the proper way to behave in the res publica.   For Cicero, decorum is 
concerned with, “The orderliness (ordo) and moderation (modus) of everything that is said and 
done, wherein consist temperance (temperantia) and self-control (modestia).”44  As such, it 
rests on three principles: (i) the submission of appetite to reason, (ii) the careful evaluation of 
the importance of desired objectives so that the appropriate care and attention may be 
expended upon them, and (iii) the observation of moderation in all that is essential to man’s 
outward appearance.45      The qualities of the man of decorum, therefore, include constantia, 
moderatio, temperantia and verecundia (steadfastness, moderation, temperance and modesty 
or considerateness) displayed through prudent speech and action, and the repression of 
passion, including desire (cupido), fear (metus), rage (libido), and pleasure (voluptas).46  Justice 
is the guide of such a citizen, for all things that are just are proper, and all things that are 
unjust are improper.47   Justice adds good faith and fairness to man’s natural qualities, working 
in harmony to produce the behaviour appropriate to a free man, enabling  decorum to govern 
and check the behaviour of the individual, safeguarding the res publica from the dangers of 
desire, ambition and licence.    
Cicero believed that decorum should guide the behaviour of the good citizen in all areas of 
his life, directing the kind of man he wished to be and the calling he wished to follow. 48   It sets 
rules for the behaviour of the citizen and directs them to the fulfilment of their ingenium in 
their choice of public role – be it philosophy, oratory or civil law.49   Decorum also acts as a 
guide to the citizen in communication: without it, man’s speech may be inappropriate, 
offensive, or even false.   The danger of this in a polity in which decisions were made through a 
                                                             
44 Cic., Off., 1.15, 94,100, 101-102. 
45 Cic., Off., 1.141.   
46 Cic., Off., 1.101-102. We will see that many of these appetites are also opposed to the true expression 
of the magnitudo animi, marking the animi perturbatio. Arena (2007b) pp.53-58, 65 argues that this 
freedom from fear is one of the factors that makes a Roman  citizen truly free.  
47 Cic., Off., 1.94. Stone (1999) pp.67-68 has argued (from Off., 1.159) that even justice is made to yield 
to decorum, however as Cicero’s understanding of decorum is itself rooted in justice, this is a false 
dichotomy.  Stone reads haec communitas as justice, rather than the community, which is to misread 
Cicero’s argument. Cicero refers to the second of his virtues, those things that support the communitas, 
(community), of which justice is a part, but not the whole. Cicero states that the wise man (who must 
have a sense of justice) will not think it right to behave in a way that is not decorous (which is a quality 
aware of what is just), because it cannot ever be truly in the interests of the res publica for the wise man 
do so.   Therefore, there can never be any true conflict between justice and decorum, or indeed 
between the communitas and decorum. 
48 Cic., Off., 1.103-140.  
49 Cic., Off., 1.103, 114-118. 
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process of verbal debate was clear to Cicero, as we shall see below.50   Without decorum, 
relationships between citizens in the civitas would be difficult to maintain, for each would put 
themselves first, above the interests of each other and above the res publica.   Cicero’s 
emphasis on the importance of decorum in the character of the good citizen was stimulated by 
the way he saw Antonius behaving.   The Philippics included vivid descriptions of Antonius’ 
improper behaviour: his relationship with Curio; his tendency towards violence, including 
political violence; and his abuse of his magistracies.51 He is described as profligatus, impudicus, 
effeminatus, a man of lust and cruelty (libido, crudelitas) who has no moderation or self-
respect (moderatio, pudor).52   Antonius’ behaviour, as Cicero describes it, did not serve the res 
publica, only himself.  It made him a bad citizen, a bad magistrate, and a danger to Rome.     
The temptation to put oneself before the res publica was something Cicero saw as a 
dangerous quality of the citizen’s animus.  He believed that justice and decorum were the 
guard against this, preventing the citizen man from indulging his animus and acting purely out 
of self-interest in a quest for gloria and thus damaging the res publica. The good citizen who 
achieves this balance is said to possess an animi magnitudo.      Cicero’s conception of the 
animi magnitudo focuses on the mental, rather than the physical, qualities of the man who 
possesses it.  Its key elements are fortitudo and reason (ratio), and it is expressed in the 
performance of great deeds.   These deeds are those that sustain and support the  res publica – 
Cicero once again expressing the belief that the character and deeds of the citizen were central 
to the stability of the polity.  
Cicero describes fortitudo as that virtue (virtus) which champions aequitas and justice, and 
encourages an indifference to circumstances, through the conviction that only that which is 
                                                             
50 Connolly (2007) pp.170-171 & 270-272, argues that decorum was primarily an aesthetic quality that 
provided a performative index of acts of the body and tongue that enables the citizen to articulate the 
ethicocivic goals Cicero laid out at the start of de Officiis.   She sees Cicero’s particular interest in 
decorum as being in its role of governing oratorical practice, arguing that the ideal citizen is the one 
whose decorum is manifest in heterogeneity of speech, where it censors elite arrogance and superiority 
and enables the speaker to bring the audience together with him as equals and reinforce communal 
identity. Whilst Cicero is certainly concerned with oratory throughout his works, and does frame 
arguments for the orator as the ideal citizen, this is less to the fore in de Officiis than his concern for 
decorum as an ethical virtue that should govern the behaviour of all citizens in the res publica in 
whatever field for which their ingenium best fits them (Cf.,  Dyck (1996) p.241 who argues that Cicero 
moved the term from the aesthetic to the ethical sphere). Nature grants individuals with universal and 
particular characters, the latter of which should be guided by decorum in choosing a career (Cic., Off., 
1.107-118).  Decorum thus guides the citizen through their lives in a way that does not endanger the res 
publica.  
51 Cic., Phil., 1.6, 12-13, 26-27; 2.44-45, 51, 53; 3.24, 30; 5.10; 6.3; 13.5. 
52 Cic., Phil., 3.1, 12, 28, 35; 4.21; 5.6.  
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honourable is important and one should not be subject to passion or fortune.53     This is 
displayed in a refusal to be overcome by fear, desire, pain or pleasure, anger, or avarice – the 
qualities of injustice and indecorousness.54   Such avoidance of excessive emotion (animi 
perturbatio) brings a calm spirit and displays decorum, allowing the animi magnitudo to be 
expressed through performance of great deeds, which leads to the attainment glory indicative 
of a great spirit.55   Such deeds also required the citizen to possess magnum ingenium - great 
talent.   It is this quality that provides the citizen with his gifts, fits him for particular roles and 
careers and allows him, through the application of reason to consider the possible 
consequences of actions and events.56  It also inspires deeds that display a man’s talent, and its 
courage and spirit are those that uphold the res publica.  They include the attainment of civil 
and military offices; involvement in the direction of the res publica, through politics or 
administration of the law; the defence of libertas; a willingness to engender one’s own welfare 
rather than that of the public; and even tyrannicide.57  It is these deeds that bring a man gloria 
and cause him to be considered honourable by his fellow citizens.58    
Cicero acknowledges the danger of some of the qualities of the animi magnitudo, noting 
that, “From this greatness of spirit spring all too readily self-will and excessive lust for 
power.”59  Such a desire might distract a man from putting the res publica first and lead him to 
focus instead on his own self-interest and wishes.    This could show itself in several ways: it 
could lead men to seek war in order to gain gloria, or turn them away from argument and 
public or lawful authority towards bribery and agitation (factio).60  The greater a man’s spirit, 
Cicero worried, the more he would want to become the foremost citizen or sole ruler.   Justice 
was the quality that restrained the animus, preventing it from carrying out acts that would 
harm other citizens, through the sense of aequitas inherent to it and through the decorum it 
                                                             
53 Balmaceda (2005) p.48 suggests that Cicero deliberately chose to use fortitudo, rather than virtus, as 
his term for courage in de Officiis in order to avoid confusing his readers when he uses virtus as an 
overarching ethical term.   He defines fortitudo at Rep., 5.7.9 as a “Virtus called fortitudo, which is made 
up of nobility of spirit and an entire contempt for pain and death.”  It was not a common term before 
Cicero took it up, although fortis was used as an adjective associated with virtus (McDonnell (2006) p.61 
& Hellegouarc'h (1963) pp.247-248).    
54 Cic., Off., 1.62; 66; 68-69.  
55 Cic., Off., 1.67 - 69.   
56 Cic., Off., 1.81; 2.46.  
57 Cic., Off.,  1.68, 70-72, 92.  
58 Cic., Off., 1.67. 
59 Cic., Off., 1.64.  
60 Cic., Off., 1.64, 74, 85.  In this latter part, Cicero is clearly thinking of Antonius who had effectively 
ceased from discourse and debate in the Senate by mid-44.   Schofield (2009) p.208 notes that Cicero’s 
critique of magnitude animi in de Officiis was unprecedented in his work.  
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inspired.61    Without justice and decorum, a man’s animus could not be considered a 
magnitudo animi.    
Cicero cited Octavian, Trebonius and Sulpicius as examples of men who used their ingenium 
in the service of the res publica, Trebonius, notably, in his role in the conspiracy to assassinate 
Caesar.62   In contrast he compared Octavian’s ingenium to that of Caesar, who, he argued, 
wasted his mind and his talents in satisfying the populus through demagoguery, ignoring the 
advice of the Senate and the good men (boni) and pursuing his own aggrandisement in a way 
that a free people (liberi populi) could not tolerate.63    In the Philippics, too, Cicero implied 
that Caesar’s misused ingenium and the damage his actions did to the constitution meant that 
he was not truly a man of magnitudo animi. However it was Antonius who more immediately 
inspired Cicero’s exploration of a ‘false’ magnitudo animi.    Cicero argued that if the animus 
does not act on fortitudo but is inspired by self-interest (cupido), then the citizen must be said 
to display audacia (audacity), and can be described as having an animi perturbatio – a 
disturbed or passionate spirit.64  Audacia is a characteristic regularly ascribed to Antonius in 
the Philippics linked to his utter lack of decorum.  Cicero used audacia to reveal Antonius as 
bold and reckless, a man who doesn’t care if his actions harm others or harm the res publica as 
                                                             
61 Cic., Off., 1.64.  
62 Cic., Phil., 5.49; 9.12; 11.9. 
63 Cic., Phil., 5.49.  His comment on Caesar suggests that he broke fides with the populus through this 
behaviour, misleading them, although it also suggests, perhaps unintentionally, that the people were 
easily mislead through demagoguery.  Manuwald (2007) p.719 notes that Cicero’s criticism of Caesar 
places emphasis on the importance of the relationship between the individual and the Senate within the 
res publica.   The boni do not feature prominently in Cicero’s discourse after the assassination of Caesar.   
In the Philippics he urges Calenus to listen to the boni (10.6) who will guide him away from Antonius.  He 
also declares that, “Nature makes good citizens (boni cives) in the first place, then fortune aids” (13.16).  
In such a formulation, it seems that the boni incorporated all those citizens Cicero judged to be ‘good’ 
and to have the interests of the res publica at heart.  As Galbraith (2005) p.124ff notes in discussing the 
use of the term in a fragment of Cato the Elder (ORF4, Cato, 8.6.58 = Gell. 10. 3.17-18), there was no 
fundamental opposition between boni and populares, and follows Hellegouarc'h (1963) p.485 in arguing 
that the bonus vir was one who, “Manifests in his character the highest reaches of a vir, that is to say 
virtus.”  Galbraith argues that bonus in public discourse held a social and moral judgement, rather than a 
political one, but that such judgement eventually became a part of political partisanship, concluding 
(p.155) that the terms boni, optimas and optimate should be seen as words over which opponents 
would compete in order to support their arguments.   Although the term is not widely employed in de 
Officiis and the Philippics, when it does appear Cicero does indeed lay claim to the boni as those who 
were ‘good citizens’ in his formulation of the concept, defining this ‘group’ on his own terms.  
64 Cic., Off., 1.63, 102.  We can see, from this, the importance of the good citizen’s understanding of key 
Roman political terms and the need for proper use of language within the res publica. See section 3(iv) 
below for further discussion of this. 
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long as they provide him enjoyment or benefit.65  Antonius did not restrain his passions, was 
not a good citizen and did not understand, and therefore could not fulfil, the duties he owed to 
the res publica.   The animus without justice and fortitudo, such as that of Antonius, could not 
be regarded as true animi magnitudo.   As Cicero said: “Not only has it no element of virtus, 
but its nature is barbarous and revolting to all our finer feelings (humanitas).”66  In this way, 
Cicero aimed to redefine the idea of the great man in Roman public life post-Caesar, rejecting 
both Caesar and Antonius’ understandings of the great Roman as being dangerous to the res 
publica and offering his own reformulation of citizenship, in which the good citizen and great 
man is not he who achieves the most, but he who does most in the service of the res publica.  
The last of the major objects in Cicero’s formation of the good citizen in de Officiis is 
beneficentia and its coevals, benignitas (kindness) and liberalitas (liberality, generosity).    At its 
most basic a system of favours, true beneficence is extended though opera (work, service) and 
industria (diligence, industry), such as the protection of a man’s legal rights by assisting with 
counsel, or through one’s eloquence.67  Money may be given with discretion and moderation 
to ransom captives, assume friends’ debts, help with provision of dowries or acquisition of 
property and also to pay for public building works, but generosity (liberalitas) is not to be 
confused with extravagance (prodigentia).68  The aim of all service, if it is to constitute 
beneficentia rather than largitio (bribery), is the benefit of the res publica, which it achieves by 
strengthening social bonds and common interests,  because beneficentia in its true form is not 
simply about self-interest but about serving one’s fellow citizens and the res publica.  Cicero 
declared that the first principle guiding an act of kindness is that it does not injure the 
recipient or others: “By the standard of justice all acts of kindness must be measured.” 69   
Justice and in particular, aequitas, must guide all acts of kindness, not only as regards their 
direct impact upon the recipient but also as regards the giver, who must not give beyond his 
means, and the worth (dignitas) of the recipient: generosity must be fair to all.70   The worth of 
                                                             
65 Cic., Phil., 1.63; 2.1, 4, 9, 19, 43, 44, 64, 68, 90; 3.28, 35; 5.10, 41; 6.2, 28; 8.21; 9.15; 11.5; 13.10, 
13.28.  Manuwald (2007) p.106 & 323 describes this as part of the Roman oratorical practice of 
invective.  
66 Cic., Off., 1.62,  
67 Cic., Off., 2.54, 65-66.   
68 Cic., Off., 2.55-56, 60. Although Cicero thinks it better to give to deserving individuals, rather than 
spend lavishly spending on public exhibitions (2.60, 63). 
69 Cic., Off., 1.42.  See also 1.44, where Cicero says that nothing is generous if it is not just, and 1.48, 
where Cicero declares that the vir bonus must always requite kindness, as long as he can do so without 
iniuria (injustice).  
70 Cic., Off., 1.42, 44-45. The acts of Sulla and Caesar in transferring property should not be regarded as 
generosity, according to Cicero.  
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a recipient is established by their virtutes, particularly temperance (temperantia), self-control 
(modestia), and justice; in other words, by their decorum.71   
Cicero’s understanding of beneficentia is also formed in opposition to certain objects.  The 
duties associated with beneficentia must come from a just sense of what is needed, not a 
selfish desire to receive in return, whether that return be financial or in the form of reputation 
or gloria.72  Such desire (cupiditas) perverts the guidance that justice should provide.  It leads 
to such actions as the plunder and misappropriation of property in order to supply gifts that 
will secure personal gain for the giver.73    These are the deeds of Antonius after Caesar’s death 
for, according to Cicero, he thought only of profit and plunder, he sold exemptions, granted 
freedom to communities, removed provinces from the jurisdiction of the people and brought 
exiles back to Rome, all in pursuit of his own interests as he sought to gain support for his 
position.74      Such activities, Cicero argued, are born out of the desire for glory and mark false 
kindness.  They are not true liberalitas, and the proper term for them is largitio (bribery) not 
beneficentia.75  Such denial of mutual obligation, social ties or a common interest in favour of 
self-interest demolishes the social fabric of the civitas, and thus the res publica.76  This is where 
justice is important, for it guides the citizen in their understanding of what is best for the polity 
as a whole and directs them to pursue these ends in their expression of beneficentia.  
In discussing each of these attributes of the good citizen: justice, decorum, kindness and 
generosity, and greatness of spirit, Cicero offered descriptions that centred firmly upon the 
good of the res publica.   This involved the reclamation of key political terminology and 
concepts, in which he defined appropriate behaviour by focusing on the citizen’s identity as a 
member of the community.77  His arguments were formulated in opposition to the behaviour 
                                                             
71 Cic., Off., 1.46.   
72 Cic., Off., 1.43, 49.  
73 Cic., Off., 2.85. This ties in with Cicero’s understanding that justice should ensure the safeguarding of 
private property (1.20). 
74 Cic., Phil., 3.30.  
75 Cic., Off., 1.44.   Here we see Cicero’s belief that Roman political vocabulary had become corrupted, 
with certain terms and concepts being misunderstood and misused.  This is an idea that recurs in his 
work after Caesar’s death, and also in Sallust’s historiography.  Of course, one can argue that Cicero 
spun the term largitio in order to portray certain kinds of behaviour in a negative light:  Largitio may 
also be understood to mean giving freely or generosity, as well as bribery, but Cicero focused on the 
negative connotations in order to make his point about the kinds of activities that constitute the 
concept he seeks to promote as ‘honourable’. Nonetheless, although Cicero chose to overlook his own 
possible complicity in the misuse of political language, the importance of the theme in Roman political 
thought remains.   
76 Cic., Off., 3.28.   
77 See 3.2(c).   
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he believed had damaged the res publica in recent years, primarily that of Caesar, whose 
dictatorship he believed had damaged the bonds of fides and aequitas that had to exist 
between citizens in order that the civitas could function as a political system, and that of 
Antonius, whose individualistic understanding of the res publica Cicero believed would lead 
him to dominate and destroy Rome.  This process of redefinition can also be seen Cicero’s 
expression of another key political term:  dignitas.  This was a prominent quality in Roman 
political discourse in the Republican era, a positive characteristic that citizens were eager to 
claim they possessed, but which did not have one clear definition, and which Caesar had 
employed in defence of his actions in 49.  Cicero sought to reclaim it from Caesar, turning away 
from his focus on the achievements of the individual, and formulating dignitas as a quality 
defined by the behaviour of the individual within the polity,  and which, like the cardinal 
virtues discussed above, was rooted in a sense of justice.78    
Dignitas features in Cicero’s discussion of the cardinal virtues in de Officiis as an element of 
decorum and therefore as a quality that guides the good citizen’s behaviour.  Cicero claimed 
that dignitas inspired submission to one’s auctoritas, potestas and imperium, and described it 
as stemming from moderation in one’s appearance, character and habits and not one’s 
deeds.79   In his formulation of decorum, Cicero employs dignitas as element of man’s proper 
appearance, under the heading of beauty. It avoids finery and improper gestures and manners 
in favour of those that are simple and unaffected, and describes a man possessing a good 
complexion, born of physical exercise, and with neatness.80  Dignitas returns, again connected 
with decorum, in Cicero’s discussion of beneficentia, where it is the quality determining the 
nature of the kindness that is to be extended to an individual, which must be proportional to 
that man’s dignitas, as it is shown by moderation in his character and habits.81    As noted 
above, Cicero thought that the animus had the potential to endanger the res publica through 
the individual’s desire for glory, and argued that decorum and justice were important qualities 
in restraining the citizen.   Dignitas, as part of decorum was part of that restraint, not a quality 
earned by the performance of great deeds inspired by one’s magnitudo animi.   Indeed, Cicero 
describes it as being earned by following the ‘golden mean’, rather than pursuing greatness. 82  
                                                             
78 See chapter 2.1 on Caesar’s conception of dignitas.  
79 Cic., Off., 2.22. See also Phil., 7.14.  
80 Cic., Off., 1.130.  
81 Cic., Off., 1. 42, 45.  See also Phil., 1.14 where dignitas is associated with the ability to speak without 
fear; fear being a quality that is repressed by the man who possesses decorum, and Phil., 7.14, where it 
arises from behaviour demonstrating constantia, gravitas and perseverantia.  
82 Cic., Off., 1.130: “Mediocritas optima est” 
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Cicero denied dignitas to Antonius, because his behaviour was immoderate and he lacked a 
proper sense of decorum to restrain his animus, which endangered the res publica.83   For the 
same reason, the Senators who attended Antonius’ controversial senate meetings are said as 
having gone “Unmindful of their dignitas,” because they attended a meeting that was injurious 
to the res publica.84   On the other hand, Cicero argued that the Senate would maintain its 
dignitas as a body if it acted against Antonius in accordance with justice and decorum in the 
best interests of Rome.    In asserting that dignitas was part of decorum rather than a result of 
great deeds, Cicero’s description of the good Roman citizen responded to the ideas of men like 
Caesar and Antonius, who sought to pursue and maintain dignitas through the great deeds 
that mark the animi magnitudo, and argued that they had forgotten dignitas’ ties to decorum, 
justice and the service the individual owes to the polity.  
Cicero’s reclamation and redefinition of the attributes of the good citizen in terms of the 
good of the res publica led, naturally enough, to a formulation of virtus as a quality that might 
be attained by any citizen so long as they fulfilled their duties towards the res publica.85   
However, the complexity of Cicero’s employment of the term reveals the multiple possible 
understandings of virtus that were held at Rome and the tensions between them.  Throughout 
44-43, Cicero used virtus in three ways: (i) as a general positive characteristic, (ii) to describe 
one amongst many good characteristics, and (iii) as the overall characteristic of the good 
citizen.     Thus Pansa is said to possess fortitudo, gravitas, moderatio, constantia and virtus; 
whilst the qualities of the good citizen in de Officiis - justice, wisdom, decorum and 
beneficentia - are styled virtutes, and M. Brutus is described as a man made for the res publica 
by grace of his virtus.86  These multiple uses are further complicated by Cicero’s employment 
of honestum and honestas in de Officiis, as the ultimate characteristic of the good citizen, 
attained by the performance of his duties.87   Adding to the problems of our understanding of 
                                                             
83 Cic., Phil., 12.4.  Cicero is responding to Q. Fufius Calenus, who had claimed that Antonius would be 
obedient to the Senate if he can maintain his dignitas.   
84 Cic., Phil., 3.20. 
85 That this was not the only possible understanding of virtus was shown by Sallust, in his depiction of 
Catiline (see chapter 4(ii)). Long (1995) p.224, 230, 233; Schofield (2009) p.208.  
86 Cic., Phil., 7.6-7. 10.14; Off., 1.16, 17; 3.28. 
87 There is some difficulty with Cicero’s employment of the words honestum and honestas in de Officiis.  
Lewis and Short define honestas, honestatis as honour received from others, or repute, and honestum, 
honesti as honesty, integrity or virtue, with the implication that the possession of honestas is related to 
the regard in which an individual is held, whilst honestum is an innate characteristic.  However, Cicero 
uses them interchangeably: for example, at 1.15 he presents the four qualities that lead to honestum, 
but at 1.61 these four cardinals are said to lead to honestas. Dyck (1996)  p.69 sees no difference 
between the two terms in de Officiis, whilst Hellegouarc'h (1963) p.388 suggests that honestum was the 
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the Ciceronian concept of virtus are the different aims of the two surviving texts from this 
period, as these direct different uses of the term.  In de Officiis we can see the attempt of 
Cicero the political philosopher to formulate clear understandings of virtus, honestum and the 
nature of the good citizen; whilst in the Philippics we see Cicero the politician exploit the 
different possible uses and understandings of virtus to the advantage of his argument.   These 
differing expressions of virtus reveal the way in which Rome’s political discourse about the 
constitution was shaped and the impact that this had upon the renegotiation of the 
constitution.  
In de Officiis the nature of virtus as a quality of the good citizen is established as being built 
out of the separate virtutes that are characteristic of that individual.  In book two of de Officiis, 
Cicero describes it in the following terms: “Virtus as a whole may be said practically to depend 
upon three things.  One is perceiving what is true and clear in each case… The second is 
restraining the disturbed movements of the spirit… and making the impulses… obedient to 
reason.  The third is treating those with whom we associate knowledgeably and with 
moderation…”88  These qualities of virtus align with three of his four cardinal virtues.89    The 
missing quality is the citizen’s animus, something that is explained by Cicero’s comment that 
the courageous spirit in a man without perfection and wisdom is too impetuous to mark out 
the good man (vir bonus): that is left to the other virtutes.90  The animus, unless carefully 
balanced by justice to create an animi magnitudo, is the most dangerous of the citizen’s 
attributes: necessary for the gaining of honour, but at the same time drawn to gloria, 
sometimes at the expense of the res publica.   In 44-43 Cicero reformulated virtus so that it did 
not require the expression of the animi magnitudo but only the performance of the duties 
associated with the other three virtues.91  Like the individual virtutes, virtus is focused on the 
service of the res publica above self-interest, and is not primarily interested in any benefits 
that might result.     
According to de Officiis, the natural rewards of virtus are honestum and gloria.  Whilst 
Cicero’s understanding of these ideas overlaps with virtus in many ways, they are distinguished 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
philosophical version of honestas. The idea that Cicero would have defined his usage more specifically if 
he had more time to revise the text is tempting, but must remain no more than speculation.  
88 Cic., Off., 2.18.  
89 Dyck (1996) pp.385-386.  
90 Cic., Off., 1.46 
91 Cic., Off., 1.19. Barton (2001) pp.36-37.  Schofield (2009) p.208 notes that this sees Cicero ‘picking an 
argument’ with the entire Roman aristocratic tradition on virtus, presenting his view as correct by 
claiming that he was restoring not reforming Roman virtues.  See chapter 4(II)a for more on the 
‘aristocratic tradition’ of virtus, with reference to his portrayal of Catiline.  
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by their association with the reputation of the citizen, a reputation that is, in turn, linked to the 
performance of great deeds inspired by the magnitudo animi.     Cicero argued that honestum 
cannot be fully separated from the possession of virtus for the former cannot exist without the 
latter; but also notes that it requires a man’s virtus to be recognised by his fellow citizens, 
something that occurs through the citizen’s performance of the duties that reflect the 
magnitudo animi.92   Such a citizen will gain a good reputation and be regarded as honourable.   
However, Cicero also argued that honestum had come to be misunderstood in Rome; seen as 
being earned by the individual’s personal achievements and separated from the individual’s 
service to the res publica. This misunderstanding is linked to the perversion of the animi 
magnitudo that occurs when the citizen is not guided by justice.   At the same time Cicero 
makes it clear that the apparent division between self-interest and the interest of the res 
publica which has created problems in the understanding of the true nature of animi 
magnitudo and honestum is a false dichotomy.   In Cicero’s res publica the interest of the 
citizen and the res publica are one and the same, for it is in the citizen’s interests to put the res 
publica first if he wants to be considered truly honourable.93   In the res publica as Cicero 
thought it should be, the good citizen was be the man who fulfilled his duties within the res 
publica with wisdom, justice, decorum, generosity and a great spirit.  Such a man would 
possess virtus and should also possess honestum and also gloria.   
In relating good citizenship to the stable res publica in de Officiis Cicero developed an 
argument as to why his understandings of virtus was the correct one, explaining how it upheld 
the constitution.94  In the Philippics, however, he simply employed it to describe those he 
wanted to present as good citizens. He avoided using honestum and eschewed the 
establishment of any definite meaning of virtus order to allow his audience to insert their own 
understanding of the term into his argument.  What Cicero himself believed virtus to be was 
immaterial in this kind of discourse, what was important was that he convinced his audience of 
the virtus of the people and actions he was supporting.  Cicero used virtus to describe the 
characters and deeds he wants to support, assuming that his audience knows why they are 
virtus and using rhetorical techniques to align himself with his audience in support of this 
                                                             
92 Cic., Off., 3.13.  
93 He also suggests that a similar misunderstanding has occurred regarding gloria.  The exploration and 
resolution of this tension between the honourable (honestum) and expedient (utile) is the focus of book 
three of de Officiis.  
94 Schofield (2009) p.208.  
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virtus.95   He focused on the link between virtus and service to the res publica; making it a 
double association – if a citizen has virtus it implies that they are serving the res publica, and, if 
they can be said to be serving the res publica, then they must have virtus - but he does not 
explore the nature of this service.96          
Virtus, in the Philippics, is a quality of the good citizen who serves the res publica, but the 
specific qualifications for this status remain largely hidden behind Cicero’s rhetoric. The form 
of the Philippics encourages the rhetorical creation of such a semantic vacuum: the speeches 
do not provide the space for a detailed, philosophical explanation of the qualities and activities 
that grant a man virtus: they must simply demonstrate that a man has virtus or not.    Cicero’s 
most public political discourse expresses the importance of virtus in Rome’s constitutional 
ideology, but does not seek to redefine the term in the same way that he does in de Officiis.  
He was able to avoid his argument’s rejection by those who might disagree with his own 
understanding of virtus and at the same time painted over the cracks in Rome’s constitutional 
knowledge.  By employing virtus as a tag to describe citizens and emphasising the link between 
virtus and the service of the res publica, Cicero not only demonised and de-Romanised his 
enemies but also made the nature of virtus appear incontestable, making it harder for them to 
fight back in debate and driving them towards military action.  
Just as Cicero sought to redefine the nature of the various characteristics of the good 
citizen in de Officiis, so his presentation of gloria sought to reclaim it from those he believed 
used its possession to justify actions that might damage the res publica, casting it as a quality 
that only had value within the res publica and which could not, therefore, be won by deeds 
that did not serve the interests of Rome. In this his definition of gloria resembles his 
exploration of honestum in de Officiis: its possession by a citizen depends upon public opinion, 
but this public, in the late Republic, misunderstood the true nature of the quality to be 
accorded to the citizen.    For Cicero, gloria was not a characteristic that the citizen was 
required to possess in order to be considered good or honourable, but rather a quality that 
was part of his reputation, attained through his behaviour as a good Roman. Because of this, 
Cicero’s understanding of gloria built upon his understanding of the qualities of the good 
citizen. To possess gloria, one had to behave with justice and decorum and perform the duties 
associated with beneficentia and the animi magnitudo, for “The peak and perfection of gloria 
                                                             
95 See 3.2(b)i below for discussion of the rhetorical techniques Cicero employed in speaking to the 
people.  
96 Cic., Phil., 3.8, 31; 5.35, 41; 7.6-7; 10.14; 13.24; 14.11.   
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lies in the following three things: if the masses love you, if they have faith in you (fides), if they 
think you worthy of some honour combined with admiration (admiratio, honor).”97  In the 
Philippics, rather more stirringly, gloria is described as, “The credit (laus) for laudable actions 
and the reputation (fama) earned by notable public services, approved by the testimony of the 
best of us (optimi) and also by that of the multitude.”98 
As with honestum, the deeds that contribute most to the gaining of gloria are those that 
stem from the animi magnitudo, including military service and eloquence, for they build a 
man’s reputation.99   Just as the true animi magnitudo was defined by service to the res 
publica, so Cicero defined gloria not in terms of personal success and achievement, but in the 
service rendered to the res publica.    Writing of his son’s opportunities for gaining gloria, 
Cicero bemoaned the fact that any praise young Marcus had won for his deeds in Pompeius’ 
army came to nothing with the fall of the res publica: without the res publica, military success 
was worthless in terms of gaining gloria. 100  In discussing eloquence, Cicero argued that when 
a single man dominated affairs there was no longer room for counsel (consilium) or auctoritas, 
disabling the citizen’s ability to win gloria through eloquence. The silence of the good citizen 
indicates the failure of the system, in which all citizens should be able to participate.101  The 
good citizen’s eloquence should guide and support the res publica, and thus bring him gloria.      
                                                             
97 Cic., Off., 2.31; Cf., Cic., Off., 2.31-42 and 52-64. 
98 Cic., Phil., 1.31.  He declares at 1.33 that Antonius is ignorant of vera gloria.  Speaking publicly in 
Rome, Cicero includes the crowd as one of the groups granting a man’s reputation.  In the Tusculan 
Disputations, however, he describes vera gloria as the approval of good men (laus bonorum) only. 
Cicero argues that the multitude tends to err, in contrast to the wise judgement shown by the boni, and 
that the popular understanding of gloria blinds men to the extent so that, “Some of them bring about 
the utter ruin of their country and others their own downfall.” (Tusc., 3.4. Cf., Off., 3.13-17 where Cicero 
comments that the crowd does not understand how far the common, or ‘mean’ (media) understanding 
of honestas falls from the ideal). 
99 Cic., Off., 1.65; 2.45-51. Cf., 1.72-78 for Cicero’s comparison of civil deeds with military ones in the 
duties that fulfil animi magnitudo. Cicero (Off., 1.77) associated his own eloquence with his service to 
the res publica, notably in his activities against Catiline, declaring that it was owing to his vigilance and 
counsel that Catiline was defeated.  Dugan (2005) p.20 has argued that Cicero sought to construct his 
claim to power on his intellectual and literary achievements, rather than military ones. This must 
partially have been due to his own lack of military success and inclination for it, but it is also likely to be 
the result of observing the events of the first century B.C. at Rome, including the civil wars of Marius and 
Sulla in his youth, where the successes of individual military commanders tore the res publica apart. 
Many of Cicero’s treatises, de Oratore in particular, deal with the orator as the ideal Republican citizen, 
having knowledge and wisdom, able to discern the best course of action and guide and advise the res 
publica.   
100 Cic., Off., 2.45.  
101 Indeed, Cicero suggested that it was more honourable and more worthy of glory to remain silent 
during the domination of an individual, and worried that his pro Marcello of 46 had robbed him of his 
honourable absence from public affairs (Cic., Fam., 4.4.4).  This idea recurs in the prologues of Sallust’s 
monographs (see chapter 4.2(a)).  
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Eloquence is thus established not only as an activity that brings one gloria but also as an 
essential part of Cicero’s res publica, necessary for the continued success of the polity.102  
Without the res publica, true gloria cannot exist.  The good citizen’s actions may be virtuous 
and just, but they cannot be counted glorious, because they cannot reflect glory upon the res 
publica.   
As in his philosophical presentation of the attributes of the good citizen, Cicero reclaims 
gloria arguing that there is a ‘true’ and a ‘false’ understanding the term, with the service of 
good citizen to the res publica being the defining characteristic of vera gloria.103  This vera 
gloria, rooted in the honourable performance of duties is a legitimate part of Republican 
politics for Cicero, a laudable attribute that should not be scorned.104  Like the virtues 
discussed above, man’s pursuit of gloria must be directed by his sense of justice and submitted 
to the good of the res publica.105   False gloria, however, is won by pretence and injustice 
rather than the development of fides and from the performance of activities associated with 
the false versions of the citizen’s qualities: cunning, largitio, audacia and cupido rather than 
moderatio, beneficentia and decorum.106   Things done and said out of a desire for gloria, 
rather than in support of the wellbeing of the res publica are dangerous to Rome.  This danger 
is the same as that of the animi magnitudo: Cicero acknowledges that the greater a man’s 
spirit the more likely he is to be tempted by glory (gloria cupiditate) and that, in such a 
situation, a man may desert justice.107  The gloria that he will win through deeds that lack 
justice will not be vera gloria.  Cicero’s understanding and expression of vera gloria is 
influenced by the careers of men like Caesar and Antonius who both sought and claimed 
gloria.  In order to reconstruct the res publica as a polity in which the community was more 
                                                             
102 Cic., Off., 2.2-3.  Dugan (2005) pp.232-34notes that litterae may be translated as voice or words, 
associated with one’s performance in the Senate and the forum, both of which indicate Cicero’s silence 
under Caesar. Brut., 6-7; 331-332  presents a similar theme: the lack of counsel in the contemporary res 
publica, and the interruption of Brutus’ own oratorical career, robbing him of the res publica and the res 
publica of his services.  Cicero’s return to active public life and speaking in the service of the res publica  
with the Philippics in 44 made such an impact that Dugan (2005) p.73 can argue that these speeches 
were a more authentic version of his ‘self’ as a servant of the res publica and threat to the triumvirs than 
his own body.   
103 Cic., Off., 2.43-44.   
104 Cic., Off., 1.71.   
105 Cic., Off., 1.26 notes the failure of justice when men desire imperium, honos or gloria.   1.84 demands 
that gloria, which is a personal quality, must be sacrificed if Rome requires it.  
106 Cic., Off., 2.36, 43.  
107 Cic., Off., 1.65.  Long (1995) pp.224, 230, 233 and Schofield (2009) p.16 agree that Cicero’s ‘assault’ 
on perverted magnitudo animi  and critique of false glory is an attempt to reform the Roman honour 
code, making glory a, “Co-operative value, grounded in justice.” (Long, p.230) 
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important than the individual, and to justify his attack on Antonius and on Caesar’s 
dictatorship, Cicero reformulated gloria, making its central object the service of the res publica 
above the performance of great deeds.  This led him to declare that Antonius was ignorant of 
the true path to gloria, and that Caesar’s achievements, whilst great (magnas) were not truly 
glorious.108 
Cicero’s reformulation of gloria, honestum and the other characteristics of the good citizen 
in de Officiis acknowledged that something had gone wrong in the political discourse and 
culture of Rome.  This, he argued, was a danger to the stability and survival of the res publica 
in its best form, for it had allowed the domination of Caesar and potential dominance of 
Antonius.   Therefore, in de Officiis and the Philippics he offered his fellow Romans guidance in 
the way they should behave as Roman citizens and, more particularly, in the contemporary 
crisis.  However, the guidance was of different kinds and expressed his understanding of good 
citizenship in different ways.   In de Officiis he presented a philosophical argument for the 
importance of good citizenship in the successful res publica to other members of the Roman 
elite whom he wished to influence, explaining in detail why his understandings of the proper 
citizen qualities were the correct ones.  In the Philippics his rhetoric removed this process of 
explanation, replacing it with the simple association of the positive qualities of the Roman 
citizen with those he wished to support.  In both Cicero redefined and manipulated Rome’s 
political vocabulary in support of his presentation of good citizenship, seeking to counter the 
example of Caesar and the threat of Antonius, and urging his fellow citizens to follow his 
precepts in order to save the res publica.  Such salvation, according to Cicero’s presentation of 
the res publica,  started with the citizen and his personal behaviour, but ended in the public life 
of Roman politics: in the decisions that were being made in the forum and in the Senate.  As 
the following sections of this chapter will make clear, the individual was required to undertake 
the duties of the ‘good citizen’ whatever role he had in public life: be it as a member of the 
Senate, a magistrate or one of the populus Romanus.   Such behaviour would support the res 
publica and bring stability as it would enable the political bodies of Rome to function properly.  
 
 
                                                             
108 Cic., Phil., 1.33. This clashes with, or corrects, Cicero’s expression of gloria in relation to Caesar in the 
pro Marcello of 46.  There he described gloria as being the fame of great services done in the service of 
his fellow citizens, the country (patria) and all mankind, and implies that Caesar was a man of gloria.  In 
44 with Caesar dead, and writing a philosophical treatise, Cicero was freer to express gloria as he 
wished, and he chose to deny it to Caesar.   
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(b) Political Structures 
  In de Officiis Cicero presented the following definition of the res publica: “Without the 
association of men, cities could not have been built or peopled.  In consequence of city life, 
laws and customs were established, and then came the equitable distribution of private rights 
and a definite social system. Upon these institutions followed a more humane spirit and 
consideration for others, with the result that life was better supplied with all it requires.” 109   
This coming together was inspired by nature, acting through the common bonds of reason and 
speech, and developed into the close bond of fellow citizens, free people who enjoyed equal 
rights before the law.110  This section will examine Cicero’s understanding of the nature of the 
structures that were established as a result of city life, the roles of the magistrates, Senate and 
people of Rome and the relationships between them in order to establish the way he believed 
they should function in the constitution of the res publica. At the heart of Cicero’s 
understanding of the political structures of the res publica was the Senate: advisor to both the 
magistrates and the people, and upholder of Rome’s laws.  Yet at the same time, Cicero’s 
Senate was not all-powerful.   He recognised that the Senate could only function effectively in 
conjunction with Rome’s magistrates and the various assemblies of the people, and that these 
relationships relied upon the good citizenship of all involved.   Cicero’s understanding of these 
relationships can be seen most particularly in the Philippics, in which he urged the restoration 
of the res publica as it should have been.   However, even Cicero could not, or did not choose 
to, clearly delineate the practical workings of the relationships between Rome’s institutions in 
the constitution; his expression of them varying depending on the audience to whom he was 
speaking.  In the absence of such perfect clarity, the successful functioning of the constitution 
of the res publica came to rest upon the shoulders of the citizens.  
 
(i) The Populus Romanus 
In recent years, classical scholarship has paid a good deal of attention to the political role of 
the populus in the res publica, with work by North, Millar, Mouritsen and Morstein-Marx 
examining their place, in political ideology and in the practice of politics; establishing their 
importance within Republican political life.111  The populus were the people of Rome, the total 
                                                             
109 Cic., Off., 2.15. 
110 Cic., Off., 1.12, 50, 53, 88. 
111 Millar (1986); Millar (1995); Millar (1998); Morstein-Marx (2004).  This is a movement away from the 
focus on the Roman aristocracy as the driving force in the politics of the Republican era that typified 
 
 
74 | P a g e  
 
citizen body who held the right to vote in elections and on legislation.  As such they were 
involved in Rome’s decision-making processes through contiones, voting assemblies and 
elections and played a major part in the political life of the res publica.   The distinction 
between populus and plebs is complicated but was by no means arbitrary, and it is worth 
examining them, as far as possible, as separate political concepts when looking at the 
construction of understandings of the constitution.112  In 44-43, Cicero avoided talking about 
the plebs except when referring to the tribunes, preferring instead to focus on the populus as a 
united entity not split by differing political interests.    His representation of the populus in this 
period, primarily expressed in the Philippics, centres upon their power to affect the decision-
making process and upon the importance of their libertas, which is equated to the libertas of 
the res publica as a whole.   
That Cicero understood the populus to have a role in Rome’s decision-making processes can 
be seen both from the arguments he makes in the Philippics and from the fact that he chose to 
speak directly to the people.   Cicero acknowledged that the people had a voice in Rome and 
knew that they could be encouraged to make that voice known in order to affect the direction 
of Roman politics.  Philippics Four and Six were delivered in contiones, Cicero using the 
occasion to inform the populus of the Senate’s decisions and to put his own perspective upon 
them, with the aim of gaining popular support for his cause.113  For him, the power of the 
populus lay not only in its ability to elect magistrates, but also in its power to choose which 
proposals they were going to support – be they those put forward by the Senate, or those of 
other individuals (such Antonius, in 44, or, in previous years, the tribunes). Hence Cicero 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
scholarship for much of the twentieth century, for example in Gelzer (1912) (trans., Gelzer (1968)); 
Münzer (1999); Syme (1939); Taylor (1949); Gruen (1995).  
112 Horsfall (2003) p.26; Hellegouarc'h (1963) pp.506ff.  The difference between the categories of 
‘patrician’, ‘plebeian’ and populus have garnered a good deal of comment in scholarship dealing with 
the early Roman Republic.  It seems generally accepted that the term populus or populus Romanus 
initially covered the army, but that the distinction between this and the body indicated by the term 
‘plebeian’ gradually faded over time (Momigliano (2005) p.174; Cornell (1995) pp.256-8; Smith (2006) 
p.200; Mitchell (2005) p.152).   There is also some consensus that the term plebs was used to refer to a 
political group amongst the non-patricians and which, by the end of the Republic had come to be used 
for the lower classes generally.  Momigliano (2005) pp.177-181 argues that the plebeians were originally 
those outside the army, who formed their own organisation whose structures mimicked those of the 
army, and whose group began to grow as dissatisfaction with the patricians increased.  Cornell (1995) 
pp.256-258 doubts that the plebeians were formally excluded from the army, but also holds that they 
had their own identity and agenda, whilst Smith (2006) p.200 argues that the plebeians were shaped by 
more than one interest group, but that they undoubtedly had a political dynamic. Yavetz (1969) p.7, 149 
suggests that the difference between populus and plebs was, at times, moral, writers using them to 
show goodwill or aversion to a group. See chapter 4.2(b)ii for Sallust’s understanding of the people, 
which reflects some of these distinctions. 
113 Manuwald (2007) p.81. 
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sought to gain the support of the people for his stance against Antonius, both to draw them 
away from Antonius himself, and to encourage the Senate to act against him.   
In order to gain this support, Cicero aimed to bring the populus together as a group and 
align them with his point of view.   To this end, he sought to create unity through his rhetoric, 
making his audience stand for the whole of the populus in a synecdochical relationship and 
conflating the interests and opinions of this populus with those of the res publica.114  He 
claimed that the populus was united against Antonius, who was an enemy of the res publica, 
and described them as speaking “Una et mente et voce,” – with one voice.115   In his 
assumption of this unity, Cicero also evoked it, and called upon it in support of his argument 
against Antonius, aiming to deprive his opponent of popular support.   Morstein-Marx has 
discussed the kinds of claquers or “claptraps” Roman speakers used to manipulate the 
audience, from outright bribery or packing the meeting to the use of rhetorical techniques to 
elicit applause such as using cues to let the audience know when the message was coming, and 
when they should applaud.116  The crowd could be called on by a speaker to become “The 
People” as a political entity: to form themselves into a cohesive, effective political body that 
was able to make demands.117 The Fourth Philippic exemplifies Cicero’s employment of this 
technique  as he declared that: “The brave, true judgement of the legions is confirmed by the 
Senate and improved by the entire Roman people (populus Romanus), unless you, Men of 
Rome (quirites), judge Marcus Antonius to be a consul, not a public enemy?  Yes, Men of 
Rome, I thought your judgement was as you now declare it.”118   He identified his audience, the 
quirites, with the populus Romanus, and defined them politically in their opposition to 
                                                             
114 Ober (1989) p.147 on the synedochical relationship between the orator’s audience and the whole 
citizen body, Cf., Chapter 2n.54 above.  See also Morstein-Marx (2004) p.121.   As we will see in chapter 
4.2(b)i Sallust shows this effect  in action in the Bellum Jugurthinum and critiques it. 
115 Cic., Phil., 4.2. Cf., 1.21; 4.8; 6.2; 7.22. Ramsey (2003) p.130.   
116 Morstein-Marx (2004) pp.119-159.  His argument is based on Atkinson (1984) pp.47-85’s discussion 
of ‘applause-elicitation’.  It is worth noting that, for Cicero, violence was not a legitimate popular 
response, and he did not seek to elicit it from the people.  He acknowledged that other men did so, and 
referred regularly to Antonius’ passing of new laws by violence.   He implies that the ‘true’ populus did 
not employ violence, and that they were shut out of the assembly by Antonius’ armed men (Cic., Phil., 
1.26; 5.10; 6.3; 13.5).  This is contrary to Cicero’s understanding of how the Senate and the people 
should and did interact with each other: violence is the illegitimate response of a subset of the people to 
a ‘rogue agent’ such as Antonius.   
117 See Laclau (2005) especially pp.65-171 for a critical analysis of the way in which ‘the people’ are 
formed as a political unit.  He argues that ‘the people’ form themselves by excluding an Other and 
representing themselves as the legitimate totality of the citizen body, claiming that, “The ‘people’ do 
not emerge without a breakdown in the social and a sense of something lacking.” (p.81).   He also argues 
that this political ‘people’ cannot pre-exist its articulation in political discourse and is created in political 
argument, usually through a series of demands. 
118 Cic., Phil., 4.6-7. Morstein-Marx (2004) pp.140-142. 
 
 
76 | P a g e  
 
Antonius. Cicero’s rhetorical rhythm left a pause for an audience response before his final 
statement, which encouraged them to react in his favour, excluding Antonius from the populus 
Romanus and the citizen body. 
The key idea around which Cicero’s understanding of and approach to the populus 
Romanus centred was that of libertas.  This quality, and the demand for its defence was 
particularly prominent in the speeches given in contiones, although Cicero also employed it to 
motivate action in the Senate speeches, as a quality belonging to the populus Romanus that 
the Senate must defend with their auctoritas.119   Throughout the Philippics libertas is 
presented as a birthright of the populus Romanus guaranteed by the continued existence of 
the res publica and defined almost entirely by an opposition to servitude.  The threat of 
servitude is personified in Antonius, as Cicero argues that to defend the res publica against 
Antonius is to protect the libertas of the people, which Antonius threatens by being both 
willing and able to lead a military attack on the res publica, and also by his political methods 
when he is in Rome, which remove both the Senate and the populus from the decision making 
process.  This critique of Antonius reveals a conception of libertas rooted in the right to 
participate in governance through legislation and elections; protected by both the citizens’ 
understanding of justice, and their access to it in the courts.120  True libertas is thus made 
synonymous with the existence of the res publica, as Cicero encourages his audience to join 
with him against Antonius or lose the res publica and with it their libertas.121     
Mouritsen has argued that the lack of definition of libertas was due to its importance in 
Roman politics, invoked by every political player who had to defend their position in relation to 
the idea of libertas populi Romani.122   Cicero’s use of libertas in the Philippics attempted to 
                                                             
119 Cic., Phil., 3.8, 29; 4.1, 3, 4, 7, 11, 16; 5.34;  6.1-2, 9, 17; 7.27; 8.8; 13.1, 33.  The importance of the 
defence of libertas as a trope can be seen by the way in which the fourth Philippic ends with a call for 
libertas to be restored.   
120 Cic., Phil., 1.16; 3.19;  8.8; 13.1.  
121 Cic., Phil., 1.15;  3.12, 29; 4.3; 5.21; 8.32; 10.18; 12.1; 13.2; 14.11. 
122 Mouritsen (2001) p.11.  Brunt (1988) pp.281-350 discusses the variety of possible understandings of 
libertas in the late Republic beginning with libertas as the opposite of slavery, but shows that it became 
more than the legal status of an unbounded man (p.296) and notes the importance of both ‘positive’ 
and ‘negative’ freedoms in Roman libertas (p.309; See Berlin (1979) p.7 for ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ 
liberty and Connolly (2007) pp.158-159 for a critique of its usefulness in considering the Roman idea of 
libertas).  Most importantly, Brunt notes that one man’s freedom may lead to another man’s servitude: 
political rights may lead to power for some, subjection for others; the underprivileged may complain in 
the name of liberty if they suffer restraints from which others are immune or lack power others enjoy 
and discusses the employment of libertas in different ways by different people and groups (p.330).  He 
refuses to accept that any Roman concept of libertas itself included a degree of restraint or moderation, 
arguing that any limits on libertas came from without, either through law or personal behaviour (p.318).  
Wirszubski (1950), however, argues (p.7) that libertas was seen as an acquired civic right, describing it as 
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sidestep the tensions that existed between these different understandings of libertas at Rome 
by refusing to clearly delineate the nature of the powers it granted the people.   It must be 
defended, certainly, and its existence enabled the populus to participate in political life, but 
the extent of the power it gave the people and the exact nature of the rights it guaranteed 
were not specified.123  In the Philippics Cicero’s employment of libertas varied depending upon 
his audience. When addressing the Senate, Cicero implied that whilst the libertas of the people 
must be defended, it also needed guiding in the right direction.124   Meanwhile, when 
addressing the people, he suggested that this libertas allowed them to direct the Senate 
through the expression of their opinions.125   His very broad representation of libertas as the 
right to participate freely in politics, without specifying how far this power could or should be 
taken, enabled Cicero to allow several conceptions of libertas to be held simultaneously by 
different audiences and different members of the same audience.  Cicero did not require his 
audience to abandon their understanding of libertas for his, lowering the probability of their 
rejection of his proposals as regards Antonius because they did not believe that he cared 
sufficiently about their libertas.  His usage also reflects a constraint to express political ideas 
differently in front of different audiences.126  This had an impact upon the discursive 
construction of the constitution as it lead to a lack of clarity as to the proper nature of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
sum of civic rights granted by the laws of Rome, and claiming libertas thus contains a notion of restraint 
distinguishing it from licentia. Like Brunt, Connolly (2007) understands that libertas acts as a ‘conceptual 
spectrum’, and argues that slave vs. free is the key binary in the construction of libertas, rather than 
positive vs. negative, ruling out the idea that libertas was equated to participation in politics (p.35).  
However, as we shall see, libertas is associated with the right to participate by both Cicero and Sallust.   
123 Contra Arena (2007b) who has argued that Cicero’s conception and expression of libertas changed 
during the period of Caesar’s dictatorship, from a more traditional Roman understanding rooted in law 
and legal procedure (which she sees as present in the treatises of the 50s) to one influenced by Greek 
philosophy and ethics with one’s libertas arising from one’s own behaviour.  In this formulation, only the 
truly virtuous (those with honestum/honestas, in the terms of de Officiis) have true libertas, which can 
therefore be understood as freedom from emotion, passion, and the domination that these lead into.  
She suggests that Cicero moves away from seeing libertas as a juridical concept associated with 
citizenship, towards a moral, universal idea, and concurrently turns away from law as a guarantor of 
libertas towards personal initiative. This division is too rigid: although Cicero’s expression of the way 
libertas should be defended did alter over time, so did the situation in which he was speaking.  Whilst de 
Officiis and the Philippics do present an idea of a personal, ethical libertas linked to virtus, it is not 
entirely new to him, nor Cicero does he not abandon his juridical understanding of libertas. 
124 Cic., Phil., 3.29; 7.27. 
125 Cic., Phil., 4.16.  
126 Contra Connolly (2007) pp.159-161, who suggests that Cicero’s praise of popular libertas from the 
rostra was merely a pandering to the demands of the crowd, preferring to focus on his presentation of 
the term in his political and philosophical treatises as his ‘true’ understanding, which she argues present 
a dialectical relationship of libertas and dignitas and reveal Cicero’s “aristocratic bias”. 
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relationship between the populus and the Senate and magistrates who counselled and lead 
them, as we will see below.  
The defence of libertas in Cicero’s constitution depends upon the behaviour and actions of 
the populus themselves, and on those who lead and guide them.  In 44-43, it depended on the 
unity of the people and their will to withstand Antonius, and upon the ability of the Senate and 
Magistrates to guide their actions against him.  It also depended on their virtus: Antonius was 
not a true citizen but a hostis; therefore it was the duty of the good citizen, the man of virtus, 
to stand against him.  Given the voice Cicero allows the populus within the res publica, the 
character of the citizens who made up that body was important to the success of the polity.   
For Rome to succeed, her citizens had to put their own interests aside and put Rome first.  
They also had to be able to identify and reject those that might lead them in the ‘wrong’ 
direction.   However, this was complicated in practice by the use of rhetorical techniques, such 
as the claptraps mentioned above, which evoked the voice of the people and guided it, and 
which Cicero both employed and allowed in his conception of the res publica.  This is a 
problematic issue in politics – after all, it was possible that the speakers would not have had 
the best interests of the populus or the res publica at heart.127  Rhetorical techniques such as 
claptraps allowed speakers to unite the populus and lead them in the ‘right’ direction, thus 
countering dangerous elements of the populus or bad citizens within this body.  However, they 
also allowed those Cicero saw as ‘bad’ citizens to lead the populus astray.    For Cicero’s res 
publica to be successful, therefore, it was critically important that the people’s leaders, as well 
as the people themselves, be good citizens.  
 
(ii) The Roman Magistrate 
Whilst Cicero believed the behaviour of all Rome’s citizens to be important, that of those 
who wished to become magistrates was perhaps most important because they held power and 
influence through the possession of potestas and imperium.128    Caesar and Antonius, he 
believed, were examples of the potential a magistrate had to destroy the res publica.  The 
citizen-qualities of Rome’s magistrates and senior statesmen are, therefore, to the fore in 
Cicero’s consideration of Rome’s political institutions after Caesar’s assassination.  In 
confronting Antonius after Caesar’s death Cicero was dealing with the consul of Rome, and his 
                                                             
127 Morstein-Marx (2004) p.21-21 describes this as the ‘less-than-ideal’ speech situation in a critique of 
Habermas (1984) & Habermas (1987).  
128 Lintott (1999) pp.95-99.  
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arguments about Antonius’ character and actions relate to his understanding of what a Roman 
consul should be.  Throughout his work, Cicero also reflected on the roles of other magistrates, 
including tribunes and the consulars: Rome’s former consuls, now senior members of the 
Senate.     
The qualities of the good magistrate were those of the good citizen expressed on the most 
public of stages.  The magistrate must represent the civitas and uphold its dignitas and honour 
(decus); enforce the law (lex) and administer justice (ius), focusing not on the gaining of 
honour but only on serving the res publica.129  They must also have wisdom and eloquence, the 
former enabling the latter to be used in the service of the res publica.130     Cicero argued that 
Antonius’ bad character was proof that he was a bad consul, emphasising his inability to 
control his passions, his tendency to use violence in pursuit of his aims and his improper 
attitude towards the Senate and people of Rome, finally declaring that there was, “Nothing of 
a consul [about Antonius], neither in his mode of life nor in his official conduct nor in the 
manner of his election.”131    Good magistrates should uphold the res publica and defend it, 
declared Cicero, and Antonius was not such a man, as his tribunate and time as magister 
equitum had also proved.132    In contrast to Antonius and Dolabella Cicero put forward himself, 
Hirtius and Pansa as examples of good magistrates.  Cicero defined his “good” consulship in 
the Philippics with reference to his submission to the advice of the Senate in 63, arguing for 
the importance to the res publica of a symbiotic working relationship between magistrate and 
Senate that is founded on the trust that each has the best interests of Rome at heart.133  
Antonius did not maintain such a relationship, argued Cicero, and therefore cannot be 
considered a good consul or proconsul.   Hirtius and Pansa, on the other hand, are said to have 
worked with the Senate in 43 and to be good men and good consuls with Pansa described as, 
                                                             
129 Cic., Off., 1.73, 124.   
130 Eloquence included speaking before jurors, the people and the senate, offering advice, and 
concerning oneself with the good of the res publica (Cic., Off., 2.46-51).  Many of Cicero’s treatises, de 
Oratore in particular, deal with the orator as the ideal Republican citizen, having knowledge and 
wisdom, able to discern the best course of action and guide and advise the res publica.     
131 Cic., Phil., 2.10.  See also Phil., 1.8-9, 12; 2.81, 109; 3.9-10, 24, 28; 4.4, 15; 5.7, 25; 6.5, 16 for 
Antonius’ unconsular character.  Antonius’ bad characteristics appear in de Officiis as characteristics of 
the bad Roman citizen. See section 2(c) below for more on Antonius’ illegitimacy as a consul. Dolabella 
also failed to be a proper consul: he had feigned affection (benevolentiae falsae) for the people and 
broken the trust (fides) required in their relationship through his crimes.  Cf., Cic., Phil., 11.2, 10, 15 
which describe Dolabella as a ‘bad’ magistrate and support the proposal that he should be declared a 
hostis after his capture, torture and murder of Trebonius. 
132 Cic., Phil., 1.25, 2.53; 3.12; 4.9; 7.15 
133 Cic., Phil., 2.11. See section 2(b)iv for more on this.  
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“The best, most outstanding consul I can remember.”134  Both men are said to possess virtus, 
gravitas, prudentia, industria, sapientia and animi magnitudo, all of which are qualities of the 
honourable citizen.  Moreover, their qualities are highlighted by the situation in which they 
hold office.  They have not buckled before the threat of Antonius, but exercised their good 
qualities in guiding the res publica.135  In the final Philippic Cicero praises both consuls, saluting 
them as imperator for their virtus, consilium and their felicitas in saving the res publica from 
slavery (servitus).136  They put themselves in danger to fight for the future and freedom of the 
res publica against Antonius, whom Cicero again declares a hostis.137  This is the behaviour of a 
true consul: the exercise of virtus and other honourable qualities in the service of the res 
publica.  
The other magistracy to which Cicero referred specifically is that of the tribune of the plebs.   
This office appears only briefly in Cicero’s comments after the assassination, a time at which 
the tribunes seem not to have been particularly prominent, or at least, not to have been giving 
Cicero himself too much cause for concern.138  However the tribunate was a problematic office 
for Cicero in the constitution of the res publica, and in the Philippics he mentioned both the 
positive and negative points of the tribunate as he understood the office.  He notes that some 
tribunes have had ‘subversive tendencies’, which had to be checked by the quaestiones dealing 
with vis and maiestas, and described the tribunes who proposed Pompeius’ commands in the 
60s as ‘troublemakers.’139  He also referred to Antonius’ tribunate, arguing that it was 
Antonius’ abuse of this office that allowed Caesar the pretext for the civil war through the 
claim that the tribunician prerogative had been overthrown.140  Yet at the same time, Cicero 
acknowledged the good ends towards which the tribunes might exercise their powers, asking 
whether Rome should fear bad laws so long as there are good tribunes ready to use their veto 
to defend the res publica.141  In Cicero’s constitution the tribunes had an important role to play 
in the passing of legislation and the defence of the citizens, but it was important for the 
                                                             
134 Cic., Phil., 7.6.  
135 Cic., Phil., 7.6-7; 12.2; 13.24; .14.4. 
136 Cic., Phil., 14.11, 28. 
137 Cic., Phil., 14.24.  
138 The new tribunes were responsible for calling the Senate meeting on 20 December 44, at which 
Cicero gave the Third Philippic, in order to discuss security for the inauguration of the new consuls, for 
which Cicero praised them, noting their good judgement (consilium) and intentions with regard to the 
security of the res publica (Manuwald (2007) pp.21-22). 
139 Cic., Phil., 1.22; 11.18.  Cicero conveniently ignored the fact that he spoke in support of Pompeius’ 
second command in the Pro lege Manilia.  
140 Cic., Phil., 2.53. 
141 Cic., Phil., 1.25.  
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stability of Rome that they used their powers for good, serving the res publica rather than their 
own ambitions and interests.   
Cicero’s demand that Rome’s leaders be good citizens first and foremost did not end with 
the magistrates in office.  He also required this of all those former magistrates who made up 
the Senate, in particular Rome’s consulars.   In the Seventh Philippic Cicero constructed an idea 
of what kind of men the consulars should be and what their role should entail, envisioning 
them as an important group who ought to put their experience to the public benefit by acting 
as leaders in the Senate, and arguing that no-one should be called a consular unless their 
behaviour merited it.142  Manuwald suggests that Cicero’s repetition of the term nomen in his 
description of the consular emphasises that consularis was no mere title but a role that carried 
with it obligations and standards of conduct.143   Indeed, the role of the consular was so 
important in Cicero’s res publica that he declared that in the absence of former consuls all 
right-minded and courageous men should be considered consulars.144  He describes some of 
the current consulars as, “Not persevering resolutely enough (with constantia) in the cause 
that they have embraced (i.e. that of the res publica against Antonius) and not always 
regulating their views by the public advantage (utilitas rei publicae) but sometimes by hope 
and sometimes by fear.”145  He expected consulars to live up the same high standards as the 
consuls, though in an advisory rather than a proactive role, upholding the res publica in a 
                                                             
142 Cic., Phil., 7.3- 5.  Manuwald (2007) pp.909-910 notes that Cicero’s more theoretical considerations 
on the role of the consular are only seen in the Philippics and in some contemporary letters.  Cf.,  
Bonnefond-Coudry (1989) pp.644-654.  Manuwald notes that in 43 B.C. there were 17 consulars in the 
Senate (including Ser. Sulpicius Rufus who died during the year), many of whom were associated with 
Antonius. 
143 Cic., Phil., 7.5; Manuwald (2007) p.844.  Sall., Iug., 3.1 suggests a similar idea, stating that the honour 
of a magistracy is no longer bestowed upon merit (virtus). Given the context and argument of the 
Philippics is not surprising to see that Cicero also defines appropriate behaviour in terms of opposition 
to Antonius, who is described not only as an unworthy consular himself, but also as unworthy of support 
from others. 
144 Cic., Phil., 7.5; 8.22.  
145 Cic., Phil., 14.17.  Cf., 7.1-2, 5; 8.8, 12-13, 17-18, 30; 10.3, 7; 12.4, 7 for further criticisms of Cicero’s 
opponents and the damage their arguments did.   In de Officiis (1.68-69) Cicero places hope and fear 
amongst the emotions that disturbs the spirit of the individual and marks them as negatives of 
constantia, fortitudo and the possession of animi magnitudo, which is one of the cardinal virtues 
required to be honourable.  If we regard Cicero’s thinking on the subject of the honourable in de Officiis 
to be something he drew upon when composing the Philippics , then it seems that he accused his fellow 
consulars of failing to be honourable in this regard. Arena (2007b) argues that Cicero, in de Officiis, 
borrowed from the Stoics in his formulation of libertas, and considered that only the wise, morally 
virtuous man can be free and preserve the libertas of the community.  She argues that as fear endangers 
men’s virtue, so it causes them to give up their independence to those who wish to dominate them.  
Here Cicero accused the consulars of not only giving up their own libertas, but also that of those to 
whom they are responsible, the people of Rome.  
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responsible fashion and not leading the people astray.  The behaviour of the individual Senator 
as a citizen is therefore to be understood as vital to the proper functioning of the Senate 
because it brings with it the auctoritas that is required for the fulfilment of its role.   Failure to 
lead the res publica in the right direction would bring dishonour to the individual, and to the 
Senate, and endanger the res publica as a whole.146    
 
(iii) The Roman Senate 
The Roman Senate was the collective body of current and former magistrates.  As such, its 
members were required by Cicero to replicate the qualities demanded of the magistrate, 
which are those of the good citizen writ large. Without such character the Senate could not 
function effectively in the res publica.  Cicero stated his understanding of the Senate’s place in 
the constitution in the opening of the First Philippic when he said that he had hoped that the, 
“The res publica had at last been restored to your *the Senate’s+ guidance (consilium) and 
authority (auctoritas).”147   Cicero placed the Senate at the core of Rome’s political life; 
deliberating, advising and overseeing the activities of Rome and preserving the res publica.   
The Senate was the guardian of appropriate, legitimate action within the Republic and, in this 
way, the ultimate judge of what constituted the best interests of Rome.148  In the Seventh 
Philippic he described the Senate as, “The supreme council of the world” and feared that it 
might have been seen to lack counsel (consilium) if it did not act as it should against 
Antonius.149    For Cicero it was nature of their behaviour, their auctoritas and the quality of 
their advice as regards Rome’s interests that made the Senate.150      
                                                             
146 Cic., Phil., 8.20.  
147 Cic., Phil., 1.1. 
148 What Cicero does not seem to have taken into account, at least in the Philippics, was the idea that it 
might be possible for several people to hold the best interests of the res publica at heart and yet have 
different ideas about the course of action these interests should direct.  He argues that ‘other’ 
understandings of the  constitution are misunderstanding, but it would be possible even if there was a 
single understanding of the constitution for different courses of action to be proposed by those 
genuinely seeking to support the ‘best interests’ of Rome. It would certainly not constitute good 
rhetorical practice for him to admit this in the Philippics as he must convince his audiences that there is 
only one possible course of action, but his refusal to negotiate created problems for Rome.  Sallust 
presents a better understanding of this problem, speaking from ‘outside’ the public debate, as he shows 
both Cato and Caesar, in the debate over the fate of the captured conspirators, as speaking in the best 
interests of the res publica whilst making it clear that it is impossible for them to truly know what these 
best interests are, due to the loss of Rome’s vera vocabula (see 4.2(a) and 4.3).  
149 Cic., Phil., 7.19.    
150 Cic., Phil., 11.27. This led him to argue that Brutus and Cassius had been, “Their own Senate on a 
number of occasions.” 
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It was this auctoritas that enabled the Senate to act in relation to the magistrates and the 
people of Rome, giving them the standing that they required in order for their consilium to be 
heeded.151   However, the possession of auctoritas was not a given for the Senate: it had to be 
earned through the appropriate behaviour of the Senators, expressed in the counsel they gave 
Rome’s magistrates and the populus Romanus.   Cicero’s conception of senatus auctoritas was 
of a quality rooted in the behaviour of the Senators, who must possess seemliness (decus), 
respectability (honestas), credit (laus) and dignity (dignitas) through their expression of 
constantia, fortitudo gravitas, perseverantia and sapientia in dealing with the problems that 
face both them and the res publica.152      In 44-43 he sought to persuade the Senate not to be 
intimidated by Antonius and to remain constant to the cause of the res publica.153   The 
behaviour of the individual Senators as citizens within the wider body was vital to the proper 
functioning of the Senate because it brought the group the auctoritas that is required for the 
fulfilment of its role.    If they failed to give good advice their auctoritas would fail, and they 
would not be heeded in future, creating problems for the res publica.154  This led to Cicero’s 
argument that the Senate must act against Antonius in order to preserve both its auctoritas 
and the Roman res publica.   
Throughout the Philippics, and in particular in those speeches delivered before the Senate, 
Cicero regularly emphasised the importance of auctoritas to the Senate, presenting it as an 
attribute that was vital to success in their role as a guardian and guide of the res publica. Their 
function was to counsel the magistrates; who were members of the Senate; through its 
debates and to direct their actions, and also to guide the people through the proposals it made 
and the discussions in which its members participated in contiones, such as those at which 
Cicero presented his Fourth and Sixth Philippics, and through both of these activities to defend 
the libertas of the populus Romanus and uphold the res publica.155    It was therefore 
important that the Senate was able to work effectively with Rome’s other political bodies.  
Cicero presented the relationships between Rome’s political bodies as fluid and flexible, with 
                                                             
151 Cic., Phil., 7.14; 13.6.  Constantia, gravitas and perseverantia are behavioural qualities that Cicero 
lists as contributing to auctoritas here, but in de Officiis they, along with fortitudo and sapientia are 
qualities of the honourable, suggesting that for Cicero auctoritas was a result of being honourable.   
152 Cic., Phil., 7.9-25; 13.6. See Manuwald (2007) p.825 on the structure of this speech.  
153 Cic., Phil., 7.1-2, 5; 8.8, 12-13, 17-18, 30; 10.3, 7; 12.4, 7; 14.17.    
154 The fact that the behaviour that brings auctoritas seems to come from acting in the best interests of 
the res publica, including the giving of good counsel, makes the system circular and a break in it 
dangerous – once true auctoritas is lost by inappropriate behaviour or bad advice how can the Senate 
reassure the people that their future actions are in the best interests of the res publica? 
155 See Morstein-Marx (2004) pp.34-67 for a discussion of the procedures of the contio.  
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the Senate not simply dictating policy to the magistrates and the people, but interacting with 
both to guide the res publica towards the best course of action.  
 
(iv) Political Relationships: Senate-Magistrate-People  
Cicero’s understanding of the political relationships that existed within the Roman 
constitution can be seen on two levels: (i) in the way in which he depicted them in his words in 
44-43, and (ii) in the way in which he behaved in 44-43 as he gave the Philippics.  Both of these 
express an understanding of the constitution, particularly of the flexibility the relationships 
between the Senate and magistrates, Senate and people and the magistrates and people, and 
neither clearly expresses the direction in which power should flow.  Despite the fact that 
magistrates were Senators with the ability to participate in Senate debates,156 the interests 
and opinions of Senate and magistrates were not automatically identical.  But who should be 
the voice of authority in such a disagreement?  Should the magistrates always be guided by the 
Senate, or should they have the authority to ignore their advice if they disagreed with it?     A 
similar tension existed between the Senate and the people: the voice of counsel and the voice 
of political power.  Should the Senate, as the guide of the people instruct them as to the best 
course of action for the res publica, or should the Senate’s proposals for action be guided by 
the opinion of the populus Romanus?   Cicero’s presentation of the relationships between the 
Senate, the populus, and the magistrates reveals this uncertainty and the way in which it could 
be exploited.  The relationships between the different political bodies and the balance of 
power had to be negotiated through discourse, with the good citizenship of all parties essential 
if this flexibility was not to be exploited.  However, Cicero’s own behaviour, especially in giving 
the Philippics, made the most of the flexibility as he tried to urge both the Senate and the 
People to guide Rome in opposition to Antonius. 
Throughout the Philippics Cicero’s understanding of the Senate/magistrate relationship in 
the constitution is presented in reference to Antonius’ behaviour, the orator ultimately 
claiming that Antonius’ rejection of the Senate’s consilium was a rejection of the best interests 
of the res publica in favour of his own, a sign of his failure as a magistrate and as a citizen.157  
Cicero argued in the first Philippic that the Senate should guide magistrates, saying that his 
hope that Antonius would leave his bad advisors and be directed by the Senate (ad 
                                                             
156 North (2006) p.266. 
157 Cic., Phil., 4.14, Cf., Phil., 1.6; 2.11, 52. 9.6, 9; 10.23 for examples of Antonius failing to be guided by 
the Senate. 
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auctoritatem senatus esse rediturum) had prompted his return to Rome.158    The good 
relationship of Senate and magistrates is thus established as a key part of the proper 
functioning of the res publica in Cicero’s thought a harmonious working partnership between 
council and counselled ensuring the res publica could be led in the right direction.   Cicero 
himself provides the model for the proper constitutional relationship between Senate and 
magistrate claiming that in 63, “[The] consulship was mine only in name; in reality it was yours 
[the Senate].  Every decision, every official act, everything I did was done by the advice and 
authority and vote of this House.”159    Cicero’s discussion of the character and behaviour of 
Regulus in de Officiis also provides a constitutional example for the proper Senate-magistrate 
relationship and a contrast with the behaviour of Antonius, Cicero declaring that the noblest 
aspect of Regulus’ conduct was his submission of his judgement to that of the Senate.160     
Cicero employed of his own and Regulus’ examples as precedents for proper, constitutional, 
behaviour, allowing him to interpret the constitutional relationship between Senate and 
magistrate as one in which the magistrate was guided by the Senate in the best interests of the 
polity.  
However, Cicero’s expression of the Senate/magistrate relationship was influenced by his 
desire to bring Antonius under the influence of the Senate.  He wished to curb Antonius, and 
so he argued that the Senate should guide Rome’s magistrates.  As North has noted, the 
Senate needed the magistrates to enact their advice as they were the primary active agents of 
the res publica and their liaison with the populus through their power to call contiones: 
Cicero’s desire to bring Antonius and Dolabella ‘in from the cold’ in the First Philippic reflects 
the powerful position of the magistrate in the res publica.161    Indeed, Cicero’s citation of his 
own consulship as an example of how things should be is adapted to suit his aim as regards 
Antonius.162  In 63 B.C. Cicero was hardly the simple executive of the Senate’s will that this 
passage suggests: his First and Fourth Catilinarians show Cicero, as consul, seeking to persuade 
                                                             
158 Cic., Phil., 1.8-9. 
159 Cic., Phil., 2.11.   
160 Cic., Off., 3.110. Dyck (1996) p.620.  Regulus is also used as a comparative figure by Cicero at Phil., 
11.9, where his torture by the Carthaginians is compared to Trebonius’ by Dolabella. This not only 
elevates the character of Trebonius, making him a martyr to the cause of the res publica, but also 
emphasises the un-Roman behaviour of Dolabella, who had been declared a public enemy after this act.   
Cicero is then able to make clear that Dolabella could no longer be considered a citizen of Rome, and 
legitimise Cassius’ action in setting out for Syria against him.   
161 North (2006) p.266; Morstein-Marx (2004) pp.38-42.  
162 Cic., Off., 3.110. 
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the Senate to see the danger of Catiline’s conspiracy and to act accordingly. 163   The influence 
of the contemporary situation can be seen in Cicero’s interpretation of his consulship in these 
examples, as in the years since his consulship he had spent much effort in establishing himself, 
rather than the Senate, as the saviour of the res publica from Catiline.164   
Cicero understood that the constitution of the res publica allowed the relationship between 
the Senate and the magistrate to be more than simply one-way traffic.   The Senate could offer 
advice to the magistrate and the magistrate should heed it, but at the same time the Senate 
should also listen to the advice of the magistrate and heed it.   However, the success of this 
depended upon the nature of the communication and upon the maintenance of good faith in 
the relationship between the two parties, each trusting that the other was truly concerned 
with the best interests of Rome.  If the magistrate threatened the Senate, for example by 
stationing soldiers outside the meeting,165 or if either the magistrate or the majority of 
Senators were not good citizens, then the res publica was jeopardised.  If one man came to 
dominate, as Caesar had and Cicero feared Antonius might, then, Cicero argued, auctoritas and 
consilium would cease to exist for the fides binding Rome’s citizens would be broken and  
speech would no longer be honest.166   Cicero feared Antonius’ influence over the Senate in 
such a situation and so he argued that the proper constitutional relationship was for the 
Senate to instruct the magistrate.   Nonetheless, it is not hard to imagine him arguing that a 
good magistrate should have the final say in a dispute with a recalcitrant Senate, when the res 
publica’s interests were at stake.  Indeed, he approved Brutus and Cassius acting as their own 
Senate in pursuing the best interests of the res publica when the Senate would not or could 
                                                             
163 Cape Jr. (1995) pp.260-3.  He describes the way that Cicero emphasised the Senate’s fears whilst 
playing down his own, establishing standards for political action and also appealing to their self-interest.  
On the matter of the possible editing of the Fourth Catilinarian before publication see Gelzer (1968) 
p.99; Syme (1939) pp.105-111 and Rawson (1983) pp.82-85 who all argue that the text was edited, 
against  McDermott (1972) and  Cape Jr. (1995) pp.258-260, who argue although the speech may have 
been edited, it remains good evidence for its political and rhetorical context.   
164 For example, Cic., Rep., 1.2; Leg., 1.8; de Orat., 1.3; Mil., 73, 82; Att., 12.21.1-2; and his epic poem de 
Consulato suo, now only surviving in fragments, including at Juv., 10.122.  In Mil., 8 Cicero is careful to 
lay the responsibility for the execution of the conspirators at the feet of the Senate (See Melchior (2008) 
on the similarities between the Fourth Catilinarian and the Pro Milone).  
165 Cic., Phil., 5.18; 13.14.  Cicero ignored the fact that he wore a visible breastplate to oversee the 
consular elections in 63 in order to emphasise the danger of Catiline, which might be read as an attempt 
to influence the electorate (Cic., Mur., 52; Dyck (2008) p.7). 
166 Cic., Off., 2.2-3. One might suggest, therefore, that for Cicero the auctoritas of an individual is also 
associated with their ability to speak freely, offering counsel, in the res publica.  It is therefore ironic that 
Cicero was so desperate to get the Senate to do things his way in 43.  
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not guide them properly,167 and much of his self-presentation in the Philippics was of himself 
as a consular who understands what is in the best interests of Rome and who is advising the 
Senate to heed his counsel.  
A similar two-way relationship can be seen in Cicero’s representation of that between the 
Senate and the people of Rome.  In Cicero’s constitution each had the power to direct the res 
publica: the Senate counselling the people, who should listen to their advice; and the Senate 
listening to the opinion of the people.  Cicero’s rhetorical assumption of a unity of interest and 
opinion between the two groups with regard to Antonius enabled him to ignore the potential 
problems that might arise because of this flexibility.   However Cicero’s own presentation of 
the power balance in the Senate/populus relationship changed depending on whether he was 
speaking before the Senate or the populus, revealing the potential for different conceptions of 
the relationship between the two groups.   When speaking to the Senate he urged them to act 
as a guide and to persuade the populus to follow their lead, emphasising the need for them to 
advise and guide the populus, to defend libertas and to set an example of good citizenship by 
their actions, their ability to counsel the people giving them power.    The importance of this 
role can be seen in Philippic Seven, where Cicero urges the Senate to action against Antonius, 
arguing that if the people did not know what the Senate were doing then they would begin to 
lose heart for the fight.168    The auctoritas of the Senate was vital in guiding the opinion and 
action of the populus; their behaviour had to act as an example and a guide to people of Rome 
and then their advice would be taken up and acted upon to the benefit of the res publica.169  
However, when speaking to the populus, he urged them to make their opinion known and to 
guide the decision-making of the Senate, putting them in a position of power as they chose 
whether or not they were going to take up the proposals put forward by the Senate.  He saw 
that the people had a voice, and that they could be encouraged to make that voice known.  
Senatus auctoritas had an important role in encouraging the people to choose in favour of the 
Senate, but it was also possible for a speaker to encourage the people to make their contrary 
opinion known, and thus to guide the decision making of the Senate.170     
                                                             
167 Cic., Phil., 11.27; Brut., 2.5.5; 1.2a.1; 1.4.2; Fam., 12.7. Brutus rejected Cicero’s argument, declaring 
that the Senate and people of Rome should direct his actions. 
168 Cic., Phil., 7.14. 
169 Cic., Phil., 5.1; 12.8. As Morstein-Marx (2004) pp.38-42, 160-164 pointed out, it was the magistrates, 
members of the Senate who called contiones, invited speakers, setting the scene within which the 
people heard advice and opinions, and putting the political elite in a position of power. 
170 Cic., Phil., 1.21; 3.2, 32; 4.2, 8; 6.2-3.  
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Cicero’s own behaviour and use of rhetoric shows that he understood the constitutional 
relationship between the Senate and people to be fluid in terms of the direction that power 
flowed and that he was prepared to exploit this fluidity.     As can be seen by the two sets of 
paired speeches; Philippics Three and Four, and Five and Six; Cicero sought first to persuade 
the Senate of his arguments; claiming that they should lead the people accordingly; but when 
he failed to gain their support for his proposals he went to the people to seek their support 
and to urge them to encourage the Senate to act.   He did not seek to rouse the people 
violently against the Senate, but he was willing to encourage them to let the Senate know that 
they disagreed with their decision in order to influence the Senate’s position.  In the Sixth 
Philippic he incites the people’s disapproval of the proposed embassy to Antonius: “I realise, 
Men of Rome (quirites), that you repudiate this proposal, and you are not wrong.”171    Cicero 
knew that he was using rhetoric to provoke a popular response:  in the Fourth Philippic he 
compared himself to a general exhorting his troops.172   However, he claimed that it was the 
people who put him in this role, declaring him to have saved the res publica for the second 
time after he had given the Third Philippic, and implied that it was therefore legitimate for him 
to speak against the decision of the Senate in such a manner.173   As such, Cicero claims to be a 
true popularis, because he represents both popular opinion and the best interests of the 
people. Those who opposed him, he argues, were known as populares but were self-interested 
and did not really support the res publica in its proper form.  Here we see again Cicero’ 
reclamation and redefinition of political vocabulary in his portrayal of the res publica, as he 
develops the concepts of ‘true’ and ‘false’ populares, just as he did for  ‘true’ and ‘false’ 
gloria.174  Cicero makes clear that being a true friend of the people is about the good of the res 
publica as well as popularity, his behaviour expressing an understanding of the constitution in 
which it was legitimate for a consular to counsel the people to encourage the Senate to act in 
accordance with their wishes, just as long as it was done by a good citizen in the service of the 
res publica. 
In Cicero’s depiction of the constitution of the res publica, proper and effectively 
functioning relationships between the Senate, the populus and the magistrates depended on 
                                                             
171 Cic., Phil., 6.3.   
172 Cic., Phil., 4.11. See section 2(b)i above on claptraps.   
173 Cic., Phil., 6.2. Morstein-Marx (2004) p.143.  
174 Cic., Phil., 7.4-5. Cf., Cat., 4.9; Leg. agr. 2.6-10. Contra Manuwald (2007) p.841, who argues that 
Cicero uses popularis in two ways: (i) to refer to a member of a party allegedly supporting the interests 
of the people, or (ii) to refer a person working in the interests of the people, and that these two 
meanings are mutually exclusive.    
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the maintenance of unity between these groups in the common desire to serve the best 
interests of Rome.  This meant that the stability of the institutions, the constitution and of 
Rome depended upon the political culture and the quality of its citizens.  If Rome’s citizens 
were men of virtus then they would be able to discern the best interests of the res publica and 
guide Rome accordingly; the fluidity in the relationships between institutions would not create 
problems.   However, if self-interest and ambition crept in amongst the citizens, the flexibility 
in the constitution could be exploited, the institutions protecting the res publica would not be 
upheld and the res publica, in its true form, would cease to exist.   This, Cicero believed, had 
happened under Caesar and would occur again if Antonius were to be successful, thus, if the 
res publica was to be restored successfully, the character of the citizen – both those in 
positions of leadership and amongst the mass of the people - became more important than 
ever.   
 
(c) The Individual and the Community: The Citizen within the res publica 
 Cicero’s connection between the behaviour of the citizen and the welfare of the res publica 
was an important element in his understanding of the constitution and of his attack on 
Antonius. From Cicero’s presentation of the way the political institutions of Rome functioned 
in the constitution the importance of good citizenship is clear and from our study of Cicero’s 
discussion of citizenship in section 2(a) it is clear that the wellbeing of the res publica was a key 
part of his definition of the good citizen.  Without the res publica as a polity the citizen did not 
and could not exist: therefore, only the citizen who put the res publica first could be regarded 
as a truly good citizen and a legitimate magistrate of Rome.  For Cicero, the citizen who 
endangered the res publica was not a true citizen.  In this way, the security and wellbeing of 
the res publica became the key factor governing the possession of citizenship itself.  This 
section will examine the way in which Cicero understood the relationship between the citizen 
and the res publica as a legal bond which the citizen must not break, and which, he argued, 
defined legal and constitutional action at Rome.  It will also consider the way in which Cicero 
saw the citizen as interacting with his peers within the res publica, the significance of speech as 
the medium through which the community was maintained and the importance of good 
speech in Cicero’s understanding of the constitution of Rome.  
For Cicero the citizen was a part of the res publica: without it, he had no status and it was 
therefore his duty to uphold the polity that gave him meaning and security. He turned the 
connection between the cives and their civitas into a legal bond born out of the contract that 
 
 
90 | P a g e  
 
bound citizens together in the res publica, employing legal terms such as fides and societas to 
describe the association of mankind in a polity.  Law (ius) itself is a critical part of Cicero’s 
understanding of the constitution.175  From the life of the city, which was created by the 
coming together of men, came laws and customs (leges moresque), and these constituted the 
foundation of the res publica.   The difference between a hominum societas and a civitas as a 
community was citizenship, a quality rooted in common bonds and possessions including laws 
(ius), statutes (leges) and courts (iudicia), creating a free people who enjoy equity before the 
law.176  Cicero argued that since Rome’s citizens had come together to form the res publica in a 
partnership  they had the duty of behaving towards each other ex bona fides, as partners in a 
legal association were expected to do and were required to treat each other with justice and 
uphold the res publica.177    For Cicero any citizen who did not act in the interests of the res 
publica had broken his legal obligations and was not, legally, a citizen.   He applied this 
argument to Antonius and to Dolabella in order to justify action against them178 
Cicero’s presentation of law in 44-43 plays out on two levels: that of statutes (leges), rights, 
tradition and precedent (ius) which he employs and interprets to make his case, and that of a 
higher law or standard of right action, which Harries has called law-as-philosophy, and which 
came into play when man-made law failed to protect the res publica.179   These levels are never 
fully separable, since the law, in the form of the leges, mores and institutes of the ancestors, 
must be upheld by good citizens acting in support of the res publica.180    However, if these 
laws fail to protect the polity, then the good citizen may act in support of the res publica 
through the exercise of his reason and wisdom.   As Agamben has noted, this kind of  ‘state of 
exception’, in which extraordinary constitutional action is legitimised by a state of emergency, 
exists in the border areas of juridical order, neither within or without legal norms, and is 
                                                             
175 The law itself is defined by justice and aequitas: without aequitas, ius would not be ius, and that the 
law is concerned with fairness (aequitas), not wrath (iracundia).   Indeed, the reason for first making 
good men kings and then for creating laws (leges) was to establish aequitas because the people were 
being oppressed by those with power (Cic., Off., 1.89; 2.41-42).  Rome’s leges, according to Cicero, were 
the statuary expression of ius, aequitas and justice, but they did not, on their own, comprise the entirety 
of Roman law.  See Lintott (1999) pp.3-8 and Harries (2006) pp.68-70 on sources of legal authority at 
Rome. 
176 Cic., Off., 1.12, 50, 53, 88; 2.15.  
177 Cic., Off., 1.12, 15, 23, 45, 50, 64 Cf., Rep., 1.39.  Harries (2006) pp.23-25, 54 & 71. 
178 This argument was not new in 44-43; he had also employed it against Catiline. Cic., Cat., 1.3, 13, 28.  
Cf., Ibid. pp.57, 189-193.  
179 Ibid. pp.53-58.  
180 Cic., Phil., 13.14 declared that permission to act comes from these three sources.  
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justified by the principle that law is ordained for the well-being of men.181   Through such a 
presentation of Roman law and a declaration that Rome was in a time of crisis Cicero was able 
to argue that only actions that support the res publica are legitimate for the citizen and that 
because they are legitimate they must therefore be legal.   The law is concerned with justice, 
as is the good citizen – therefore, logically, the acts of the good citizen must be legal.   
Simultaneously, acting illegally, in contravention of statutes, traditions and institutions, is 
illegitimate and marks one as a false citizen.  In such an understanding of law, therefore, the 
character and behaviour of the citizen is the arbitrator of legitimacy and legal and 
constitutional action.    
Cicero’s expression of this understanding of law in the constitution both reflected his 
understanding of the situation at Rome in 44-43 and responded to it as he attempted to justify 
the actions of the conspirators and Octavian, and to de-Romanise Antonius in order to 
legitimise his attack on him.182   We have already seen that Cicero described the qualities and 
activities of various individuals in order to portray them as good or bad citizens.  However, 
Cicero’s aims in this were not only limited to the influencing of public opinion; he wanted to 
turn this opinion to action, in particular the establishment of the tyrannicides and Octavian in 
legal positions of authority, and the declaration of Antonius, and later Dolabella, as a hostis.  
He sought to turn his understanding of the constitution into the constitution by having his 
arguments accepted and acted upon in Roman political life, in this case through the enactment 
of the legal measures that would see Antonius outlawed, and the positions of Octavian, the 
two Brutii and Cassius made official.  
In the Philippics, Cicero argued that Antonius’s bad character, his inability to control his 
passions, his attitude towards the Senate and people of Rome, and in particular his tendency 
to employ violence, endangered the res publica and were proof of his illegitimacy as a citizen 
                                                             
181 Agamben (2005) pp.23-25.  He describes the ‘state of exception’ as a fictional lacuna in public law, 
where the law remains in force but with its application suspended (p.31).  Cicero’s argument has been 
reiterated over the years, for example by Abraham Lincoln, who believed it was not possible to, “Lose 
the nation yet preserve the constitution,” and that all action taken in defence of the constitution was 
legal (Lincoln (1989) p.585-586), and by Richard Nixon, who cited Lincoln’s argument saying that, “When 
the President does it, that means that it is not illegal,” (Transcript, (1977)). The acceptability of this kind 
of argument is clearly a matter of context and perspective: Cicero’s argument was not accepted by all at 
Rome.  
182 Harries (2006) p.185 argues that after his exile Cicero created a public discourse making law the 
defining characteristic of the community and excluding the lawless.  His attack on Antonius in the 
Philippics is the culmination of this.  
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and consul of Rome.183  To these arguments Cicero added the claim that the legislation 
Antonius had ushered through after Caesar’s death was illegal because it violated existing 
leges, mores, and institutes and because it damaged the res publica.   In the first Philippic he 
countered Antonius’ argument that he was maintaining Caesar’s acta by claiming that such 
acta should consist only of Caesar’s laws, passed whilst he was alive as legislative acts of the 
people.   Cicero also implied that, as Antonius was the sole authority producing these new 
acta, they might not be those of Caesar at all, and thus doubly illegal, as only Caesar’s acta 
were to be maintained.  Cicero then presented Antonius’ actions as triply illegal, since not only 
were they not really acta, and possibly not even the acta intended by Caesar; they actually 
undermined the acta Caesar passed when he was alive.184  By acting in this way, Cicero argued, 
Antonius broke fides with the Senate and of Rome, because he undermined the settlement 
that had been established in the Senate after Caesar’s death.   
 In addition to the illegality of the Antonius’ legislation, Cicero also argued that Antonius 
passed this legislation in an unconstitutional manner; failing to promulgate the statutes 
beforehand, in order to prevent any discussion or protest of them either in the Senate or 
before the people.185    Cicero questioned the make-up of the assembly that passed this 
legislation, quoting from the traditional formula: “The People (populus) lawfully enacted…” 
and then responding by asking, “What people? The people (populus) which was shut out? 
                                                             
183 Cic., Phil., 2.10. Cf., 10.12 where Cicero declared that to use one’s imperium to attack the res publica 
is to automatically forfeit that imperium. 
Similar rhetoric about legitimacy was employed in the US elections in 2008, when President G. W. Bush, 
speaking at the RNC, declared: “Fellow citizens: If the Hanoi Hilton could not break John McCain’s 
resolve to do what is best for his country, you can be sure the angry left never will.” (For the full text of 
the speech, see Bush (2008).  This was followed by Sarah Palin’s comment about Barack Obama: “This is 
not a man who sees America as you and I do - as the greatest force for good in the world. This is 
someone who sees America as imperfect enough to pal around with terrorists who targeted their own 
country.”  (Ambinder (2008)).  Political bloggers Marc Ambinder (2008) and Matt Yglesias (2008) both 
commented on the way in which such rhetoric aimed to push Obama and the Democrats out of 
legitimate political debate because they were un-American.  Ambinder translated Palin statement in the 
following way: “It's that Obama, ‘is not a man who sees America as you and I do.’   This is the message 
that opponents of Obama began with: he's not one of us. He's culturally foreign. He doesn't share your 
values.  He's dangerous.”  Such examples illustrate the example of the divisiveness of this kind of 
rhetoric.  
184 Cic., Phil., 1.16-23.   This provides an example of the problem of political vocabulary at Rome, as 
Cicero and Antonius dispute the meaning of the term ‘acta’.  
185 Cic., Phil., 1.25; 5.7. Lintott (1999) p.44-6 notes that the waiting period was known as a trinundinum, 
or three market days, and was in effect around 17 days long. 
185 Cic., Phil., 1.25.  This criticism is also important since it shows that Antonius’ actions prevent the 
Senate from fulfilling their proper role in the res publica.  
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Lawfully? Are you referring to a legality which has been abolished by armed violence?” 186    
Cicero also argued that Antonius’ behaviour towards the Senate was improper and 
unconstitutional, portraying him as either ignoring the Senate and its consilium, or making a 
mockery of it.   He claimed that Antonius effectively suspended the Senate in the summer of 
44, using the popular assembly in order to pass legislation.187  Later, Antonius was described as 
failing to attend Senate meetings he had called, using the Senate to allot provinciae in order to 
suit his interests, and overseeing the issuing of decrees after nightfall.188    Antonius is said to 
have no consilium publicum, because he ignores the Senate; this meant, to Cicero, that he 
really based his behaviour on privatum consilium and his actions were illegal.189   Antonius’ 
relationships with the Senate and the populus were, according to Cicero, not those that a 
consul should have in the constitution of the res publica, as they denied both their proper role 
in the political processes of the res publica.    
 Cicero argued that Antonius’ actions and therefore his position as consul were illegitimate 
and illegal because they did not uphold the constitution.   His abuse of his magistracy and his 
failure to support the best interests of the res publica meant that he was not a true Roman 
citizen, and Cicero therefore claimed that he must be a hostis. He also argued that  the Senate 
had effectively declared him such by their actions towards him and that the people confirmed 
this: all that was needed was the legal confirmation 190  At times Cicero’s arguments for 
Antonius’ illegitimacy became circular, for example in his claim that Antonius could not truly 
be a consul, because if he were then those soldiers who abandoned him must be condemned, 
an argument that could only be sustained by the simultaneous claim that the legions acted 
rightly in abandoning him, an argument supported by the commendation that Cicero proposed 
for them in the third Philippic, based on their refusal to support Antonius.191   Once Dolabella 
was officially declared a hostis, however, Cicero was able to argue that by aligning himself with 
                                                             
186 Cic., Phil., 1.26; Cf., 1.25; 2.112; 5.7. This begs the question as to who did pass these laws.  If the 
answer, as it seems it must be, is that some of the people did attend, then Cicero’s claim that the 
populus thinks and acts as a united entity against Antonius (Phil., 3.32; 4.2) is undermined, and his 
manipulation and interpretation of the concept of legality can be seen. 
187 Cic., Phil., 1.6.  
188 Cic., Phil., 3.19-20, 24-25.  Manuwald (2007) p.412 on the possibility that the provincial allotment was 
passed illegally after dark. Lintott (1999) p.73.  
189 Cic., Phil., 3.5, 12; 4.14.  
190 Cic., Phil., 4.1-2; See also 2.2, 51; 3.6, 14; 4.5, 14; 5.27; 13.23, 26; 14.6 for Antonius the hostis.  
191 Cic., Phil., 3.39; 4.5-6; Brut., 2.5.5; 1.2a.1  
 
 
94 | P a g e  
 
Dolabella, Antonius effectively condemned himself.192  However, he still failed to convince the 
majority of the Senate of his argument, and Antonius was not declared a hostis till after 
Mutina, a failure that revealed the existence and strength of other understandings of the 
constitution in Rome. 
Whilst seeing Antonius as having no consilium publicum, because of the way he interacted 
with the Senate and people, Cicero argued that although the conspirators and Octavian had 
taken action on their own initiative (privatum consilium), without the authority of the Senate, 
their actions were constitutional because they were carried out in the best interests of the res 
publica and had merely pre-empted the decision the Senate was about to make.193   In 
defending Octavian he argued that the young man’s deeds were carried out in defence of the 
res publica rather than self interest and that they were therefore constitutionally legitimate. 194   
Cicero’s presentation of Octavian’s actions echoed his description of the proper behaviour of 
the magistrate.  In justifying his proposal that Octavian be appointed propraetor he also cited 
the example of Pompeius, who had received great honours in a less worthy cause, and of 
Rullus, Africanus and Flamininus, who had been elected to consulships at a young age.195    For 
Cicero age was not a constitutional objection to giving Octavian imperium, as long as Octavian 
was a good citizen who would defend the res publica; as he had already proved he would.  
 Cicero’s justification of the conspirators’ actions as constitutionally sound followed the 
same argument. He began with a defence of the assassination of Caesar itself, citing the 
example of L. Junius Brutus and the expulsion of the kings as constitutional precedent;196 
                                                             
192 Cic., Phil., 13.23, 36.   Cf., Phil., 11.10 & 15 for Cicero’s support of Calenus’ proposal that Dolabella be 
declared a hostis, which uses argument based on Dolabella’s behaviour in capturing and murdering 
Trebonius 
193Cic., Phil., 3.3, 8; 4.2-4, 7-8; 10.12, 15; 11.27. Harries (2006) pp.224-228.  For Sallust, acting on one’s 
privatum consilium was a sign of a bad citizen, one who put his own interests ahead of those of the res 
publica.  In the Historiae (fr., 1.77M) Lepidus is criticised by Philippus for acting on his privatum 
consilium.  McGushin (1992-94) 1.146-7 suggests that Philippus’ phrase may be a deliberate reference 
by Sallust to the illegal activity of Octavian.   Pompeius’ later warning (fr., 2.98M) to the Senate not to 
force him to act on his own counsel acts echoes the privatum consilium of which Lepidus is accused.  It 
allows the historian to show his audience how easy it would have been for Pompeius, who had been 
sent to Spain at the request of the Senate, to become another Lepidus, turning on the res publica in 
support of his own ends and those of a group he claimed to champion.   It is possible that Sallust’s 
criticism of acting upon privatum consilium is a comment on Cicero’s behaviour and political thought as 
expressed in the Philippics, as the man who stood against Catiline in 63 B.C. sought to legitimise the 
actions of a man who acted on his own initiative in a similar way to both Lepidus and Catiline, and to 
whose actions as triumvir Sallust referred in Caesar’s speech in the Bellum Catilinae (51.36), and the 
prologue to the Bellum Jugurthinum (3.2). 
194 Cic., Phil., 3.3, 8; 4.2; 5.47-53; 11.20. 
195 Cic., Phil., 5.43, 47-48.  
196 Cic., Phil., 1.13; 2.26, 114; 3.9, 11. 
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countering the attacks Antonius began to make against the conspirators after Octavian’s 
return to Rome, and, possibly, the opinion of Octavian himself.   In de Officiis Cicero discusses 
the duty of the good citizen to a friend who has become a tyrant, arguing that although it is 
dishonourable to kill a friend and may thus appear dishonourable to kill a friend who becomes 
a tyrant, it is in fact an act of service to kill a tyrant, and therefore it is both a duty of the good 
citizen and one that will bring him honour.197   In the Philippics he defended Decimus Brutus, 
Marcus Brutus and Cassius by arguing that they were acting in defence of the res publica, and 
that the Senate should acknowledge and legalise their deeds. 198  In defending M. Brutus and 
Cassius he went so far as to claim that, “Law (lex) is nothing but a moral code of right conduct 
derived from the will of the Gods ordaining what is good (honestum) and forbidding its 
opposite.”199 This was the principle he applied to his arguments about right action within the 
res publica, defining proper conduct as that which upheld the constitution (as he understood 
it) and defended the res publica.  Cicero’s understanding of law as a standard of right action 
emphasises the importance of good citizenship in his understanding of the constitution, for the 
good citizen will know what this standard is and act in accordance with it.   
As Manuwald notes, Cicero’s definition of law and legal action in the res publica allowed 
him to take his own assessment rather than positive law as his guideline for his arguments, 
determining the welfare of the community subjectively.200 Cicero’s expressed certainty of the 
right course of action led him to pursue a rhetorical line of attack that sought to drive his 
opponents out of the discourse, as he argued that they did not understand the proper duties 
of the good citizen or know or care about the best interests of Rome.  In order to convince his 
audiences of this, Cicero presented them with two mutually exclusive options, favouring one 
himself, and not fully elaborating on the other, refusing to allow any other conception of the 
situation.201   In de Officiis too, Cicero suggests that devotion to the res publica led to one clear 
set of duties and activities.  That reality of the legal situation was more complicated than 
Cicero allowed in his speeches, and that his interpretation did not find favour with a majority 
                                                             
197 Cic., Off., 3.19. Both Dyck (1996) p.519 and Atkins and Griffin (1991) p.107 note that Cicero 
exaggerates the unity of the populus Romanus over the assassination of Caesar at this point (see chapter 
2.5), but despite the fairly obvious reference to recent events; it is still technically a paradigmatic 
example and thus Cicero can make such a sweeping statement 
198 Cic., Phil., 3.8, 12, 38; 4.7-9, 46-48; 5.19, 37; 6.9. 
199 Cic., Phil., 11.28. Cf.,  10.2, 7, 12, 14, 25; 11.30. Harries (2006) p.227 notes that this argument 
employs the principles of natural law that Cicero first laid out in de Legibus, adopting it for oratory and 
exploiting the ambiguities it brought to  the concept of ‘law’.  
200 Manuwald (2007) pp.303-4. 
201 Cic., Phil., 2.31-32 makes the technique explicit. Cf., Phil., 5.5; 8.11-13; 13.49. Ramsey (2003) pp.209-
210;  Harries (2006) pp.201, 218; Manuwald (2007) p.305.  
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of the Senate can be deduced from the way in which he continually has to reiterate his 
arguments, responding to other proposals not only from Antonius, but also from other 
Senators, and from his attempt to reclaim and clarify the definitions of key Roman political 
terminology in de Officiis.       
The final concept in Cicero’s understanding of the constitution also shows the importance 
of good citizenship in successfully supporting the res publica.   Speech was the medium 
through which Rome’s citizens interacted with each other and was of critical importance in 
Rome’s political processes and in the maintenance of the res publica.  It was through speech 
that the citizens’ understandings of the res publica were expressed through which the 
constitution was interpreted, constructed and developed.  Throughout his work after Caesar’s 
death, Cicero expressed the importance of good speech and the proper use words to the 
effective functioning of the constitution.  Cicero was aware that different understandings of 
words indicating political concepts existed in Rome and argued that this damaged the res 
publica by misleading people into thinking that certain things were of benefit to the res publica 
when in truth they were dangerous.   
As seen above, Cicero sought to reclaim and redefine key terms in Rome’s vocabulary to 
create a ‘true’ understanding of the res publica, as opposed to any other ‘false’, self-interested 
versions.  Cicero argued that false understandings of words led to fundamental 
misunderstandings of the key political ideas of the Roman constitution, breaking the essential 
bond between the duty of the citizen and the good of the res publica.  One of the most 
fundamental misunderstandings that Cicero described is the separation of utile (expediency) 
from true honour, something that led men to pursue their own self-interests.  Cicero claimed 
that only things that were honourable were useful to the individual and that honour could only 
come from the service of the res publica.202   Without such an understanding of the 
relationship between citizen and polity, Cicero argued that men would pursue their own self-
interest at the expense of Rome, destabilising the constitution and damaging the polity.      
Such misunderstandings of Rome’s political vocabulary were expressed in speech as well as 
in actions.   Knowing the ‘vera vocabula’203 was the duty and the mark of the good citizen, for if 
words were used inaccurately or with deliberate intent to mislead an audience then fides was 
betrayed and the decision-making processes of Rome would be compromised and the res 
                                                             
202 Cic., Off,. 2.9; 3.43. Cf., Phil., 5.6. 
203 Sall., Cat., 52.11-12 for the term vera vocabula.  The place of language in the res publica is a theme 
Sallust takes up and develops: see 4.2(a) and 4.3. 
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publica damaged.204   Cicero argued that in order for the res publica to function as a polity it 
was necessary that all the citizens understand what was meant when these various terms were 
employed in political discourse. The loss of vera vocabula made it harder for Rome’s citizens to 
be sure that they were not being misled or deceived by those who were advising them as to 
the best course of action for the res publica.  So, when arguing against Calenus’ proposal for 
negotiation with Antonius, Cicero claimed that Calenus misunderstood the true nature of 
peace.  Calenus’ understanding of peace, according to Cicero, was slavery and his proposals for 
the res publica based on this understanding misled his fellow citizens and endangered Rome. 205    
Such misuse of words could break the bonds between Rome’s citizens leading to factionalism 
and civil strife and also allow decisions to be made that would not benefit the res publica.  
The misunderstanding and misuse of words was a negative feature in Cicero’s formulation 
of the constitution of the res publica.  The lack of a vera vocabula led to misunderstandings of 
the key elements of the constitution – both the ideas and the institutions.  In such a situation 
the flexibility of the relationships between Rome’s various institutions could be exploited, as 
political actors failed to understand the proper constitutional roles of these institutions and 
the true meanings of the political terms they employed in speaking in the Senate or the forum.   
Bad speech meant that individuals not only misunderstood the constitution and acted 
improperly in the res publica; they also led others away from the ‘true’ understanding of the 
constitution through their proposals and arguments in public discourse.  In this way, different 
understandings of the constitution became a part of Rome’s political discourse, fracturing 
Roman knowledge about the constitution and making its renegotiation or re-establishment 
more difficult.   
 The successful maintenance of Cicero’s constitution required that the citizen behave 
appropriately and speak properly in order to ensure the effective functioning of Rome’s 
political institutions.   The citizen was required to uphold the constitution and the res publica 
or they would not only not be considered a good citizen but would be regarded as no citizen at 
all.   The citizen, in short, was the key element in Cicero’s interpretation of the Roman 
constitution in 44-43 and the basis of his hope for its future as he sought to guide the actions 
of men like Brutus, Cassius and Octavian in its defence. However, while Cicero emphasised the 
importance of a unified understanding of the constitution to the stability of Rome, his 
                                                             
204 See Cic., Off., 2.21-23, 33-3 for the importance of fides in the relationship between advisor and 
advisee.  Moderation in speech was also important, and comes from a citizen’s decorum (Cic., Off., 
1.94). 
205 Cic., Phil., 8.11-13.   
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understanding of it was one amongst many.  He sought to present other understandings of the 
constitution as false and damaging, but cannot fully escape the charge that his own discourse 
was a part of the problem Romans faced as they sought to renegotiate their constitution in 44-
43.  
The way in which Cicero expressed his understanding of the constitution had an impact 
upon Rome’s constitutional discourse and thence upon the constitution; but not always in the 
manner that Cicero himself would have hoped.  As Cicero sought to drive Antonius out of the 
res publica by portraying him as a bad citizen and illegitimate consul who did not possess the 
vera vocabula or have the best interests of Rome at heart, he shaped Antonius’ expression of 
his understanding of the res publica and was a factor in Antonius’ decision to take military 
action to defend himself.   Cicero’s express ion of his understanding of the constitution further 
affected its reproduction through its role in establishing Octavian in a position of power at 
Rome, from which he could argue for his understanding of the constitution.  Although Cicero 
was, ultimately, successful in seeing Antonius declared a hostis and the positions of the 
conspirators legitimised, as happened after the battle of Mutina, the unintended 
consequences of his words and actions was the shaping of the actions of Antonius, and of 
Lepidus and Octavian and thus the renegotiation of the constitution of the res publica that led 
to the formation of the Second Triumvirate. 
 
In Conclusion 
Cicero’s expression of the constitution of the Roman res publica in the aftermath of 
Caesar’s assassination reveals an understanding of Rome’s political system that had been 
formed by the experiences and considerations of his long career, but which also reacted to 
some very specific contemporary issues, notably the dictatorship and death of Caesar and the 
behaviour of Marcus Antonius in 44-43.    Believing that the constitution of the res publica had 
been in abeyance throughout Caesar’s dictatorship and fearing for its future survival, Cicero 
took up the cause of the conspirators, who he argued had acted honourably in assassinating 
Caesar, and who he believed could help lead Rome and restore the constitution.  He also took 
up the cause of Octavian, who, as Caesar’s heir, could command the loyalty of the people and 
the army, aiming to bring Octavian under the guidance of the Senate and to use his power 
against Antonius for the good of the Republic.  
Throughout 44-43, Cicero emphasised the importance of the relationship between the 
citizen as an individual and the res publica as a whole to the stability and wellbeing of the 
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latter and the identity of the latter.  In his understanding the res publica arose from a union of 
the citizens for the security of their mutual interests and the dispensation of justice, whilst the 
citizens, particularly those who played a role in the administration of the res publica, were 
responsible for the maintenance of this union.   This they could do by behaving as good citizens 
should, with justice, decorum, generosity and greatness of spirit.  Such behaviour when carried 
out in the political sphere at Rome by participation in the political practices of the polity as a 
member of the Senate or of the citizen body attending contiones and voting assemblies, 
sustained and supported the res publica.      It was a duty of the citizen to sustain the polity, 
but it was also in their best interests.  Without the civitas and the res publica the citizen could 
not be a citizen, for there was no polity he could be a citizen of or be protected by.    Any 
denial of the social ties and mutual obligations that bound the citizens together in support of 
the res publica destroyed the civitas as it led to the corruption and rejection of such virtues as 
beneficentia, liberalitas and justice as well as to theft, embezzlement,  plundering of both allies 
and citizens in a lust for wealth and power.206    Citizens, Senators and magistrates who did not 
behave appropriately or speak properly endangered the relationship between the Senate and 
people of Rome, exploiting its fluidity, and in so doing they damaged the res publica and could 
not be regarded as true citizens.  Rather, they ought to put the interests of Rome before their 
own desires, creating a unity of purpose within the res publica.   Cicero sought to bring his 
understanding of the constitution into being through his oratory and create this unity, 
persuading his audiences that the res publica would be secured if they acted appropriately, 
and isolating those, such as Antonius, who he believed endangered this.    
Cicero’s understanding of the constitution of the res publica allowed for debate and 
discourse in Rome’s public fora, indeed, it required it, as can be seen in from his discussion of 
gloria in de Officiis.207  Yet in 44-43 Cicero found that such debate threatened his argument 
and, he thought, the future of the res publica, for it allowed those he considered dangerous to 
have a voice.    He therefore sought to control Senate’s relationship with the people through 
his rhetoric, arguing that there was only one legitimate course of action that the Senate and 
people of Rome could take and portraying those who opposed it as ‘bad’ citizens: amongst 
them the consuls Rome.     However, Cicero failed to convince his fellow citizens of the justice 
of his cause and the correctness of his understanding of the constitution, while his own 
discourse and actions, in particular his attack on Antonius and support of Octavian created 
                                                             
206 Cic., Off., 3.26, 28, 36. 
207 Cic., Off., 2.2-3 Dugan (2005) pp.232-234. See section 2(a), above.  
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problems additional to those they aimed to solve.208    His tendency to define other 
understandings of political concepts, as wrong and dangerous for the res publica, rather than 
accept the possibility of their validity in a different understanding of the constitution or an 
evolving polity helped to drive Antonius out of the political debate towards a military defence 
of his position, and precluded the opportunity for compromises that might have enabled Rome 
to avoid civil war. He also helped to legitimise Octavian’s irregular position in Roman political 
life, providing him with the platform he needed to establish himself and to gain the consulship.  
As the next chapter will show, Sallust responded to and critiqued Cicero’s political thought as 
he sought to explain the crises at Rome in the first century, making clear that Cicero’s 
understanding of the was not the only one to exist at Rome, and that his pursuit of it in 
political praxis contributed to the problems of the Republic.  
Cicero’s statements about the constitution in 44-43 not only sought to establish a particular 
understanding of its nature, but also to effect it in practice.  In this way, his discourse became 
part of the events that followed Caesar’s death, responding to them and stimulating them as 
he sought to restore and preserve the res publica.  Men such as Antonius, Octavian, M. Brutus 
and Cassius engaged with and reacted to Cicero’s arguments and activities at Rome, driving 
events forwards. Cicero’s statements and the actions he took in entering the political discourse 
of the day also entered into archive of constitutional knowledge of the res publica that existed 
in Rome at the end of the first century B.C.  They had an impact upon the way that the 
constitution was reconstituted through the discourse of the time, for they influenced the 
actions of Antonius, as well as Lepidus and Octavian, and the way in which they expressed 
their understandings of the res publica through them, which led, in the end, to the formation 
of the triumvirate, and the beginnings of a new kind of governance and constitution at Rome.  
 
                                                             
208 Of course, it doesn’t follow that Cicero was any more guilty of this than any other prominent Roman 
in the late Republic, it is just that the surviving evidence allows us to see it in his case. 
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Chapter Four: Sallust’s res publica 
 
The death of Cicero did not see the end of republican political thought in Rome.1  
Circumstances changed: Cicero was proscribed and executed in 43, and the desire of the 
conspirators to re-establish a res publica free from the dominance of an individual or handful 
of individuals died with Brutus and Cassius at Philippi.2  In November 43 the lex Titia formally 
established Antonius, Octavian and Lepidus as the Second Triumvirate, the years that followed 
seeing a struggle for dominance between the three men.  Yet constitutional thought and 
political discourse continued nonetheless: its expression shaped by the events that had 
followed Caesar’s death and the new rule of the triumvirate.3   This chapter will examine 
Sallust’s representation of the Roman constitution in his historical writing, arguing that his 
understanding of the res publica, and in particular his emphasis on speech in daily political life, 
reveals the fractured nature of Roman knowledge about the constitution.  
Sallust’s depiction of the res publica was as influenced by the events and discourse that 
followed the assassination of Julius Caesar as it was by the events about which he wrote.4  
Hayden White has claimed that, “Everyone recognises that the way one makes sense of history 
is important in determining what politics one will credit as realistic, practicable and socially 
responsible.”5  Whilst it may not be true that everyone does recognise this, in Sallust’s 
historiography we can see that his understanding of Rome’s recent history and contemporary 
situation did shape his expression of the proper nature of Rome’s constitution.  Whilst both of 
his monographs deal with periods and events that the historian presents as key moments in 
the decline of the res publica: the long-running war with Jugurtha at the end of the second 
century B.C., and the rebellion of Catiline in the 60s; each also has its own political and 
constitutional strategies that relate both to the primary narrative and to the historian’s 
                                                             
1 Pace Connolly (2007) p.21.  
2 Pelling (1996) p.8. See also App., B Civ., 4.2ff; Dio 46.54ff; Plut., Vit. Brut., & Vit. Ant., as well as Syme 
(2002), and Osgood (2006) for further narrative of the period in which Sallust was writing.    
3 Osgood (2006) examines the effect that Caesar’s death and the Triumviral period that followed had 
upon Rome through Roman literature. Syme (2002) pp.246-255 also argued for the existence of a 
“Triumviral Period” of literature, which includes Sallust, Horace’s Epodes and Satires, the early works of 
Propertius and Virgil and the last of Varro, and which probably also included Asinius Pollio. Cf., 
Henderson (1998), who discusses the relationship of civil war and literature, see especially chapter one 
on Appian’s account of the proscriptions.  
4 As Fox (2007) p.263 notes, Sallust stressed the past as a mechanism for understanding the present, 
depicting recent historical events to emphasise the close connection.   
5 White (1987) p.73. 
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contemporary situation.6  The Bellum Catilinae considers the role of the individual in the 
decline of the res publica through an account of Catiline’s rebellion, whilst the Bellum 
Jugurthinum focuses on the danger of factio at Rome, both issues as relevant under the 
triumvirate as they had been in 107 or 63 B.C.     In addition, both texts express a concern with 
the nature of the relationship between the individual and the community and the importance 
of good speech in the maintenance of the res publica.  Through this last concern, in particular, 
Sallust’s discourse reveals the problems that beset a discursive constitution and offers an 
explanation for the political instability of the res publica that is rooted in the nature of 
language and discourse.  Whilst Sallust’s Cato decries Rome’s loss of vera vocabula, suggesting 
the existence of such a language, the historian used the various speakers in his works to reveal 
the multiplicity of political ideas and conceptions of the res publica at Rome, suggesting that 
such a true vocabulary was, in fact, an impossibility.7    
                                                             
6 Sall., Cat., 4.4 and Iug., 5.1-2 emphasise these ‘turning points’.  In terms of Sallust’s understanding of 
Roman decline, one can see that the Bellum Jugurthinum acts as a clear ‘prequel’ to the Bellum 
Catilinae, although the writing of Rome’s history before the dictatorship of Sulla leads Sallust to certain 
inconsistencies or evolutions in his depiction of the decline of virtus in chronological terms, as he moves 
the date at which Rome’s decline begins backwards in time.   However, evolution of political thought in 
a historian is hardly unsurprising, and the Bellum Jugurthinum represents such a development in Sallust, 
especially with regard to his understanding of the decline of virtus and its role in the failing res publica, 
and his presentation of factiones at Rome. Garcia Lopez (2001) p.6 argued that these turning points 
allow Sallust to exclude certain qualities as non-Roman, while Fox (2007) p.264 notes that this use of 
‘decisive moments’ allows Sallust to sustain both an ideal past and a corrupt present, in which the ideal 
is only glimpsed in flashes of individual virtue, in an ‘ironic’ account of history (which White (1973) 
pp.37-38, 54-59 defines through the historian simultaneously composing history and drawing the 
reader’s attention to the difficulty of this composition).  
7 It is important to remember that the speeches and statements in the Bellum Catilinae are not those 
uttered by the historical figures themselves but the historian’s representation of them.   However, it is 
unlikely that the historian simply created fictional speeches.  Wiseman (1979) pp.28-29, 51-52 notes the 
ambiguity in historians’ ‘reporting’ of what was said, citing the classic line of Thucydides (1.22.1) “My 
method has been, while keeping as closely as possible to the general sense of the words that were 
actually used, to make the speaker say what in my opinion, was called for by each situation.”  Whilst 
noting that few historians were as dutiful in fulfilling these conditions as Thucydides or Polybius 
(12.25a5-25b4) and that speeches were used to add colour and style to the text, he also argues that the 
content of these speeches was not entirely the historian’s own invention but must have reflected the 
arguments that were found in the sources. Cf., Fornara (1983) pp.142-168 on the tensions within 
historiographical speeches, who concludes that in generally, the Thucydidean principle seems to have 
governed historical practice; Woodman (1988) p.11 who follows De Ste Croix (1972) pp.9-10 in arguing 
that most historiographical speeches ‘got the gist’ of the main thesis of the original, but did not 
necessarily follow the main points of the argument.  Smith has argued that there was a tradition about 
the speech-making in the early Republic, that key phrases or ideas were remembered as being uttered 
at particular moments and that these became canonical and were elaborated upon by later historians 
(Smith (2007), Cf., Miller (1975)).  Speeches in Sallust’s work have specific roles to play within the 
narrative, illuminating character or allowing for a simpler representation of complicated events (Syme 
(2002) p.68; Paul (1966); McGushin (1977) pp.134-135).  It seems that Sallust’s work recreated speeches 
that were actually given: certainly those of Cato and Caesar before the Senate and Memmius before the 
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Sallust’s understanding of vocabulary and language-use has been commented upon by 
other scholars.  Syme claimed that Sallust was aware of the ways in which words could be used 
either positively or negatively in both political and ethical connotations, and noted the way in 
which, in his elaborated narrative, the historian was selective with his own vocabulary. 8   An 
examination of Sallust’s choice of terminology and the understandings he expresses is  
important in analysing his understanding of the Roman constitution and the decline of the 
Republic.   This chapter will begin by presenting Sallust’s work and its major themes within the 
context in which it was written in order to show the way in which Sallust’s depiction of the res 
publica was influenced by recent events at Rome.  Then it will describe Sallust’s formulation of 
good citizenship and of the political structures of Rome within his narrative of a declining res 
publica, with particular focus on the moral quality of Sallust’s conception of virtus and his 
understanding of the role of various groups and factiones in the res publica.  Finally, I will 
examine Sallust’s presentation of political language and discourse at Rome, and his implication 
of Cicero in the creation of the crises that followed Caesar’s death.    
This chapter will focus on Sallust’s two monographs, the Bellum Catilinae and the Bellum 
Jugurthinum, written between 43 and 40 B.C.9  The Historiae are too fragmentary for a 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
people would have been widely known and commented upon (McGushin (1987) p.80).  In addition, 
Sallust as a former tribune and a member of the Roman elite knew the ways in which ideas might be put 
across in the speeches uttered in these times and places, even if he had not heard them himself.  The 
thesis of the argument presented in the speeches of the characters, therefore, may be regarded as a 
credible representation of what was said at the time, so whilst we must remain aware that these are not 
verbatim reports, we may read the direct speeches within the Bellum Catilinae as plausible statements 
of the political and constitutional strategies of these characters in their situation. Particularly relevant, 
for my argument, is the way in which Sallust’s presentation of different arguments through different 
speakers allows him to show the plurality of understandings of the res publica at Rome.  
8 Syme (2002) pp.117 & 255-6.  See also Batstone (1988a),  Batstone (1988b), Batstone (1990); Batstone 
(2008); Garcia Lopez (2001); Grethlein (2006a); Grethlein (2006b); Kraus and Woodman (1997); Levene 
(2000); Scanlon (1980); Sklenar (1998); Tannenbaum (2005) & Woodman (1988) pp.117-127.   
9 It is impossible to firmly establish the date for any of Sallust’s works, but the Bellum Catilinae and 
Bellum Jugurthinum appear to have been written during the 40s, and the Historiae during the early 
years of the 30s and left unfinished at the time of Sallust’s death.  Syme (2002) pp.58-59 sets Cicero’s 
death as the terminus post quem for the writing of Bellum Catilinae; Ramsey (2007a) pp.6-7 sets it at the 
death of Caesar, due to Sallust’s reference to Cato and Caesar  in the past tense (53.6), but argues that it 
was probably published after the death of all the major participants, including Cicero.  The consensus 
now is that the Bellum Catilinae was written and published in 43/42 and the Bellum Jugurthinum in 
41/40, with the Historiae being composed during the early years of the 30s and left unfinished at the 
time of Sallust’s death (Cf.,  McGushin (1977) p.7; Comber and Balmaceda (2009) p.2; Paul (1984); 
McGushin (1992-94) 1.4, 18-20) although it has also been suggested that the Bellum Catilinae, at least 
pre-dated the deaths of Cicero and Caesar (Büchner (1960); MacKay (1962)).  The way in which Sallust 
responds to the political concerns and discourse of the late 40s, as is my contention, support a post-
Ciceronian dating.   Following Syme (2002) p.313ff I regard the Epistulae ad Caesarem senem de re 
publica and the Invective as spurious.  
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confident discussion of its overarching themes within the limits of this thesis. It is possible to 
identify key catchwords, phrases and concepts, and to begin to compare their use in the 
Historiae with their employment in the monographs, but difficult to do more than speculate as 
to the overall arc of political thought as expressed in the original text, or to more than suggest 
fragments as possible examples for an extension or development of Sallust’s political thought.  
While the work does appear to incorporate similar political ideas to those expressed in the 
monographs, it is hard to employ them as primary evidence for this thought without offering a 
serious consideration of the possible structure and content of the work.10   
 
1. Living in the shadows: Sallust’s situation after 43  
By the time Sallust began writing history he was no longer the fiery tribune he had been in 
the 50s,  but a mere spectator: unable to pronounce his political views in the forum.  He had 
left public political life during Caesar’s dictatorship and apparently had no desire to return to 
it.11  Rome was under the governance of the Second Triumvirate, who he could not directly 
criticise without risking the fate of Cicero.   Syme describes these years as a period in which, 
“Freedom, justice and honesty, banished utterly from the public honours and transactions of 
the State, took refuge in the pursuits and relationships of private life.”12   The holding of public 
offices and participation in political life were fraught with problems, and there was rivalry 
amongst the triumvirs and the likelihood of further civil strife.  It was safer to remain in 
retirement.   From such a position, Sallust could not engage in oratory as Cicero had done and 
                                                             
10 The limitations of a doctoral thesis make such a discussion impossible at the present time. The 
fragmentary nature of Sallust’s Historiae leads, inevitably, to problems when one seeks to examine them 
for evidence of the historian’s political and constitutional thought.  The reader must take statements 
that deal with political and constitutional matters out of their narrative context, lessening their ability to 
fully appreciate Sallust’s thought.   Bearing this in mind, this account will focus on Sallust’s discourse in 
the monographs.   
11 Sall., Iug., 4.4. Little is known of the life of Sallust until his involvement in the turbulence after the 
death of Clodius. Born in the Sabine town of Amiternum, he seems to have come to prominence in 
Rome during his tribunate of 52 (Asconius 37C. 18-21, 49C. 1-10, 20-24; Cic., Mil., 45, 47).  At the end of 
that year both Rufus, and his fellow tribune, T. Munatius Plancus Bursa were tried and condemned, but 
Sallust somehow escaped until 50 B.C. when he was ejected from the Senate by the censors L. 
Calpurnius Piso and Ap. Claudius Pulcher (Dio 40.63.4. Cf., Syme (2002) pp.33-35 & Ramsey (2007a) p.4). 
After this, Sallust is known to have commanded a legion for Caesar in 49, been involved in the African 
campaign and then to have held the province Africa Nova as praetor in 46.  When he returned from 
Africa to face charges of corruption; Dio says that he pillaged the province, and implies that Caesar took 
money from those accused of extortion in return for clemency. (App., BC., 2.92.387; Dio 42.52.1ff; 
43.9.2, 47.4).  Sallust’s political career was effectively at an end once again, although he was spared the 
humiliation of a second expulsion from the Senate, and he retreated into private life. (See also Allen Jr. 
(1954); Taylor (1949) pp.26 & 178; Paul (1966)) 
12 Syme (2002) p.246.  
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he also chose to avoid political philosophy.  He turned instead to history, using it to express his 
dissatisfaction with the changes that had taken place at Rome from a distance.13   However, it 
would not have been wise to write about Rome’s very recent history; involving, as it must, the 
consideration of Caesar’s later career.  The conspiracy of Catiline and the Jugurthine war were 
safe choices that allowed the historian to comment upon the decline of Rome whilst leaving 
the careful reader to draw for themselves the conclusion that this decline had ended in the 
rule of the triumvirs.14  Sallust’s historiography treads a careful path between outspokenness 
and caution: expressing his disaffection at the developments of events in Rome over the past 
century, but carefully retaining a plausible deniability on the subject of his opinion of the 
triumvirate. 
Sallust’s depiction of the constitution in his monographs responded to the contemporary 
situation in Rome in a number of ways: in relation to the situation in Rome and Italy, in Rome’s 
wider empire, and in the way that the res publica was governed.  The Bellum Catilinae 
                                                             
13 Woodman (1988) p.125. Sallust’s choice of genre and, particularly, his style, have been seen as a 
response to and reaction against Cicero.   de Or., 2.51-4 presents the clearest picture of Cicero’s 
understanding of how history should be written (see Wiseman (1979) p.25, 34 & 40 & Woodman (1988) 
pp.77-80 for commentary on this passage).  Sallust’s style does not fit Cicero’s prescriptions: brevity, 
speed and abruptness are his hallmarks, along with obscure vocabulary.  He is anti-Ciceronian in 
sentence structure and vocabulary (Quint., 4.2.45, 10.1.102; Sen., Ep., 114.17; Syme (2002) p.54, 257) 
and may have deliberately chosen to go against Cicero’s stylistic demands in a rejection of Cicero’s 
politics and personality. Seneca expressed the belief that style of writing and speaking reflected one’s 
life and personality, and to Sallust, Cicero’s style may have seemed symptomatic of a complacency and 
conservatism that were part of the decline of the res publica. ( Sen., Ep., 114.1.  Woodman (1988) 
p.126).   However, even more than displaying a rejection of Cicero, Sallust’s language reflects his life and 
personality, and his subject matter and personal historical context. Syme (2002) p.61-64 suggests that 
Caesar’s death spurred people to look back at his early life and career, which may have been an 
additional factor in Sallust’s choice of Catiline’s rebellion but cannot explain his study of the Jugurthine 
war.   He and Earl (1961) pp.2-3 rebuff the claims of Mommsen (1952-69) p.489, Schwartz (1897) p. 
580, Schur (1934) p.184, Leeman (1952) p.23 and Leeman (1955) p.208 that Sallust was an apologist for 
Caesar.  Rather, Sallust adopted the persona of an historian out of joint with his times. Levene (2000) 
p.170ff notes the association of  Sallust’s style and that of Cato the Elder (Quint., 8.3.29; Suet., Div. Aug., 
86) and argues that Sallust sought to align himself with Cato’s morals by doing this (Cf.,   Earl (1961) 
pp.44-45).  Grethlein (2006b) pp.304-311 has argued that Sallust’s style reflects the uncertainty of his 
narrative and the confusion of Rome in 63 through mimesis, rhetoric and reception, transmitting the 
uncertainty and chaos of Rome in the first century to the reader.      
14 Eagleton (1983) p.205 describes subtext as, “A text that runs within, visible, at certain ‘symptomatic’ 
points of ambiguity, erasion or over-emphasis and which we, as readers, are able to write, even if the 
novel itself does not.”  Sallust’s understanding of the Roman constitution and his critique of the rule of 
the triumvirate are expressed in subtext, notably through the gap he creates between the words of his 
speakers and their proper meanings (see section 3, below).   Ahl (1984) discusses the use of ‘figured 
speech’ in order to criticise safely.  The essential idea behind the concept is that the speaker or writer 
wants us to understand something different than is being said (p.192), and she notes its employment by 
Thucydides in the Mytilinean debate.  Cf., Scanlon (1980) and Drummond (1995) pp.50-56 on Sallust’s 
employment of Thucydidean techniques and styles, including the similarities between the Mytilinean 
debate and the Caesar/Cato debate in the Bellum Catilinae (p.102).  
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considers the situation in Roman Italy, describing its condition at the time of Catiline’s 
rebellion as debt-ridden and dissatisfied, its people ready to revolt if a leader could be found.15   
In 42 B.C., around the time Sallust was composing the Bellum Catilinae, Octavian returned to 
Rome; his brief the settlement of army veterans.   Given the recent history of settling Rome’s  
veterans, it seems unlikely that the problems that Octavian’s programme encountered and 
exacerbated were wholly unexpected.16  Sallust’s understanding of the Roman res publica 
incorporates Italy, recognising the existence of a long-running problem in the constitution as 
regards this union, and the possibility of its exploitation by disaffected or ambitious Romans.  
His recognition that struggles for power in Rome were tied to dissatisfaction across Italy is 
expressed in the Bellum Catilinae, formed by his personal experiences of the first century B.C., 
including the immediate situation in Italy before and after Octavian’s return from Philippi. 17    
In the Bellum Jugurthinum, it is the relationship of Rome with her empire that is considered 
with regard to the constitution, Sallust describing the way in which the extension of the empire 
affected the governance of the res publica.  After the destruction of Carthage, he claimed, fear 
had died, and avarice, pride and ambition had arisen at Rome. 18  The desire for provincial 
commands where riches and glory could be gained was a part of this and it stimulated rivalry 
within the Roman elite culminating, during the Bellum Jugurthinum, in Marius’ turn to the 
populus in order to win the consulship and be given command of the war.  Sallust knew that it 
was these divisions that men such as Caesar, Antonius and Octavian had exploited, and would 
continue to exploit, as the triumvirs divided Rome’s provinciae between them.19  His 
commentary on the way in which Marius incited popular support for his consulship and 
command of the war acts as a criticism of the way in which these men gained their power at 
Rome.20     
                                                             
15 Sall., Cat., 20.2-17; 23.4; 40.1. 
16 The question of what to do with returning veterans had been a problem for Rome throughout the first 
century, perhaps most prominently on Pompeius’ return from his eastern campaigns in 62 (Wiseman 
(1992a) pp.364-367) where the failure to resolve the issue was  a factor in the formation of the first 
triumvirate.  
17 Sall., Cat., 28.4; 52.16-19; Drummond (1995) p.28.  In Octavian’s settlement both the very smallest 
estates and the very large ones belonging to Senators would be largely exempt from redistribution.  It 
was those in between who were the worst hit, and they could ill-afford their losses.  L. Antonius, brother 
of the triumvir, became the focal point for much of the dissatisfaction, which broke out into rioting and 
then warfare in 41. Events culminated in the siege of Perusia, which finally fell in the spring of 40 and 
was brutally plundered by Octavian’s troops (Pelling (1996) pp.14-17; Syme (2002) pp.207-212).  
18 Sall., Iug., 35.10; 41.2-5. 
19 Dio 46.55.3-56.2; App., B Civ., 4.27; Osgood (2006) p.60; Pelling (1996) p.1; Rawson (1992b) p.486.  
20 Sall., Iug., 63-64; 73.2-7; 84-85.  
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Sallust’s discussions of the relationship of both Italy and the empire with Rome reveal both 
his understanding of the impact Rome’s expansion had had upon the constitution and his 
concern for good governance at Rome.  His focus on the relationship of the behaviour of the 
individual, especially within the political community is particularly important with regard to 
this and is prominent in both texts.   His descriptions of, amongst others, Metellus Numidicus, 
Marius, Sulla, Catiline, and even Cato and Caesar make clear the danger that the failure of the 
moral character of its citizens poses to the res publica: problems are only potential problems, 
until flawed men make use of them for their own ends.  The failure to act appropriately and 
speak honestly led to the abuse of power by men in positions of authority and endangered the 
res publica through the increase of factionalism and civil strife.   Such a perspective reveals a 
reaction not only against the behaviour of the historical figures about whom Sallust was 
writing, but also against the prominent men of his day who he saw as acting in the same way.   
Sallust thus entered into both historical and contemporary discourses about power and the 
individual in the res publica.    
Both the Bellum Catilinae and the Bellum Jugurthinum present a picture of the Roman res 
publica in a state of decline.  Sallust’s historiography aimed both to narrate and to explain this 
decline, arguing that the decline in Roman morals had led to a decline in Roman citizenship 
and thence to a decline in the res publica itself as political ambition and avarice grew, 
undermining the constitution and destabilising Rome.  For Sallust, the second triumvirate was 
the natural (if not necessarily inevitable) end point of this decline: the problems he cites as 
causes of Catiline’s conspiracy and the long running of the Jugurthine war had turned Rome 
into the polity in which he lived.   The establishment and the governance of the triumvirate at 
Rome shaped Sallust’s understanding and depiction of the res publica in the last hundred years 
of the Republic, and also directed his expression of these ideas in historiography rather than in 
public life.  
 
2. Constructing the res publica 
Sallust’s expression of the constitution shared Cicero’s discursive strategy of the res publica 
as a community of citizens, the behaviour of these citizens supporting and maintaining the 
institutions of the community and enabling the res publica to succeed.  Similarly, Sallust’s 
formation of this strategy centred on conceptions of good citizenship, including the ideas of 
virtus and gloria, good speech and conceptions of Rome’s political institutions.  However, a 
description of Sallust’s political discourse reveals that he expressed these concepts in a 
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different manner to Cicero and brought them together in a different way in his depiction of the 
constitution.   This was, in part, a reflection of the different ambitions and genres of in which 
Cicero and Sallust expressed their understanding of the constitution: while Cicero actively 
sought to establish his understanding of the constitution and restore the res publica, Sallust 
wished to explain how the res publica had declined.  His history did not need to persuade an 
audience of the correctness of his understanding of the constitution as Cicero’s oratory and 
philosophy did, and instead he was able to explore the different constitutional concepts and 
strategies that had existed in Rome and the impact that they had had upon the res publica.   By 
virtue of writing in a different genre and writing after Cicero, Sallust was able to include a 
critique of Cicero’s discourse in his depiction of the constitution and the decline of the res 
publica.   The events that had followed Caesar’s death, in which Cicero was an active 
participant, shaped Sallust’s constitutional thought and confirmed his understanding of the 
importance of good speech and good citizenship in maintaining the constitution of the res 
publica. However, while Cicero saw himself in the role of the good citizen, Sallust’s political 
discourse shows that he was not and could not have been a truly good citizen, for the lack of a 
vera vocabula had affected him as it had everyone else. 
 
(a) The Good Citizen 
Sallust, like Cicero, regarded the character of the citizen as an important part of Rome’s 
political culture with good citizenship upholding the ideals, processes and institutions of the 
res publica.  As such, the citizen is a key element in Sallust’s understanding of the constitution 
of Rome and in his explanation of the constitution’s change and decline.  In many ways 
Sallust’s conception of the good citizen echoes that of Cicero, especially in his presentation of 
gloria as a quality dependent on service to the res publica.  However, whilst Sallust employed 
many of the same objects as positive and negative characteristics of the good citizen, he 
brought them together in a different manner to Cicero, ultimately exposing the flaws in some 
of the ideals associated with the good citizen. Where Cicero defined and interrelated a set of 
cardinal virtues, Sallust’s good citizen was formed through progressive phases: his 
understandings of ‘morality’, ‘public morality’ and virtus building upon each other, formed 
around core group of objects with each concept becoming an object in the formation of the 
following concept.  From an understanding of morality Sallust defined the appropriate 
behaviour of the citizen in public affairs, upon which was based a concept of what it means to 
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be a man of virtus or excellence.21    Sallust then went on to reveal the multiple understandings 
of good citizenship extant in Rome and to describe the problems they created for the res 
publica as they inspired the behaviour of those who held them and contributed to the 
competition and conflict at Rome. In this section I will discuss the attributes Sallust saw as 
those of the good (and bad) citizen, the way in which virtus - the ultimate attribute of the good 
citizen – had to be gained through public service, and the way in which Sallust presented the 
existence of multiple concepts of citizenship.  
Sallust’s understanding of morality is expressed during his exposition of Rome’s rise to 
greatness, citing justice, probity, austerity, temperance and devotion to the gods as moral 
qualities, opposed to extravagance, debauchery and greed – the qualities associated with 
Catiline’s supporters, and the bribery and corruption of some of the nobilitas in the Bellum 
Jugurthinum.22   Sallust justified the importance of these objects in Rome’s political culture by 
claiming their possession by Rome’s founders and ancestors who had made the res publica 
great and setting this against the behaviour of the men in Sallust’s narratives who contributed 
to the decline of Rome.   These traditional moral qualities are then combined in the good 
citizen with wisdom; a desire for gloria, specifically in relation to praise, renown and nobility 
rather than to power, influence and money; and discipline and bravery, established in military 
life, but carried over in to the civil world to present a ‘public’ morality, for these are the 
qualities that the citizen needs if he is to participate in Roman political life.23     Meanwhile, the 
negative characteristics of citizens involved in public affairs include arrogance and tyranny, 
which are specified as characteristics of rulers; leisure and wealth, described as a burden and 
curse; avarice, the opponent of honour and integrity; and ambition, a quality that is described 
by the historian as ‘ill-starred’, holding men captive and associated with falseness and self-
interest and set against friendship and goodness of heart.24   Sallust showed the effect of these 
qualities on the behaviour of citizens and on the constitution through his historical narratives.  
In the Bellum Catilinae, for example, Catiline is associated with cunning, treachery, pretence 
and concealment, covetousness, prodigality, violent passions, lust, indiscretion, murder, pillage 
and political dissention, and his deeds threaten to bring down the res publica.  In contrast, 
Cato and Caesar are shown as men of great merit, who seek to preserve the constitution and 
                                                             
21 See chapter 1.4 above on the blurry divide between public and private at Rome.  
22 Sall., Cat., 9.1-3; 14.1-3; Iug., 8.1; 13.8.  
23 Sall., Cat., 6.5–7.7; Iug., 1.3. 
24 Sall., Cat., 3.3-4, 4.2, 6.7, 10.1-11.2.  
 
 
110 | P a g e  
 
who are described as possessing characteristics including dignity, austerity, piety, generosity 
and forgiveness.25 
 Of the negative objects of citizenship, Sallust conceived of avarice and ambition as being 
the most damaging, arguing that they tempt men to a desire for power and the wrong kind of 
gloria and corrupt virtus.  In the Bellum Catilinae he said that, “Hence *after the destruction of 
Carthage] the lust for money first, then for power, grew upon them; these were… the root of 
all evils.”26     Sallust considered avarice to be a quality of the bad citizen because of its impact 
upon the res publica: the avaricious man sought his own self interest, not the good of the 
community, and this destabilised the constitution.   It is noted as a motive for Catiline’s 
conspiracy: he and his supporters desire wealth because they have squandered their own and 
he gathers support in Italy by taking advantage of ongoing debt problems.27  It also plays a role 
in the narrative of the Bellum Jugurthinum, where Sallust employed the non-Roman Jugurtha 
to describe Rome as, “A city for sale and doomed to speedy destruction if it finds a 
purchaser.”28   In the Bellum Jugurthinum Jugurtha himself plays the role of the purchaser, 
though it is through the avarice of such men as Lucius Opimius, Bestia and Scaurus, that he is 
able to become so great a threat to Rome.29   In the narrative of the Bellum Jugurthinum the 
increase of avarice in Rome leads to discord between the people and the nobilitas, who held 
power and who were benefitting from bribery and the flow of riches to Rome, and also within 
the nobilitas itself.30  These divisions, as we will see, were an important part of Sallust’s 
explanation for the decline of the res publica.  
Whilst avarice was dangerous, it was ambition that Sallust saw as the key negative 
characteristic of the citizen.  For Sallust ambition was distinguished from a natural and good 
desire for success and glory by the methods used to gain objectives, and he described it as: “A 
fault, it is true, but not so far removed from virtus; for the noble (bonus) and the base 
(ignavus) alike long for gloria, honour, and power, but the former mount by the true path, 
whereas the latter, being destitute of noble qualities (bonae artes), rely upon craft and 
                                                             
25 Sall., Cat., 5.1-5, 15.1-5, 23.6, 26.3-4, 29.1, 54.  
26 Sall., Cat., 10.3; 11.1.  See McGushin (1977) pp.90-91 for an overview of attempts  to explain the 
apparent contradiction in listing the order in which avarice and ambition arose at Rome.  He suggests 
the cause is careless writing.  Conley (1981a) however, posits that Sallust thought in terms of two 
differently motivated ambition: ambition for imperium at 10.3, and ambition for wealth at 11.1.   
27 Sall., Cat., 14.2; 16.4.  
28 Sall., Iug., 35.10.  
29 Sall., Iug., 8.1; 15.4-5; 16.3-4; 28.5; 29.1-3; 32.2-3. Questions about the accuracy of Sallust’s reporting 
of the settlement of Numidia by Opimius’ commission (see Paul (1966) p.70) shows even more clearly 
that Sallust aimed to emphasise the danger of avarice to Rome. Levene (1992) p.60. 
30 Sall., Cat., 10.1-11.6; Iug., 41.2-3.  See section 2(b)ii below on Sallust’s conception of nobilitas.  
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deception (dolis atque fallaciis).”31   Sallust presented ambitio as a false virtus having similar 
ends in the attainment of gloria and fame, but depending on different means: cunning and 
tricks.  One could not be both ambitious and a man of virtus, for virtus depended on bonae 
artes that were not employed by the ambitious. For Sallust means were as important as ends; 
virtus and gloria could not be gained without good behaviour.32  The conception of ambitio as 
the result of a misunderstanding of virtus and its false association with gloria is part of Sallust’s 
ongoing depiction of the improper use of words in Roman discourse and the threat this posed 
to the constitution of the res publica, in this case by its corruption of the citizen.  
The damage Sallust thought ambition did to the constitution can be seen through the 
characters and behaviour of Catiline, Marius and Sulla.  Sallust’s Catiline does not possess the 
moral characteristics of the good citizen, either in public or private life and although he is well-
known, he is notorious rather than renowned.   His ambition is revealed in the way in which he 
pursues wealth and power, using intrigue and eventually armed rebellion in quest of his goals: 
the craft and deception that Sallust decried, rather than the bonae artes of virtus.    Ambition is 
also a failing of Marius, but here it is more insidious and potentially more dangerous to the res 
publica, for it does not manifest itself in violence and can be seen as part of ‘normal’ political 
behaviour in Rome.  Marius is said to have had a desire for the consulship and to have been 
driven by ambition to break the hold of the nobilitas on that office.  This caused him to court 
popularity amongst the negotiatores in Africa, complaining about Metellus’ command of the 
war and employing ‘seditious’ magistrates to gain the support of the people at Rome by 
spreading rumours about Metellus and exaggerating his own qualities. 33    His ambition does 
not wholly negate his other good qualities,34 but it causes him to abandon bonae artes in 
pursuit of his political goals and creates disharmony in Rome.  The character of Sulla, too, is 
ambitious: although he is educated and intelligent, brave and generous, he desired gloria and 
possessed, “A mind deep beyond belief in its power of disguising his purposes.” 35  Although 
Sallust contrasts the apparent difference between Marius and Sulla’s approaches to their 
commanding officers, Sulla’s ‘obedience’ to Marius is part of his ability to dissemble; his 
ambition and willingness to undermine his commander being revealed in his capture of 
                                                             
31 Sall., Cat., 11.1-2.  
32 Sall., Cat.,  11.1-2.   
33 Sall., Iug., 53.2, 6; 54.5; 55. 1-5; 63.3, 5-6.  
34 Sall., Iug., 53.2 describes Marius as possessing diligence, honesty, military skill and a great spirit.  
35 Sall., Iug., 95.3-4.  
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Jugurtha.36  By ending the Bellum Jugurthinum immediately after Sulla’s capture of Jugurtha, 
Sallust left the ambition and character of Sulla prominent in the audience’s mind, a 
premonition of the later struggle between him and Marius and the resultant crises in Rome.37  
The defining characteristic of the good citizen, which both avarice and ambition negate, is 
virtus, which Sallust understood as being the possession and expression of the moral qualities 
discussed above in all areas of the citizen’s life, but most particularly in the service of the res 
publica.   Sallust’s employment of virtus in his discourse differs from that of Cicero.  Whilst 
Cicero employed virtus in both the singular and plural forms, and also used honestum and 
honestas  as a characteristic of the citizen whose virtus has been publicly recognised, Sallust 
only used virtus in the singular and did not refer to honestum, using only gloria to refer to a 
man’s public reputation.   Sallust’s expression of virtus also reveals the different possible 
understandings of the term in Roman political discourse and of the place of virtus in the 
constitution, making clear that his understanding of the quality is different from that 
expressed by the characters in his narratives, and emphasising the way that these different 
understandings influenced men’s political actions and affected the res publica.  
  Both of Sallust’s monographs open with meditations on virtus as the quality of man: that 
excellence which he may achieve.   The concept of virtus expressed is precise and rooted in 
citizen behaviour; it avoids the plural virtutes, referring to the elements of good behaviour as 
bonae artes.   Virtus’ attainment is associated with man’s actions, in particular the good deeds 
originating in the animus (mind or spirit) that are expressions of man’s ingenium (natural 
disposition or talents).  The good citizen must act not with the tricks and cunning of the 
ambitious man but with bonae artes.38    Sallust divided man’s actions between the mind and 
the body, of which the former are superior. For Sallust the body was to be associated with 
servility, brutality and the characteristics of sloth, appetite and sleep; the mind with the ability 
to rule, the characteristics of self-restraint and justice, and success in activities such as 
agriculture, navigation and architecture.  Success in warfare depended upon both the strength 
of the body and the excellence of the mind, and the successful exercise of power, in both 
military and civil life is presented as depending upon mental excellence.39    
                                                             
36 Sall., Iug., 64.5; 96.3; 105-113. Dijkstra and Parker (2007) pp.143, 154-159.  
37 Levene (1992) pp.53-55 notes that there is no thematic closure in the Bellum Jugurthinum because 
there is no effective stylistic closure, just an abrupt termination of Jugurtha’s story, with Sallust (and 
Rome) awaiting the future careers of Marius and Sulla.  
38 Earl (1961), pp.10-12, 31-32.   
39 Sall., Cat., 1.2; 2.3-8; Iug., 1.3-4; 2.1-2. 
 
 
113 | P a g e  
 
 In his association of virtus with moral deeds that serve the res publica, Sallust’s conception 
of the quality appears to be aligned with that which Earl called the ‘aristocratic ideal’ of virtus: 
in which virtus is interdependent with nobilitas, focused around the citizen’s lineage as well as 
their own deeds.40   However Sallust’s concept of virtus was less restrictive than this as he 
divorced virtus from nobilitas, focusing instead on the behaviour of the citizen as an expression 
of their ingenium and making it clear that the way a citizen chose to pursue deeds was as 
important as the achievements themselves.41    Ingenium was something that all men 
possessed, and all had the potential to express ingenium bonum.  Virtus, therefore, was a 
quality attainable by any citizen.  In the Bellum Jugurthinum, for example, the novus homo 
Marius is described as having many of the characteristics that contribute to virtus.  His lack of 
an ancient family is noted as an obstacle to his attaining the consulship because of the state of 
Rome, but not to his being seen as a man of virtus.  On the other hand, Metellus, whilst said to 
possess virtus, is criticised for his pride and arrogance, a flaw Sallust noted as being common 
to the nobilitas.42    We can also see that Sallust’s concept of virtus is not restricted to Roman 
citizens: in the early passages of the text the young Jugurtha is associated with the quality.  His 
behaviour is described in terms of the objects of virtus: he has a vigorous intellect (ingenium) 
and is not spoiled by luxury or idleness, and indeed the word virtus is associated with him 
directly, as it is with no other character in the Bellum Jugurthinum but Metellus.43  When sent 
to serve in Numantia under Scipio he displays hard work, obedience, a willingness to face 
danger and is described as, “Valiant in war and wise in counsel (bonum consilium), a thing most 
difficult to achieve.”44  As with the positive characteristics attributed to Catiline as a military 
leader, so Jugurtha’s qualities, which might have granted him the appellation virtus, become 
perverted; used not in the service of the Roman res publica or to the benefit of Numidia, but 
only to further his own ambitions.   Virtus can thus be seen to be understood by Sallust not 
only to mean a set of characteristics and abilities, but also something linked to the end 
towards which they are directed: the service of the res publica.   
                                                             
40 Earl (1961), p.18-26.    
41 Sall., Cat., 11.1-2.  Syme (2002) p.253; Earl (1961) p.30; Comber and Balmaceda (2009) pp.21-26.  
42 Sall., Iug., 63.2; 64.1. See section 2(b)i for the complexities of ‘nobilitas’ in Sallust’s constitutional 
thought. 
43 Sall., Iug., 6.1-2; 9.3; 64.1.  Marius’ virtus is described as ‘exaggerated’ by his supporters at 73.6, 
perhaps not an absolute rejection of his possessing this quality, but Sallust nowhere attributes it to him 
directly.  
44 Sall., Iug., 7.5.  
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In his monographs Sallust sought to redefine the nature of this service in response to the 
Rome in which he lived.   As seen above, Sallust acknowledged that virtus could be displayed in 
public life, but in his discussion and justification of his turn to historiography in his prefaces he 
advocated a virtuous retirement from the corruption of political life, the man of virtus refusing 
to sully himself by participating in contemporary politics and serving Rome through reflecting 
upon and understanding the cause of her problems.  He argued that one could be of more 
service to the res publica by inactivity in public affairs, and argued that the recording of the 
past, the memoria rerum gestarum, was of particular service.45  The importance of 
remembering past deeds in the res publica is exemplified in the Bellum Jugurthinum with 
reference to Quintus Fabius Maximus and Publius Scipio, who were exhorted to the pursuit of 
virtus, fame and gloria by the example of their ancestors.46  Grethlein has argued that Sallust 
saw the relationship between res gestae and memoria rerum gestarum as a dialectical one, in 
which the former are motivated by the latter, becoming in time memorialised themselves and 
acting as an exhortation to future deeds.   The failure of this relationship, which is identified in 
the prologue of the Bellum Jugurthinum, leads to a loss of virtus and thus to a decline of the 
res publica.  In this way Sallust could create a justification for his historiography as a service to 
the res publica; recalling the past would encourage the betterment of the res publica in 
future.47    It also enabled Sallust to redefine the appropriate behaviour of the good citizen 
within the res publica and thus the relationship of the individual with the community.  Cicero 
came close to this during Caesar’s dictatorship, expressing the idea of an honourable absence 
from public life, but once the repressive force was removed and political participation was 
once more possible, he argued that intellectual activity without political action was impotent.48  
In contrast Sallust, whilst agreeing that active political participation had been the ideal for 
good citizens, argued that those days had passed.  The best course of action for the Roman 
citizen in the current situation was retirement from active politics, and that the best service 
one could give the res publica was to remind one’s fellow citizens of Rome’s past glories and 
inspire their emulation in future.  
The final object with which the good citizen is associated in Sallust’s depiction of Rome’s 
constitution is gloria.  Sallust argued that gloria could not be possessed without virtus, for it 
                                                             
45 Sall., Iug., 4.1, 4.  
46 Sall., Iug., 4.5-6.  It is unclear whether Sallust is referring to Scipio Africanus or Aemilianus at this 
point, as he refers to them both as Publius Scipio within the Bellum Jugurthinum (5.4 – Africanus; 7.4 – 
Aemilianus).  
47 Grethlein (2006a) pp.135-140. Cf., Garcia Lopez (2001) p.14. 
48 Cic., Fam., 4.4.4; Cic., Off., 1.63,153. 
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was won by actions that accorded with the positive types of behaviour that form his 
conception of good citizenship, virtus  proceeding to gloria through bonae artes, the gloria 
being eternal if gained through the outstanding deeds of the ingenium.49     Just as virtus could 
be displayed through military and political activities, such as the holding of magistracies and 
military commands, gloria could also be won through these pursuits.50  The recognition of this 
virtus should lead to gloria and renown amongst one’s contemporaries.   However, the 
attainment of gloria, particularly through public activities, was not simply a matter of holding 
the offices and getting to the top; one must behave appropriately, that is with virtus, along the 
way.    This is made clear in the reference Sallust made to the Roman magistracies, which he 
represented as having been devalued by the behaviour of men who had recently held them.   It 
was the man that makes the office, not the office the man, argued Sallust, claiming that in 
contemporary Rome, “Honour (honos) is not bestowed upon merit (virtus).”51   Since men of 
virtus were not gaining the honour of public offices, the offices themselves were no longer 
able to confer true gloria on an individual.   It was behaving with virtus in the service of the res 
publica, performing deeds inspired by ingenium bonum that brought gloria, not simply the 
holding of an office for its own sake or the wrongful attainment of office, even if one sought to 
do good with it.52  
In the Bellum Jugurthinum Sallust expressed the idea of vera gloria, arguing that the 
preference of some members of the nobilitas for vera gloria rather than unjust power was a 
cause of civil strife at Rome.53    With this statement, Sallust showed that there was more than 
one understanding of gloria held at Rome and that this caused problems for the res publica.   
The desire to hold political offices was not necessarily bad; Sallust’s concept of good 
citizenship holds the competition between citizens for the gloria that they bring to be a 
positive, but it is the way in which they are pursued and the reasons for this pursuit that 
threatened the res publica.  Sallust argued that once the desire to serve the res publica was 
replaced by a desire for the money and power these offices might bring, the constitution 
became unstable and the res publica began to decline.54   The ‘gloria’ that was earned by such 
actions was not vera gloria because it arose from selfish actions and damaged the res publica, 
exemplified in the rebellion of Catiline and  the rise of factiones at Rome, as Sallust illustrated 
                                                             
49 Sall., Iug., 1.3; 2.2; Cat.,11.1-2. 
50 Sall., Iug., 2.4; 3.1; 4.1; Cat., 3.1., 7.6. 
51 Sall., Iug., 3.1; Cf.,  4.8. 
52 Sall., Iug., 3.2. 
53 Sall., Iug., 41.10; 42.1.  
54 Sall., Cat., 11.2; 12.1.      
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the danger of different understandings of political concepts to the stability of the Roman 
constitution.  
Many of the elements of Sallust’s conception of the good citizen echo those of Cicero, 
notably in his definition of a vera gloria.  There were, however, differences: Sallust did not 
seek to remove the great deeds of the animus from the definition of virtus, and expanded the 
definition of these deeds to include the remembrance of the past and writing of history.  He 
also formed his understanding of citizenship differently – the result of expressing his 
constitutional thought in a different genre. Cicero’s expressions of virtus varied depending on 
whether he was writing philosophy or giving a speech; Sallust’s, expressed in historiography, is 
neither as complex and philosophical as that seen in de Officiis, nor as simple as that in the 
Philippics.  Unlike Cicero in his Philippics, Sallust did not need to convince an audience of an 
individual’s virtus or lack thereof; rather he was able to use his histories to explore the nature 
of virtus, the problems that its decline created for the res publica, and to show that one aspect 
of this decline was the proliferation of different understandings of good citizenship and of the 
constitution.  
Sallust’s monographs make it clear that no citizen was perfect, possessing virtus in its 
proper and highest form, or wholly bad.    Men who might be seen as ‘bad’ for Rome, such as 
Bestia and Catiline, are presented as having good moral qualities alongside the bad.  Bestia 
possesses endurance, keen intellect (ingenium), foresight, military experience and fortitude in 
the face of dangers and plots, whilst Catiline displays leadership and courage in his final 
battle.55   At the same time, the better men have their faults: Metellus may have virtus and 
gloria but he is also proud and arrogant.56  Even Caesar and Cato, whom Sallust identified as, 
“Two men of towering merit (ingens virtus),”57 possessing between them eloquence, greatness 
of spirit (magnitudo animi), generosity, gentleness, compassion, loyalty, austerity and dignitas 
are not perfect.  Sallust noted Caesar’s desire for great power, an army and war to give his 
virtus scope, displaying to his audience the potential of the man who would become dictator 
to fall to ambitio.58   The virtus of both men is undermined by the way in which they are 
compared in the synkresis that follows their speeches in the Senate debate – one of the most 
important passages in Sallust’s depiction of virtus in Rome, for it reveals the extent of the loss 
                                                             
55 Sall., Iug., 28.5; Sall., Cat., 60-61; Wilkins (1994) pp.1, 47, 54. 
56 Sall., Iug., 64.1.  
57 Sall., Cat., 53.6. 
58 Sall., Cat., 54.1-6.  
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of vera vocabula at Rome and the impact this had on the Roman understanding of virtus and 
its expression in action in the res publica.     
On the surface of the passage, Caesar and Cato are both presented as men of virtus and 
gloria.59   It has been argued that the two men together are shown to posses the virtus that 
could have saved the res publica, but individually they are flawed, and that their division 
symbolised the divisions in the res publica.60  However, the different characteristics associated 
with the two men do not function in a comparative or complementary manner and Sallust’s 
comparison not only undermines their virtus but the whole conceptualisation of virtus in 
Rome.   As Batstone has illustrated, the way in which the objects of virtus are presented 
ensures that the attributes of each man undermine those of the other, leaving the reader 
continually asking the question, ‘How can both men have virtus?’61     By contrasting Sallust’s 
attribution of the various objects of virtus to the two men with their speeches we can see that 
not only did Sallust deny true virtus to both Caesar and Cato, he also showed that neither 
possessed the proper understanding of the nature of virtus.   As such the passage functions not 
only as an example of the problems of virtus in the first century B.C., but also turns the 
speeches of Caesar and Cato into an example of the problem of incorrect use of political 
vocabulary and a representation of two of the different understandings of virtus expressed in 
Rome.  
One of the ways in which Sallust complicates the concept of virtus and reveals the multiple 
understandings of the term is through the employment of dignitas in his references to 
citizenship.  Dignitas itself was a problematic idea at Rome in the late 40s following Caesar’s 
emphasis on the quality in his justification of his actions in the civil war, and Sallust, like Cicero, 
engaged with it in his consideration of the good citizen.62   However, while Cicero aimed to 
redefine and reclaim the term for the good citizen, Sallust rejected it, his list of the moral 
qualities of the good citizen failing to include it – indeed dignitas rarely appears in his work 
attached to an individual.   It appears for the first time in Catiline’s discourse, associated in his 
words with his patrician status and Roman-ness (opposed to Cicero, whose family came from 
                                                             
59 Sall., Cat., 53-54.  
60 Syme (2002) p.120.  Cf., McGushin (1987) p.107. 
61 Batstone (1988a). He argues that Sallust shows an opposition between traditional virtues of personal, 
social and political action (in Caesar) and the traditional intellectual categories by which those actions 
are known and judged (in Cato); concluding that the problem of the first century was not so much a lack 
of virtus and bonae artes but a failure in the proper negotiation between action and judgement. 
62 Caes. B Civ., 1.7.1, 7; 1.9.2.  See chapter 2(I) for Caesar’s dignitas and 3(a) for Cicero’s engagement 
with the idea.  
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Arpinum).  This understanding is revealed to be flawed by Catiline’s subsequent actions: his 
use of the term making dignitas a suspect value for a political figure to call upon.  It is then 
employed by Caesar to appeal to the Senate and the self-interest of the Senators and by Cato 
with reference to Lentulus, who he says possesses dignitas, again tying it to family status.  
These uses raise suspicions about the speakers’ understandings of the concept and the 
possession of the quality by Rome’s citizens.63  Cato himself does not suggest that Lentulus has 
dignitas but acknowledges that he is generally seen as possessing that status; Lentulus’ 
capture in the conspiracy discrediting the emphasis on the idea of dignitas in Roman politics. 
Sallust’s refusal to grant Caesar dignitas suggests that the historian believed that Caesar did 
not understand the true meaning of the term.  By ascribing dignitas to Cato instead and 
coupling the term with severitas, Sallust indicated that dignitas is connected to the citizen’s 
behaviour, and by denying it to the patrician characters he undermined potential links to 
familial status. The coupling of the term with nobilitas in the Bellum Jugurthinum in a negative 
light further denies this link, and raises questions about the importance of dignitas to the good 
citizen.64    Finally, in contrast to Catiline’s demand for office as befits his dignitas and Caesar’s 
claim in his Bellum Civile that the actions of the Senate against him endangered his dignitas, 
Sallust ascribed the quality to Cato, a man who failed to attain the highest political office.  
Sallust thus dissociated dignitas from great deeds, as Cicero had done, but whilst Cicero sought 
to co-opt a new understanding of dignitas into his formulation of the character of the good 
citizen, Sallust did not, leaving it an inessential characteristic and suggesting that he thought 
too much emphasis had been placed on the concept in recent Roman discourse.  
This discussion of dignitas highlights one major element of the political discourse present in 
Sallust’s historiography: the historian’s exposition of the multiple understandings of political 
ideas in Roman discourse.  Through the words of his major characters the historian revealed 
their understandings of various aspects of Rome’s constitution, including the nature of good 
citizenship and its various elements and the role of the different political structures in the res 
publica.  He also undermined them through the employment of the theme of vera vocabula in 
which he reveals the loss of the true meanings of political concepts and terms at Rome, a 
                                                             
63 Sall., Cat., 35.3-4; 51.7; 52.32.  Sallust’s depiction of Caesar’s focus on dignitas referenced Caesar’s 
employment of it as a justification of his actions in 49 and also echoes Cicero’s somewhat sarcastic 
reference to Caesar’s dignitas in 63 B.C. at Cat., 4.9.8 (Harries (2006) p.204) creating a link between 
Caesar’s early preoccupation with this quality and his later actions in sparking the civil war.  
64 Sall., Iug., 41.5.2.  
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problem associated with the decline of virtus.65 Multiple understandings of citizenship are 
displayed most clearly in the Bellum Catilinae, the speeches in the Bellum Jugurthinum 
primarily reflecting understandings of different political groups and institutions in the 
constitution rather than the nature of the good citizen. At this point I will discuss the different 
understandings of the qualities of the good citizen that Sallust represents, returning to his 
critique of them through the idea of vera vocabula in section three below.  
Catiline’s understanding of the good Roman appears in his speeches to his followers at the 
beginning and end of his conspiracy, as well as through Sallust’s report of his angry words in 
the Senate and in the letter he sends to Catulus as he leaves Rome.   In these passages Catiline 
associates good citizenship with the possession of dignitas and family status and defends his 
deeds with the claim that his ingenium led him to fight for his rights and for the ‘unfortunate’ 
against the unworthy and the few whose possession of power is contrary to the proper state 
of the res publica.66   Catiline’s ideal Roman is known by his deeds, which like Sallust and 
Cicero, he relates to the best interests of the res publica.   These he defines in terms of 
opposition to the power of the few (potentia paucorum), the defence of libertas and the 
search for honour (decus) and gloria.67    However, Catiline’s libertas is associated with the 
right to pursue personal glory, power and wealth and his honour with dignitas and familial 
status.  In his letter to Catulus he justifies his deeds with the statement that:  “Maddened by 
wrongs and slights, since I had been robbed of the fruits of my toil and energy and was unable 
to attain a position of honour, I followed my usual custom and took up the general cause of 
the unfortunate… I saw the unworthy (non dignos) elevated to honours, and realised that I was 
an outcast because of baseless suspicion.  It is for this reason that, in order to preserve what 
dignitas I have left, I have adopted measures which are honourable enough considering my 
situation.”68     By using the tag, “non dignos” of others, Catiline claims dignitas as his own. Not 
only does he regard it as an important quality of the Roman citizen, unlike Sallust, he also 
emphasises his family and status, marking them as important to the citizen.  Catiline’s focus on 
dignitas and nobilitas is part of his understanding of the characteristics that qualify a citizen for 
                                                             
65 See section 3 for more on the concept of vera vocabula in Sallust. 
66 Sall., Cat., 20.11; 35. 
67 Sall., Cat., 20.2-10; 58.1-3.  This suggests that Catiline’s virtus is less ethical than that of Sallust (or 
Cicero) and more dependent on physical courage.  
68 Sall., Cat., 35.3-4. Catiline does not name names, but from his linking of the unworthy to the baseless 
accusations made against him and his reference to Cicero as a ‘resident alien’ (Cat., 31.7) it is clear that 
they include Cicero, a novus homo. 
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a ‘position of honour’ and mark him as a good Roman.69    It is this understanding of good 
citizenship and the role/rights of the good citizen in the constitution of the res publica 
combined with his ambition and avarice that led Catiline to seek the consulship so desperately 
and to turn to armed revolt when he was unsuccessful.  
Sallust used the paired speeches of Caesar and Cato to put forward other alternative 
understandings of Roman citizenship.  Both men are shown to be concerned with the 
preservation of the res publica and seek to establish the course of citizen-action that would 
ensure this, but their conceptions of the proper nature of citizenship differ.  Caesar’s 
conception focuses on the citizen’s duty to obey the law and uphold the dignitas of the res 
publica, whilst Cato’s focuses on the moral imperative to remove those who would destroy the 
res publica and secure the res publica.70    These different conceptions of citizenship lead them 
to propose different courses of action with regard to the conspirators, each of them claimed as 
constitutional with reference to different laws and precedents and each of which would have 
set different precedents for the future if acted upon.  
Caesar’s speech demands reason and obedience to statute from Rome’s citizens, arguing 
that, “All men who deliberate upon difficult questions ought to be free from hatred and 
friendship, anger and pity... no mortal man has ever served at the same time his passions and 
his best interests.”71   He makes intellect and passion antithetical in their effects upon the 
ability of men to make judgements.  Passion is something that possesses the mind, whereas 
intellect is applied by the mind, which for Caesar is the superior decision-making tool and the 
root of good judgement and good citizenship.72  In following intellect rather than passion good 
citizens will seek to uphold the law, regardless of their moral outrage against the conspirators.   
Since there is no punishment commensurate with the crime of the conspirators, argues Caesar, 
the good Senator must limit himself to the penalties established by the laws (leges).73    Caesar 
also makes dignitas a quality of good Roman citizenship. He references the example of Rome 
in deciding what to do with the Rhodians after the Macedonian war, and notes that they, 
                                                             
69 Sall., Cat., 35.3-4.  
70Sklenar (1998) pp.206-215 argues that the paired speeches allow Sallust to set his rational and moral 
ideals against each other in an autologomachy, with Caesar taking the side of logic and reason, and Cato 
the voice of moral outrage, discussing the way each speech takes on Sallust’s own earlier words.   He 
also notes that this is only possible because of the loss of appropriate behaviour and vera vocabula, an 
idea we will return to later.  
71 Sall., Cat., 51.1-4.  
72 The superiority of the mind echoes Sallust’s presentation of the roots of the good citizen in his 
prologues. 
73 Sall., Cat., 51.8.  Cf., Cic., Cat., 4.10 which implies Caesar cited the lex Sempronia.  
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“Inquired rather what conduct would be consistent with their dignitas than how far the law 
would allow them to go in taking vengeance on their enemies,” in order to support the 
constitutionality of his argument.74  While Caesar’s good citizens must be reasonable and 
personally disinterested, they must also seek to uphold the reputation and dignitas of the res 
publica.  Here it is not the dignitas of an individual person, as Caesar asserted it in his Bellum 
Civile or as Catiline asserts it in the Bellum Catilinae, but of the Senate and Rome as entities.75  
Dignitas is associated not with family status, ancestral achievements or the right to hold office, 
but with the good name of Rome, the taking of appropriate action and the example of the 
maiores, set against the vengeance and passion Caesar would have the good citizen avoid.76   
Cato, on the other hand saw the security of the res publica as the primary responsibility of 
the good citizen.  Like Caesar his conception requires an, “independent spirit free from guilt or 
passion,” but this does not preclude moral outrage on behalf of the res publica.77  Cato makes 
it clear that, ideally, Rome’s leaders would place the res publica above their own interests.78  
However, he also makes it plain that he does not see such self-sacrifice in the current Senate, 
and so when he exhorts the Senate to act against the conspirators he does so by appealing to 
the self-interest of the Senators.79  Sallust’s Cato presents two understandings of citizenship – 
his ideal, and that which he believes is common in Rome.  The latter is similar to that of 
Catiline, as it incorporates the defence of one’s own interests into the support of the res 
publica, whilst Cato’s own conception, like that of Cicero, involves sacrifice of the self to the 
good of the res publica.80  The importance of preserving the res publica is made clear by Cato’s 
presentation of the attitude the citizen ought to have towards the law in such a situation.  
Unlike Caesar, who urges restraint and faithfulness to statute, Cato argues that, “In vain will 
you appeal to the laws when once it [the overthrow of the res publica] has been 
                                                             
74 Sall, Cat., 51.5-6. Sallust’s Caesar’s choice of example is particularly pertinent given the famous role of 
the Elder Cato in persuading Rome not to make war on Rhodes (Ramsey (2007a) p.195; McGushin 
(1977) p.243).  Large sections of the speech survive in Gell., 6.3 = ORF2 frr.163-171. 
75 Sall., Cat., 51.7; Caes. B Civ., 1.9.2. 
76 Sall., Cat., 51.6-8.  
77 Sall., Cat. 52.21.  
78 Sall., Cat., 52.5.  
79 Sall., Cat., 52.5. Drummond (1995) pp.50-56 notes the likenesses between the debate in the Senate in 
the Bellum Catilinae, and the Mytilenean debate in Thucydides (3.36-59).  He argues that here Caesar 
takes the role that Diodotus plays in the original, demanding a rational and unimpassioned decision-
making process and the discernment of the long-term interests of the res publica, whilst Cato is the 
Cleon figure, appealing to the self-interest of the Senate to act, his claim that the true names of things 
have been forgotten recalling Cleon’s depreciation of ‘clever oratory.’  
80 Sklenar (1998) p.213 shows the way in which Cato absolves himself of ‘bad citizenship’ and 
responsibility for Rome’s problems.  
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consummated.”81   The good citizen, Cato argues, must risk going against the letter of the law 
in order to preserve the polity without which the law is meaningless. In this, Cato’s conception 
of the good citizen echoes Cicero’s interpretation of law–as-right in the Philippics, in which the 
security of the res publica is the most important factor in determining legal behaviour. Sallust’s 
understanding of the importance of this argument in relation to Rome’s constitution and the 
recent problems of the res publica will be seen in section three as we discuss the way in which 
Sallust undermined Cato’s argument through the theme of vera vocabula. 
   By describing several different understandings of good citizenship, Sallust was able to 
represent the political conflict at Rome and explain some of its causes, showing the way in 
which different understandings of the good citizen had an impact upon Roman discourse and 
upon the formulation of the constitution.  Even when held by relatively good, well-meaning 
citizens like Cato and Caesar, different understandings of citizenship created problems for the 
res publica for they led to the proposal of very different courses of action and created 
divisions.  The problem is shown at its most extreme in Sallust’s portrayal of Catiline, who goes 
so far as to take up arms in support of what he believes is owing to him as a citizen.   Catiline’s 
deeds, as they are represented by Sallust run counter to the ideal of Roman citizenship and 
provide an object lesson in the dangers of immorality and ‘bad’ public behaviour for Rome.  He 
surrounds himself with men who are indebted and avaricious, encourages young men in 
wicked ways and, after his failure in the consular elections for 63, begins to collect arms and 
money, and to distribute his supporters throughout Italy.82   Whilst Sallust’s Catiline is not a 
cardboard cut-out villain, displaying valour and dedication, particularly in his final battle, he 
does not employ his good qualities in the right way, using them in service of a cause that does 
not benefit the res publica.83  His understanding of the good citizen and his place in the res 
publica lead to activities that create not harmony but strife, undermining the constitution and 
endangering the res publica.  
Each different conception of citizenship led to a different understanding of the nature of 
the place of the citizen in the constitution and thence to different courses of (or proposals for) 
action.   Catiline’s conception of the good Roman citizen led him to the understanding that he 
was owed a good position, honour and power within the polity, and first his words and then 
his actions, as he sought to claim these rights, became more and more violent.    Caesar’s focus 
                                                             
81 Sall., Cat., 52.4.    
82 Sall., Cat., 14.1-3, 16.1-3, 24.  
83 Sall., Cat., 60-61; Wilkins (1994) pp.47, 54.  
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on the citizens’ reason led him to emphasise the relationship between the citizen and the 
maintenance of Rome’s statutes and the polity’s dignitas, while Cato’s understanding that the 
good citizen must defend the res publica at all costs led him to play upon his audience’s fears 
and self-interest.84  These different conceptions and divisions appeared in Rome’s political 
discourse as the understanding of the res publica against which proposals for action were 
made and action carried out.  The expression of different understandings displayed a 
fracturing of Roman knowledge about the nature of the constitution and constitutional action 
within the res publica.  Through discourse and the decision-making processes of Rome some of 
these understandings became part of the nexus of constitutional authorities and altered the 
constitution of the res publica.  Cato’s speech reveals that self-interest had grown to such an 
extent that a successful argument must appeal to this as much as to the good of the res 
publica.  It had become part of the political culture of Rome and affected the constitution of 
the res publica by changing the relationships citizens had with each other and with their 
political institutions and practices.   Cato’s own understanding of citizenship and concurrent 
proposal for action also went on to become an authority that could be appealed to in future 
debates as it established a precedent for the kind of action that could be taken against citizens 
who took up arms ‘against’ the res publica.85  
Sallust’s expression of the relationship between individual and res publica responded to a 
succession of events that influenced the political discourse at Rome in the first century B.C.: 
Sulla’s dictatorship; Pompeius’ rise to prominence; Caesar’s dictatorship, and the 
contemporary issue of the Second Triumvirate.    His exploration of the theme through a 
                                                             
84 It is possible that Sallust was responding to the events of 49 as much as 63 in representing Caesar and 
Cato’s arguments about the citizen in the res publica.  Before the civil war Caesar sought to stand for the 
consulship, as he was legally entitled to do ten years after his first consulship under Sulla’s lex annalis, 
and which he had been authorised to do in absentia through a law passed in 52, despite Cato’s 
opposition (Caes., B Civ., 1.32.2; App., B Civ., 2.25; Seager (1992a) p.201; Wiseman (1992b) pp.412-413; 
Tatum (2006) p.205).  Meanwhile Cato in 49, was one of the group opposed to negotiation with Caesar 
as injurious to the res publica (Caes., B Civ., 1.32.3; Cic., Att., 16.11.2; Tatum (2006) p.207; Tatum (2008) 
p.132-133), to the point of breaking established leges. (There was another law of 52 which required all 
candidates to submit their intention to stand in person. Although Pompeius had added a codicil to 
exempt Caesar from this, its legal standing was highly debatable (Tatum (2008) pp.130-131).  All of this 
served to make Caesar’s legal and constitutional right to stand for the consulship in absentia ripe for 
legal contestation).   
85 Caesar himself referred to it in 49, when he said that the so-called Senatus Consultum Ultimum had 
only been used against violence and popular unrest and argued that this could not apply to him (Caes., B 
Civ., 1.5; Meier (1996) p.359).  It was also an argument that Cicero used in 44-43, echoing his own 
employment of it against Catiline in 63 (Cat., 1.3, 13, 28).  Sallust’s presentation of this argument in 
Cato’s speech is resonant of Cicero’s usage of it in 63 and 44-43, and allows him to comment on its 
dangers (see section three, below).  
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historical narrative allowed him to offer criticism of the triumvirate without appearing to do 
so: whilst he could not safely talk about the triumvirs outright, he could bring out parallels in 
his writing and comment upon their historical predecessors.  For example, Sallust’s description 
of Sulla’s rule in which, “All men began to rob and pillage… the victors showed neither 
moderation nor restraint, but shamefully and cruelly wronged their fellow citizens,” 86 cannot 
fail to bring to mind the parallel of the triumvirs’ proscriptions.   Sallust brings a tone of moral 
outrage to his description of Sulla, and the understanding that his career kick-started the final 
decline of the res publica is inescapable. Issues of immorality and the wellbeing of the res 
publica are associated with Sulla and with Catiline, and implicitly with Marius and Sulla, as the 
historian draws a picture of growing decline and implies a pattern in which ambitious men 
build up armies away from Rome and then lead them on the city to obtain their goals; 
footsteps in which first Caesar, and then Octavian and Antonius would follow.       
The character of the citizen and his place in the constitution of the res publica is a constant 
concern of Sallust’s historical writing and his political thought. This reflects the importance of 
the theme in Roman political discourse throughout the first century B.C.: a theme that gained 
greater piquancy with the dictatorships of Sulla and Caesar, and which was critical to Sallust’s 
understanding of the res publica as he expressed it during the rule of the Second Triumvirate.87   
Sallust presented his own understanding of the proper relationship of the good citizen with the 
res publica through a description of appropriate citizen behaviour and the nature of virtus and 
gloria.   The true natures of these qualities, key characteristics marking the good citizen, were 
defined by the citizen’s rejection of self-interest in favour of the service of the res publica. 
Sallust argued that Rome’s rise and successful res publica depended upon the virtus of the 
citizens and its decline resulted from an increase in immorality and bad citizenship.88    The 
narratives of Sallust’s monographs and the descriptions of their key characters reveal that by 
indulging their own self-interest and acting in accordance with their avarice and ambition, 
                                                             
86 Sall., Cat., 11.4. 
87 See chapter 3.2(c) for discussion of Cicero’s expression of this theme.   
88 Sall., Cat., 10.6; 12.1; 53.4–5; Iug., 4.5-7; 41.1-5.   In the Bellum Catilinae Sallust identifies Sulla’s 
return from the east as the critical moment (11.4-7) in the increase of corruption at Rome.  However, he 
also cites the destruction of Carthage as the point at which Rome’s fortunes began to change (10.1-2).   
The Bellum Jugurthinum identifies the destruction of Carthage as the turning point in Rome’s transition 
from ideal political society to declining political society (41.2).  Sallust’s understanding of the decline of 
Rome evolves between the two texts; but it appears to be less a change of mind, than a re-evaluation of 
the spread of corruption at Rome. This process seems to have continued as Sallust wrote the Historiae, 
in which he continues to cite the destruction of Carthage as the point at which discord, avarice and 
ambition emerged at Rome, but also acknowledge that there were other disagreements in Rome from 
the very beginning of the Republic (fr. 1.11M = Aug., CD., 2.18.) 
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Roman citizens contributed to the decline of their polity through the creation of discord.   In 
the ideal res publica there should be no strife among the citizens for glory or power while the 
bonae artes that are the sign of virtus and lead to the attainment of gloria remain strong 
regardless of the polity’s success or the existence of external threats (the metus hostilis).   As 
long as the citizens were men of virtus, then harmony would be maintained and the 
constitution remain stable.89  And so it was at Rome, according to Sallust, until the fall of 
Carthage, when the removal of the metus hostilis led to a lapse in virtus as there seemed to be 
fewer reasons to maintain it: self-interest appeared, affecting men’s understandings of good 
citizenship and proper behaviour and leading to an increase in political conflict and civil 
strife.90  It is Rome that pays the price for the corruption of the citizens and the understanding 
of what a citizen should be: the constitution of Rome being undermined by the behaviour of 
the citizens who were supposed to uphold the political structures and systems of the res 
publica.  
  
(b) Political Structures 
Sallust’s historical narratives reflect an understanding of the constitution in which 
appropriate citizen behaviour maintained Rome’s political culture and enabled the political 
structures and institutions to function properly.   Consequently, the failure of citizenship, as 
discussed above, caused failures in these institutions and in the constitution of the res publica.  
Sallust’s depiction of Rome’s constitutional structures centred on the Senate, the people and 
popular assemblies; his historical narratives provide the reader with an understanding of the 
way he saw the institutions of the res publica working, in comparison to the way he thought 
they should work.   This section will examine Sallust’s understanding of the nature and role of 
the Senate and people of Rome, including his presentation of the nobilitas, the plebs and the 
problem of factiones in Roman political life.  Like Cicero, Sallust presented the Senate as the 
council of the res publica and the guide of the citizen body, with whom power rested, and 
noted the importance of the relationship of Senate and people to the constitution and the 
necessity of good citizenship in maintaining it.   However, whilst Cicero’s discourse, particularly 
in the Philippics, sought to bring the Senate and the people together and to evade the 
problems of factio through rhetoric, Sallust’s historiography exposes the different 
                                                             
89 This can be seen as the ideal version of the process of social reproduction described by Giddens 
(1982) p.35 and Giddens (1984) pp.1-14.s 
90 Sall., Cat., 10.1; Iug., 41.3; Hist., fr. 1.11M on the removal of the metus hostilis and the effect upon 
Rome. 
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understandings of the nobilitas and the people in Rome’s political discourse and shows the 
way they undermined the constitution and endangered the res publica.      
(i) The Senate and the nobilitas 
Sallust’s first presentation of the Senate comes in his brief overview of the history of Rome 
in the Bellum Catilinae: “A chosen few, whose bodies were enfeebled by age but whose minds 
were fortified with wisdom, took counsel for the welfare of the state.”91    This is Sallust’s 
conception of the proper role of the Senate in the res publica: the Senate, possessing wisdom, 
advising the other institutional elements in Rome be they kings, consuls or the people. They 
are also responsible for guiding Rome’s ‘foreign policy’, as seen during the Jugurthine War.92   
During the Catilinarian crisis, the Senate acts as a counsel to the consul; it is they who decree 
the sending of Marcius Rex to Faesulae and Metellus Creticus to Apulia in order to deal with 
the insurrections in Italy, declare Catiline and Manlius to be hostes of the res publica, and 
question the conspirators and debate their fate.93  Although the Bellum Catilinae shows the 
Senate voting to give the consuls emergency powers that enabled them, “To raise an army, 
wage war, exert any kind of compulsion upon allies and citizens, and exercise unlimited 
command and jurisdiction at home and in the field,”94 Sallust suggests this only bypassed the 
                                                             
91 Sall., Cat., 6.7.  
92 Sall. Iug., 13.3-4, 7, 9; 24.1-2; 27.1; 28.1.   
93 Sall., Cat., 30.2-3, 36.2, 48, 50-53.  
94 Sall., Cat., 29.2-3.  Cf., Caes., B Civ., 1.5, who was the first to refer to such a decree as the ultimum 
senatus consultum. Ramsey (2007a) p.144 sees the so-called SCU as serving as a substitute for the 
dictatorship, effectively suspending a citizen’s right of provocatio.   Lintott (1999) pp.89-93 prefers the 
term senatus consultum de re publica defendenda: a more accurate, if long-winded, definition.   He sees 
the decree as a tradition that emerged in the Late Republic from mos, not involving lex, in which the 
Senate encouraged the consul to take any measure necessary against a citizen threat to the res publica, 
regardless of the strict legality of the actions taken. Drummond (1995) pp.89-95 argues that the powers 
that this decree granted were always open to challenges and could not attain the privileged status of a 
proper juristic institution through custom and consent.  He sees the decree as something that could be 
argued to have a legal existence in iure as it represented the will of the Senate and because it became 
part of tradition.  He also notes that, “Where there is no established mechanism or criteria by which 
such norms (of tradition as they exist in relation to ius) can receive definitive recognition their existence 
and therefore their influence on political conduct is entirely contingent upon the extent to which they 
are acknowledged as such among those engaged in political action.” (p.87). It seems to be the case that 
the senatus consultum de re publica defendenda was something that the Senate voted on (the vote 
dealing with C. Gracchus in 121 is the first instance of this) and - despite its vagueness in terms of 
language and powers - it granted, a certain legitimacy in iure. However, the actions taken under it were 
open to question (as happened with L. Opimius after 121, and Cicero after 63) due to the fact that 
actions taken under such a decree could break certain statutes, enabling the existence of different 
opinions as to whether they could be accepted as legitimate.  The problem of the so-called SCU 
highlights the discursive nature of the constitution, because its legality and constitutionality were 
debated and accepted or rejected in Rome’s political discourse.  
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ability of the people to withhold these powers from the consuls; and the Senate continued in 
an advisory role.    
Sallust’s picture of the Senate as wise counsel and guide resembles that of Cicero.  Like 
Cicero, Sallust also suggested that the Senate’s ability to act as a guide depended upon their 
behaviour; senatus auctoritas failing when the Senate failed to act in the best interests of the 
res publica.   Cicero, as we saw in chapter 3.2(c) acknowledged the existence of disagreement 
within the Senate.  However, while he represented it as the ‘bad’ behaviour of a few Senators 
(such as Calenus) which could be overcome by negating their arguments, Sallust suggested the 
problem was more endemic.  His portrayal of the nobilitas as a powerful unit within the Senate 
reveals long-standing problems within that body that damaged its ability to guide the res 
publica.  The monographs present various overlapping and contrasting understandings of 
nobilitas, including that held by those who considered themselves to be nobilitas, that of the 
people and those opposed to the nobilitas, and that of ‘true’ nobilitas held by Sallust himself, 
and reveal the problems this created for the res publica.95  
The clearest statement of Sallust’s conception of the ‘true’ nature of nobilitas comes in 
Marius’ speech in the Bellum Jugurthinum, where the new consul declares, “For my part, I 
believe that all men have one and the same nature, but that the bravest is best born; and if the 
fathers of Albinus and Bestia could now be asked whether they would prefer to have me or 
those men [the nobiles] for their descendents, what do you suppose they would reply?... But if 
they rightly look down on me, let them also look down on their own forefathers, whose 
nobility (nobilitas) began, as did my own, in manly deeds (ex virtute).”96   Although Marius’ 
formulation of this understanding of nobilitas is rhetorically driven, in that he employs it to 
present himself as the equal of those currently regarded as the nobilitas, we must not discount 
                                                             
95 Just as modern scholars have struggled to elucidate and establish the nature of Roman virtus and 
libertas, so they have sought to understand the nature of Roman nobilitas. Mommsen (1952-69) III3 
pp.463-64 defined the nobilitas as those who had the right to display the imagines of their ancestors; 
those who had ancestors who had held curule office.  Whilst noting that there was no single ancient 
definition of nobilitas, Gelzer (1968) pp.28, 31-32 argued that it could only be claimed by those with 
consular ancestors (Cf., Syme (2002) p.11; Earl (1961) p.18).  Brunt (1982) pp.1-17 countered this, 
arguing that Mommsen’s formulation was more accurate, and was countered in turn by Shackleton 
Bailey (1986) pp.256-258, who argued for Gelzer’s model.  More recently the idea of the nobilitas as a 
fixed group has come to be questioned: Millar (1984) p.11 and Flower (1996) p.61-62 have argued for an 
understanding of ‘nobilitas’ as a descriptive term that could be employed flexibly.  Van der Blom (2007) 
pp. 56-57 argues that Cicero played on a variety of ideas, including those of family and status, associated 
with nobilitas as part of his rhetorical strategies.  Sallust, as we shall see, revealed such a usage of the 
term in his monographs.   As with virtus, the modern failure to establish the ‘qualifications’ for nobilitas 
reflected the fractured understanding and conflicting expressions of this concept in Roman discourse.  
96 Sall., Iug., 85.15-17.  
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this ‘true’ nobilitas as a political ideal of the historian.  Rather Marius’ flawed enunciation of 
the idea adds to our understanding of it, and is related to Sallust’s idea of vera vocabula (see 
section three, below). Whilst Sallust undermines many of the claims of all of his speakers, 
through the theme of vera vocabula, he does not critique Marius’ expression of nobilitas: 
instead he casts doubts on Marius’ claim to this nobilitas by questioning his virtus.  Nobilitas 
here depends on virtus not ancestry and incorporates the characteristics that were important 
to the good citizen and played a positive role in the well-being of the res publica.   It was not a 
quality that should accord the citizen advantages within the res publica, but one which 
reflected their contribution to the polity.  However, Sallust also makes clear his view that the 
idea of nobilitas had become corrupted at Rome.  In the Bellum Catilinae he associates the 
idea with a subgroup of the Senate, men who, “Strove… ostensibly in behalf of the Senate, but 
really for their own aggrandisement.”97   The true nature of the concept of nobilitas as Sallust 
presents it, had been forgotten by many of those who identified with it, superseded by a 
corrupted understanding.    
The idea of nobilitas, as understood by those who identified themselves as nobilitas, is 
represented by Sallust as centred upon family status and a corresponding possession of power.   
In his speech, Marius refers to the vetus nobilitas, an ‘ancient’ nobilitas tied to the deeds of 
their ancestors, the power of their relatives and their numerous clients, and claims that those 
who possess these regard those who do not as lacking nobilitas.98    This nobilitas is also 
associated with the possession of dignitas, a quality which, according to Catiline in the Bellum 
Catilinae was itself based in familial status and ancestral achievement.99  However, this 
nobilitas is a corrupt echo of the true concept, in which unearned familial status takes 
precedence over individual virtues. Sallust claimed that these self-identifying nobilitas abused 
their dignitas in the years following the fall of Carthage to justify their desire to maintain their 
power in the res publica.100   Those who held this idea of nobilitas believed it guaranteed them 
the right to hold power in the res publica.101   The association of the nobilitas with the exclusive 
control of power in politics is reinforced by the statement that the tribune Memmius is 
                                                             
97 Sall., Cat., 38.2.  
98 Sall., Iug., 85.4.  This is also seen in Sallust’s comment that the only qualification Marius lacked for the 
consulship was an ancient family (85.16).   
99 Sall., Iug., 41.5; Sall., Cat., 31.7; 35.3-4.  See section 2(a) above for Catiline’s understanding of dignitas 
100 Sall., Iug., 41.5; 42.1, 4.  
101 Sall., Iug., 1.3 associates potens with the animus and the individual’s ability to act.  At this level it is 
not a negative quality; although the desire for potentia is said (Cat., 12.1) to draw men from virtus 
towards ambition.  Cf., Sall., Iug., 64.2-4. 
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described as being, “Hostile to the domination of the nobles (potentiae nobilitatis),”102 and by 
Sallust’s presentation of his actions in the context of the reaction of the people against those 
considered to be nobilitas.   
This reaction and conflict, which Sallust presents as a critical part of the decline of the res 
publica,  stems from another understanding of nobilitas: one held by those opposed to the 
self-identifying nobilitas’ hold on power, a group that included the tribunes (such as Memmius 
and Mamilius) and Marius.103   This understanding adds ‘self-interest’ and ‘abuse of position’ to 
‘family status’ and ‘the possession of power’ to the concept of nobilitas, Sallust describing the 
nobilitas as following their passions (lubido) and abusing their dignitas at the expense of others 
and of the res publica.  Also attributed is pride (superbia), illustrated through the character of 
Metellus.104  Indeed, in the prologue Sallust claimed that the Jugurthine war was important 
because it marked the first occasion of resistance being offered to the superbiae nobilitatis at 
Rome.105   The negativity of this object, in terms of the nature of nobilitas is made clear 
through the consequences of Metellus’ response to Marius: the growth of the new man’s 
ambition and the civil discord that followed.106   
These conflicting understandings of nobilitas, one claiming the right to hold power at Rome, 
the other rejecting this claim, reveals one of the problems that stemmed from the existence of 
multiple understandings of the constitution.  The belief of the self-identifying nobilitas in their 
superiority and their argument that this ought to be reflected in the governance of the res 
publica represents one understanding of the constitution and led them to the abuse of their 
position and their power as they pursued self-interested ends.   The counter-conception’s 
rejection of the nobilitas’ claim to political superiority led those who held it to reassert the 
power of the people against the nobilitas.  The problems that stemmed from this process are 
exemplified in Sallust’s portrayal of Marius’ reaction to Metellus’ dismissal of his consular 
ambitions as Marius stirs up the equites and the people against the nobilitas, as he understood 
them.  This created factionalism and strife at Rome, dividing the populus from the ‘nobilitas’, 
                                                             
102 Sall., Iug., 27.2. 31.9; 40.1-3. 
103 Sall., Iug., 30-33; 40.   
104 Sall., Iug., 64.1.  
105 Sall., Iug., 5.1.  
106 Earl (1961) p.72 suggests that Sallust disguised other reasons Metellus may have had for telling 
Marius to wait.  Marius had been an ‘old’ praetor (i.e. he had not been elected at the earliest 
opportunity), had come bottom of the list and had barely escaped a bribery charge. He was not a 
political success story waiting to happen.  Syme (2002) p.161 suggests that Sallust assumed, based on his 
experiences in his own era, that military talent in a novus homo would easily bring political success as far 
as the praetorship and did not realise that Marius’ political success was not a given and that Metellus 
might have had this as a reason for advising patience.  
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and finally results in the people’s rejection of the Senate’s prorogation of Metellus’ command 
in Numidia and their replacement of him with Marius.   This act, by which the popular 
assembly overrode the Senate’s recommendation, altered the relationship between Senate 
and people in the constitution and set a precedent for future action.107  It also set a precedent 
for future interactions between members of the Senate who opposed the negative conception 
of the nobilitas, and the populus, in which elite individuals turned to the people to support 
their ambitions.108  
However, despite his description of the role of the nobilitas in the decline of the res publica, 
Sallust acknowledged that not all of those who identified themselves as nobilitas were totally 
corrupt.  Even within discussion of the beginnings of the corruption of the ‘nobilitas’ Sallust 
reveals an understanding of them as more than a homogenous group, describing the 
emergence of members of the nobilitas who preferred true glory (vera gloria) to unjust power 
as a factor in the rise of civil strife at Rome.109   At times Sallust presents nobilitas as a coherent 
concept, a united group; at others he displays an awareness of differences within that group.  
He also applied the nobilitas tag to individuals, some of whom, though by no means all, 
displayed other positive elements of citizenship.   It is the divide in the nobilitas itself that is 
said to have begun to disturb the res publica and cause, “Civil dissension to arise like an 
upheaval of the earth.”110     
The nobilitas appear as a homogenous politically active group primarily when Sallust 
expounds his theme of civil strife between partes and factiones at Rome.111  At other times his 
representation allows for more variety: individual members of the nobilitas might display 
virtus or desire vera gloria, their nobilitas being based in their familial status; or a mixture of 
positive attributes alongside the negative.112  His individual characters have degrees of virtus, 
and may have good characteristics or be judged positively within the text, even whilst they are 
members of the nobilitas which, as a whole, plays a negative role.  This dichotomy seems to lie 
in a tension between Sallust’s understanding of the nobilitas as a political group who played a 
negative part in events, his understanding of the importance of individual virtus to the 
constitution and his understanding of the relationship between virtus and true nobilitas.  This 
                                                             
107 For example, the passage of P. Sulpicius’ proposal that Marius replace Sulla in the command against 
Mithridates in 88 (Seager (1992a) p.168) which, in turn, set further precedents. 
108 Sall., Cat., 38.1 notes this practice.  North (1990b) p.18.  
109 Sall., Iug., 41.10; 42.1.  
110 Sall., Iug., 41.10.  
111 Most notably at Sall., Iug., 41. 
112 Sall., Iug., 41.10; 42.1.  
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creates a strain within the text, nobilitas being simultaneously a concept that covers status and 
behaviour; a group and individuals who may be both ‘good’ and ‘bad’.    This reflects the 
tension that seems to have existed in Rome at the time, a confusion as to who exactly the 
nobilitas were, what their role was in Roman politics and what their role should be within the 
res publica, Sallust’s writing mimicking this uncertainty in order to convey to his audience the 
confusion that existed and the political problems surrounding the place of the nobilitas in the 
constitution. 113  
 Another aspect of the complexity of the nobilitas is seen in Sallust’s presentation of 
another subgroup in Roman politics: the few (pauci).   Brunt argues that Sallust uses these 
terms indiscriminately, and at one point in his digression on factions Sallust does refer to the 
pauci in the same breath as the nobilitas.114  However, there is a distinction, and elsewhere 
Sallust conceives of the pauci as being a part, but not the whole, of the nobilitas: a part that is 
conceived of negatively, as being immoral.115   In describing those who wanted to delay the 
Senate’s response to Jugurtha’s murder of Adherbal and massacre at Cirta he refers to a ‘few 
partisans’ of Jugurtha (paucos factiosos Jugurthae), rather than the nobilitas.116  In addition, 
although Memmius is described by Sallust as being against the potentiae nobilitatis, he 
declares in his speech that he will face the factionis potentia, a group that is associated in his 
speech not with the nobilitas, but with the superbia paucorum, the arrogance of the few, that 
has been displayed towards the people over the past 15 years.117  The pauci are associated 
with the possession of power and glory, the holding of offices, priesthoods and provinces, 
factiousness, and arrogance, negative political objects, and with tyranny and the opposition of 
                                                             
113 Grethlein (2006b) and Batstone (1990) discuss the mimetic nature of Sallust’s authorial voice as he 
reflects the confusion and uncertainty depicted in both the Bellum Jugurthinum and Bellum Catilinae.  
The same process can be seen in his presentation of political affiliations and groupings at Rome, the 
complexities of the text mimicking the myriad associations within the res publica.  
114 Sall., Iug., 42.1. Brunt (1968) p.231.  
115 Paul (1984) p.14 sees the pauci in Sallust as the governing nobilitas or a clique within, but notes that 
when it is used in the prologue (3.2) it refers to the second triumvirate. Hellegouarc'h (1963) p.444 
notes the morality applied to the use of ‘pauci’ by Sallust and Cicero.  
116 Sall., Iug., 27.2. Cf., 28.4, where Sallust describes Bestia’s legates as , “Homines nobiles, factiosos” – 
with the adjective factiosos qualifying nobiles; an indication that although these men are both of the 
nobilitas and the factiosi, not all of the nobilitas fall into both groups. 
117 Sall., Iug., 27.2; 31.2, 4.   Paul (1984) pp.98-99, notes that 15 years counted back from 111 (the year 
of Memmius’ tribunate) would be 126, or 125 (counting inclusively), the beginning of the Gracchan 
agitation for the extension of Roman citizenship to the Latins and allies, but queries the importance of 
this to the people at large.  He suggests that Sallust mistakenly took Memmius’ mention of a 15-year 
period from a different speech, but this is to assume more careful accuracy in historiographical 
speechwriting than was probably the case.  It seems more likely that with 126/5 B.C. being a year 
roughly directly in the middle of the period between the tribunates of the two Gracchi, Sallust chose 
fifteen years as a rhetorical device to emphasise the length of the people’s suppression.  
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libertas.118  These are the qualities associated with the nobilitas by those who opposed them 
and indeed the pauci are sometimes associated with the nobilitas, especially by those who 
rejected the nobilitas’ claim to power.  However Sallust shows that they might also be opposed 
by those who self-identified as nobilitas, for instance in Catiline’s declaration that he was 
standing against the few.119  In this way the concept of the ‘few’ is rhetorically constructed in 
Roman political discourse as the ‘other’ to which the speaker’s argument is opposed.  This 
process is seen in the words of Catiline, who claimed nobilitas and in those of the tribune 
Memmius.   The idea of the few is always negative in Sallust’s conception of the res publica, 
their power illegitimate.   
Sallust’s representation of multiple understandings of nobilitas, the conception of the pauci 
and its occasional association with the nobilitas emphasises the fragmented nature of Rome’s 
understanding of the constitution of the res publica, and the problems this caused for the res 
publica.  For Sallust, the nobilitas were not inherently problematic or bad for the res publica, 
but their corruption, and the corruption of the understanding of ‘nobilitas’ was, as it led to 
conflict in the res publica.   All of these understandings of nobilitas featured self-interest on the 
part of the holders, itself a characteristic of the bad citizen.  ‘False’ understandings of nobilitas 
led to improper citizen behaviour, damaging the unity of the Senate and creating problems in 
the relationship between the Senate and the people.  The different conceptions of nobilitas 
reflected different understandings of the constitution and the role that a ‘nobilitas’ could or 
should play in the government of the res publica.  These in turn, were reflected in the words 
and deeds of the individuals who held them: Marius rejected Metellus’ understanding of 
nobilitas and pursued the consulship; Catiline argued that his nobilitas gave him certain 
privileges and acted to claim them; whilst Memmius rejected the understanding of the 
nobilitas as having the right to hold power in the res publica, understanding the nobilitas as a 
negative group who repressed the people’s rightful place in the constitution, and acted to 
encourage the people to claim the power he believed they should have.   The different 
understandings of nobilitas led to debate and dissent about the constitution of with regard to 
the possession of power in the res publica, affecting both the relationship between Rome’s 
elite in the Senate and the mass of the people, and the reproduction of the constitution.  
 
 
                                                             
118 Sall., Iug., 31.16, 23; 41.7; Cat., 20.7-8; 39.1.  
119 Sall., Iug., 31.9, 20; Cat., 20.7-8; 39.1. 
 
 
133 | P a g e  
 
 
 
(ii) The populus and the plebs 
Sallust’s depiction of the nature of the Roman people and their place in the constitution of 
Rome was as complex as his depiction of the nobilitas.   He presented the populus Romanus as 
the citizen body of Rome, who, while guided by the Senate’s counsel, hold power within the 
res publica through their participation in the political process in Rome’s voting assemblies.   In 
this, Sallust’s understanding of the Roman people and their place in the constitution 
resembled that of Cicero.  However, while Cicero represented the people as united in their 
rejection of Antonius and sought to use this to encourage the Senate to action, Sallust’s 
presentation of the constitution, particularly as seen in the Bellum Jugurthinum, explored the 
multiple understandings of ‘the people’, and highlighted the way in which they could be 
employed by speakers for their political ends and the damage this could do to the res publica.   
Sallust employed three terms that may be translated as ‘the people’: quirites, populus and 
plebs (occasionally, the term cives is used for citizens).  The first is the most straightforwardly 
dealt with, the term being employed by the speakers in the texts to address their audience and 
to associate themselves with them as citizens of Rome.120   The meaning of the terms populus 
and plebs are more complicated, but their usage is by no means arbitrary, and they must be 
considered as separate concepts within Sallust’s political thought: the term populus is used to 
refer to the population of Rome as a whole, and plebs to a politicised unit within the 
populus.121   Sallust’s usage contrasts with that of Cicero, who did not discuss the place of the 
plebs at Rome.  The plebs as the politicised people feature prominently in Sallust’s narrative of 
Roman discord and decline and are shown to have had a negative impact upon the Roman 
constitution.  
Sallust generally employed the term populus in relation to the Roman citizenry as a whole, 
equivalent to the quirites.122  As such they are associated with the possession of imperium and 
                                                             
120 Sall., Iug., 31; 85. Richard (2005) pp.108-9 notes that ‘quirites’ applied to the totality of citizens taken 
as a homogenous body. Smith (2006) p.200 argues that it is applied specifically to the civic community, 
as opposed to the populus Romanus who were the army, citing the example of Caesar calling his troops 
‘quirites’ to deny them their military quality (see Suet. Iul., 70).  Whatever the root of the term, it is 
certainly used in a civilian context by Sallust’s speakers.  
121 See chapter 3.2(b)i for modern scholarship on the difference between the populus and the plebs. 
122 Sall., Cat., 29.3; Iug., 8.2; 64.2.  
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maiestas.123  Sallust’s depiction of the populus shows them holding collective power in the res 
publica through these qualities, devolving imperium upon magistrates they elected and 
assenting to and legitimising the actions and decisions of the Senate and magistrates.124  The 
populus are associated with specific political and constitutional processes within the res 
publica, notably the passing of legislation and the awarding of commands.   It is they who are 
the audience of a contio, where they are addressed as quirites, and they who make up the 
political unit who vote upon bills put before them.125  They are also the body that votes in 
elections – it is they, according to Metellus, who could have denied Marius a consulship. 126   
The activity of the tribune Baebius, who was bribed by Jugurtha to help him escape judgement 
by the people is said to make the populus look ridiculous because their role in the res publica is 
bypassed by this corruption.127   In fulfilling their role Sallust suggested that the populus should 
heed the advice of the Senate – as long as this advice is in the best interests of Rome - 
criticising the populus in the Bellum Catilinae for refusing to betray Catiline, despite two 
decrees of the Senate.128    
Lastly, Sallust (like Cicero) linked the populus with the possession of libertas.129  In the 
Bellum Catilinae libertas is shown as an important element of the ideal res publica in two 
forms: that of the res publica against external rivals, and that of the citizenry against the 
tyranny and arrogance of rulers.130   In the Bellum Jugurthinum, the populus are said to have 
responded to the nobilitas’ abuse of their dignitas with an assertion of their libertas.131  This 
libertas appears to consist of their ability to participate in political affairs, such as that which 
Baebius’ corruption denied them.  As such, it is associated with their ability to exercise their 
political power freely without interference or manipulation from the Senate or magistrates.  
However, just as Sallust described the nobilitas as abusing their dignitas to hold on to political 
power after the fall of Carthage, so he said the populus abused their libertas, also with the aim 
of holding the balance of power in the res publica.   
                                                             
123 Sall., Iug., 31.11.  Maiestas here expresses the pre-eminence and independence of the people in the 
res publica. Hellegouarc'h (1963) pp.314-320 discusses maiestas, and notes (p.317) that the maiestas 
populi Romani may be opposed to the auctoritas senatus, with reference to Cic., Phil. 3.13. 
124 Lintott (1999) p.96.  
125 Sall., Iug., 30.3; 31.1; 32.1; 40.1; 73.7; 84.1, 5.  
126 Sall., Iug., 64.2;  
127 Sall., Iug., 33.2; 34.1-2.  
128 Sall., Cat., 36.4-5. Ramsey (2007a) p.164 believes these decrees to be the declaration of Catiline as a 
traitor and the earlier vote to reward anyone giving information about the plot (30.6).     
129 Sall., Iug., 41.5.  
130 Sall., Cat., 6.2, 6.5-7, 7.3-7.  
131 Sall., Iug., 42.1. 
 
 
135 | P a g e  
 
This abuse, according to Sallust, originated in the politicisation of an element within the 
populus: the plebs.  Whilst Sallust described the populus as abusing their libertas he stated that 
the plebs had fought to assert their libertas against the nobilitas, suggesting that he saw the 
plebs as a different political entity to the populus.132   From the Bellum Jugurthinum we can see 
that Sallust only employed the term plebs in relation to political activity taking place in Rome, 
specifically activity that is set in opposition to the behaviour of the nobilitas, the term ‘plebs’ 
acting as a tag for a highly politicised group with a defined political identity within the 
populus.133    The plebs act in the same political situations as the populus, but they do so in a 
factional manner.   They supported Memmius bill, passed Mamilius’ proposal for a special 
quaestio and accepted rumours Marius spread about Metellus, resulting in his election to the 
consulship.134  Finally it was the plebs who took the direction of the Jugurthine war from the 
hands of the Senate and the nobilitas: although it was the populus that had the right to vote in 
elections and on T. Manlius Mancinus’ bill to give Marius the command in Numidia, it was the 
plebs within that group that brought Marius’ election and command about.135 
The opposition of the plebs to the nobilitas is particularly prominent in Sallust’s narrative.  
He identified the figure of Opimius with reference to his cruel use of the victory of the nobilitas 
over the plebs after C. Gracchus’ death, and described the passing of Mamilius’ bill for the 
instigation of legal proceedings against those who had advised Jugurtha to disregard the 
Senate’s decrees as inspired by hatred of the nobilitas rather than love of the res publica.136   
Later Marius and other, ‘seditious magistrates,’ who support him are shown exploiting this 
opposition against Metellus: the nobilitas are defeated, and the plebs ensure that Marius is 
elected consul.137    The antithesis is also expressed in terms of social status in the Bellum 
Jugurthinum, where artisans and farmers are named as those who downed tools to support 
Marius.  In their political activity and in their rights and possessions, the nobilitas are portrayed 
as the ‘haves’, the plebs, the ‘have nots’.138    
                                                             
132 Sall., Iug., 42.1.  
133 Sall., Iug., 31.9, 20.  
134 Sall., Iug., 30.1; 33.3;40.3; 73.3, 6; 84.1 
135 Sall., Iug., 73.7; 84.1.  
136 Sall., Iug., 16.2; 40.3. 
137 Sall., Iug., 73.5-7; 84.1.  
138 Sall., Iug., 73.6.  The social element of the formation of the plebs as a concept does not feature 
largely in Sallust’s thought.   In the Bellum Catilinae Sallust’s thought about the nature of ‘the people’ is 
generally less developed and less prominent than in the Bellum Jugurthinum; but it does give the reader 
a greater insight into Sallust’s understanding of the social make-up of the plebs. They are associated 
with the urban poor, whom Sallust portrays in a negative fashion (Cat., 37.5-11), but they are not simply 
an urban group: the plebs in Etruria are described as having lost land and property under Sulla (Cat., 
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However, Sallust also suggested that the ‘plebs’ were a rhetorically constructed entity; an 
identity with which members of the populus were encouraged to associate themselves.  This 
process is revealed during Memmius’ speech in the Bellum Jugurthinum, in which he equates 
the plebs, rather than the populus, with the citizen body of Rome, making them the 
‘legitimate’ people and excluding those who do not share the political interests of the plebs.139  
By associating his audience with the plebs and declaring their sovereignty in the res publica,140 
Memmius seeks to move his audience to equate themselves with the plebs, a group that is 
conceived of as politically active and reactive against the nobilitas as a dominant faction who 
are suppressing the libertas of the people.   He evokes the history of the plebs at Rome, 
reminding his audience that their ancestors had twice seceded in order to assert their legal 
rights and sovereignty and seeking to spur them to action by the example of their forefathers 
who had acted politically in seceding in order to assert their legal rights and their maiestas. 141   
Memmius sets himself and his audience against the power of ‘this faction’, the nobilitas and 
the few.142   He claims that this group has stolen from the people, their crimes including the 
appropriation of the tributes of kings and free peoples, the possession of power, glory and 
wealth, including consulships, priesthoods and triumphs, and the betrayal of Rome’s laws and 
the sovereignty of his audience.143    It is in the context of this opposition that Memmius refers 
to the plebs’ right to and desire for libertas, arguing that ‘the few’ have suppressed it by their 
crimes and telling his audience that, “If your love of libertas were as great as the thirst for 
tyranny (dominatio) which spurs them [the few] on, surely our country would not be torn 
asunder as it now is, and your favours would be bestowed on the most virtuous, not on the 
most reckless,”144   The tribune’s speech aims to create the plebs out of the populus, calling 
them into existence with the demand for the defence of libertas against the domination of the 
few.    
We can see that Sallust’s depiction of the plebs in the narrative of the Bellum Jugurthinum 
is couched in the same terms as Memmius’ creation of them as a political power, representing 
the tribune’s construction of the concept as the common understanding of the term in late 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
28.4).  The members of the populus who might act as the plebs in Roman political life are those who are 
impoverished, to whom the rhetoric of repressed rights and libertas as Memmius formulates it would be 
most appealing. 
139 See Laclau (2005) especially pp.65-171 on the formation of the people through discourse in this way.  
140 Sall., Iug., 31.7, 9, 11. 
141 Sall., Iug., 31.16-17, 23 
142 Sall., Iug., 31.2, 4, 7-9. 
143 Sall., Iug., 31.9-10.   
144 Sall., Iug., 31.16, Cf.,  13.23.  
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Republic.  Although he reveals the idea of the plebs as a rhetorical construction through 
Memmius’ speech, the historian also accepts the force that this construction had within 
Roman politics and the impact it had upon the role the populus played in the res publica, 
particularly as regards their assertion of their libertas.   Sallust follows Memmius in relating the 
plebs to libertas, but also criticises the tribune’s representation of this association, revealing 
the tribune’s expression of the relationship to be based in a false understanding of libertas: the 
plebs are not being denied libertas as they and their champions claim; rather they are 
demanding the wrong kind of libertas.145  We have noted that Sallust considered libertas as 
important to the res publica, expressed through the ability of the populus to participate in 
political activity and the absence of tyranny or domination.  However, Memmius links the 
plebs’ desire for libertas with the right to possess glory and wealth - a formulation echoing that 
expressed by Catiline in the Bellum Catilinae, born out of ambition and avarice.146  This libertas 
is self-interested and the demand for it leads to the creation of the plebs as the political 
‘people’.  It is the plebs, as  the political ‘wing’ of the populus who are responsible for the 
abuse of libertas that Sallust describes as they seek to dominate in the political life of Rome, 
rejecting the guidance of the Senate in favour of their own interests and desires.    
Sallust’s historical narrative recognises the force of Memmius’ understanding of the place 
of the people in Rome’s constitution but also undermines it, critiquing his association of the 
plebs with libertas and showing that Memmius’ calling-out of the plebs contributed to the civil 
strife in Rome.   Sallust showed that this misunderstanding of the plebs as the true people of 
Rome had a negative impact on the res publica, just as the various ‘false’ understandings of 
nobilitas did.  Like them it represented a particular understanding of the Roman constitution, 
in this case one in which the people should control the balance of power in the res publica, the 
Senate and magistrates acting in accordance with their desires, rather than as a counsel and 
guide.  This attempt to dominate, is, in Sallust’s understanding of the constitution, as 
illegitimate as the self-identifying nobilitas’ understanding of their right to power, and is as 
damaging to the res publica, in its contribution to the rise of civil strife at Rome.  
 
(iii) The problem of factio 
Sallust presented an understanding of the constitution of the res publica in which the 
Senate should act as an advisory body and the people in accordance with the advice they were 
                                                             
145 Sall., Iug., 42.1.  
146 Sall., Cat., 20.8.  
 
 
138 | P a g e  
 
given for the good of the polity.  In such a polity the people have freedom to act, and should 
act in the right way.  Yet the success of the constitution depended upon the virtus and 
citizenship of those participating in Roman political life, and it was possible for ambitious 
individuals to create and exploit divisions within the res publica, as seen in Sallust’s 
presentation of Marius activities in the Bellum Jugurthinum.    North has argued that the will of 
the Roman people only found voice in the context of divisions in the oligarchy (using this term 
rather than nobilitas to avoid the issues over who the nobilitas actually were), democratic 
politics in Rome being a function of the degree and type of competition taking place within the 
elite.147   Sallust’s historical narratives argue that Rome’s constitution had been undermined by 
such activity, which reflected the rise of different, conflicting understandings of the roles of 
the Senate, populus, nobilitas, and plebs in the res publica, conceptions that originated in the 
self-interest in the holder and led to a rise in factionalism and civil strife at Rome.  
In Sallust’s understanding of the res publica the successful functioning and replication of 
Rome’s political structures and processes depended upon the maintenance of harmony 
between those involved in the political process.  This was sustained as long as Rome’s citizens 
were men of virtus, acting in the best interests of the res publica.  However, once virtus began 
to decline, the good relationship between Senate and people went with it, divisions emerging 
within and between the two groups. Sallust’s understanding of the importance of concordia 
can be seen in his descriptions of Rome before the destruction of Carthage and Sulla’s return 
from the east, and in the speech of Micipsa, King of Numidia, before his death.  The dying king 
hands over his kingdom to his three sons saying: “I deliver to you three a realm that is strong if 
you prove virtuous (boni), but weak if you do ill; for harmony (concordia) makes small states 
                                                             
147 North (1990b) p.18. His arguments are part of a larger debate over the extent to which there was an 
effective element of democracy in the Roman political system, marking a change of approach to the 
study of Roman politics, away from a focus on the elite and the populus as a potential tool of the elite 
(for example, Meier (1966); Badian (1972); Gelzer (1912); Gruen (1995); Münzer (1999)).  The 
arguments of Millar (1998) (following his earlier works: Millar (1984); Millar (1986); Millar (1995)) are at 
one extreme of this debate, placing the populus Romanus as the sovereign body formally at the centre 
of the Roman political system (pp.1 & 4), going so far (p.209) as to describe the res publica as a direct 
democracy, contra Brunt (1988) p.23 who argued that while the people did have constitutional rights 
this did not constitute a democracy.  Mouritsen (2001) has countered Millar’s viewpoint, arguing that a 
‘democratic’ ideology does not necessarily reflect a democratically functioning political system (p.15), 
examining the nature of the body that was the ‘people’ as it was active in Roman politics and concluding 
that only a small percentage of the populus could actually participate (pp.128-148).  Morstein-Marx 
(2004) has also critiqued Millar’s arguments in an examination of the nature of the political discourse 
that took place between the mass and the elite at Rome, arguing that public oratory created an 
ideological structure in which the populus were sovereign but that the elite were dominant in this 
discourse through a cultural hegemony (pp.33, 279-287).  
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(parvae res) great, while discord undermines the mightiest empires.”148    Yet after Micipsa’s 
death the relationship between the three men rapidly breaks down through Hiempsal’s pride 
and Jugurtha’s fear and ambition, and civil war breaks out in Numidia.   By giving Micipsa this 
speech Sallust not only provided an introduction to the situation in Numidia into which Rome 
entered, but also showed the importance of concordia in maintaining any political society.  It 
also allowed him to pass comment on the political situation in Rome at the time he was 
writing, in which three men had inherited the dominance of one, and warn of the danger of 
discord between them to the peace and stability of the res publica.   However, no Roman 
speaker is shown to enunciate the value of harmony; rather their words move Rome towards 
ever increasing discord.  Opimius, the former consul who had built a temple to Concord after 
his defeat of C. Gracchus is accused of factional behaviour in this aftermath of this ‘victory’, 
and shown to succumb to avarice which, as we have seen, led to discord at Rome.149   The true 
meaning of concordia and its importance to the res publica goes unacknowledged at Rome 
throughout the Bellum Jugurthinum, suggesting that Rome’s citizens were not fully alert to the 
importance of concordia to a stable res publica.  Instead its importance is revealed through the 
depiction of its erosion through the decline of virtus and increase of ambitio, avaritia and 
factional strife in Rome.      
Sallust’s understanding of factional strife at Rome led him to portray a tangle of fractured 
concepts that reflect the complexity of social and political relationships at Rome, making clear 
the importance of good citizenship, concordia and of a unified political knowledge to a 
successful polity.150  Sallust’s willingness to discuss the presence and effect of factiones at 
Rome contrasts with Cicero’s refusal to do so after Caesar’s assassination.  For Cicero, the only 
                                                             
148 Sall., Iug., 10.6.  
149 Sall., Iug., 16.2; 42 places the Gracchi in the narrative of the growth of factional strife at Rome. App., 
B Civ., 1.26 and Plut., C. Gracch., 17.6 record Opimius’ rebuilding of the temple of Concord.  Although 
Sallust does not mention the temple of Concord that Opimius built, his audience would surely have been 
aware of it (it stood until Tiberius’ rebuilding between 7 B.C. and 10 A.D.) and awake to the divergence 
between Opimius’ representation of his activity against Gracchus as being in the cause of concordia, and 
Sallust’s of it as part of increasing discord in the res publica.  
150 It is important to make it clear that the partes and factiones of which Sallust speaks were not 
organised associations or formal parties as we might think of modern political groupings.   Translating 
these terms without loading them with modern political understandings is tricky, but what is clear is 
that they should not be held to represent organised political groupings, or even rigid political classes.  
Brunt (1988) p.444 argues that ‘factions’ were at most small and evanescent, and that references to 
‘Marians’, ‘Sullans’ and the like almost invariably denote men following one of the leaders in the civil 
wars when there was a polarisation of the elite derived from conflicts between optimates and 
populares. He associates the divisions in Sallust not as parties centred on individuals, but optimates and 
populares, or Senate and plebs.  
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division in Rome was between those defending the res publica and those who were attacking 
it.  He dismissed Antonius’ reference to factions in the Thirteenth Philippic by arguing that all 
Antonius’ supporters were ‘bad’ citizens who were attacking Rome: it was not factional strife, 
it was war.151   Sallust’s representation of the res publica incorporates various groups and 
describes the way in which they became a part of the politics of Rome and of Roman 
understandings of the constitution.  Memmius’ comment that a group united by the same 
emotions and ambitions was called friendship (amicitia) when it was a group of good men, but 
factio when it was bad men shows the normality of such groupings in Roman politics in the 
first century.152  This comment also allows Sallust to establish that the terms used to describe 
political groups and strife at Rome were not neutral terms but ones indicating a particular take 
on the grouping in question: the multiple understandings of these groups becoming a part of 
the political debate and endangering concordia and the constitution of the res publica.  
   Sallust’s exploration of the understandings of the nobilitas, the pauci, the populus and the 
plebs in the res publica shows the way in which speakers identifying themselves with one of 
the groups could define their opponents as factional, employing the different understandings 
of these groups and exploiting and increasing the divisions in Roman political life, thus 
fracturing Roman knowledge about the constitution.   His depiction of the rhetorical 
construction of the plebs and the pauci as political groups shows the way in which this process 
undermined the constitution of the res publica by allowing discord to be established 
throughout Roman politics, as those who could not get support for their proposals within the 
Senate could turn to the people for support, forming the plebs into a political unit that 
opposed the Senate as the ‘home’ of the nobilitas.  It also damaged the understanding the 
balance of power between the Senate and the people through its expression of an 
understanding of the constitution in which the people should hold the balance of power and 
direct the actions of the Senate.   By presenting this rhetorical technique as a negative practice 
contributing to factional strife, Sallust was able to criticise the behaviour of those who 
employed it: not just Catiline, Memmius and Marius in his historiography, but also, implicitly, 
Cicero, who had used this kind of rhetoric used it to isolate Antonius from the populus 
Romanus in 44-43.153    Although Cicero denied factionalism, arguing that he represented the 
                                                             
151 Cic., Phil., 13.26-30 
152 Sall., Iug., 31.15. 
153 Chapter 3.2(a)i.  
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res publica against Antonius’ warmongering,154 Sallust’s negative depiction of this kind of 
rhetoric implies that Cicero’s actions and words did increase civil strife at Rome and indicts 
Cicero’s behaviour as part of the factionalism that damaged the constitution and as a 
contributing factor in the failure to restore the constitution of the res publica after Caesar’s 
death.  
Sallust’s representation of factiones and of the conflicting understandings of the roles of 
the nobilitas, the few and the people were part of an ongoing debate about the roles of these 
groups in the res publica in the first century.  For Sallust the concept of nobilitas held by those 
who identified themselves as nobilitas, and the idea of the plebs-as-the-populus expressed by 
Memmius were negative elements in his representation of the Roman res publica, damaging to 
the constitution because they expressed an understanding of the constitution in which one 
group of citizens could dominate the rest of the citizen body.   In the Bellum Jugurthinum 
Sallust declared that that, “To rule one’s country or subjects by force... is nevertheless 
tyrannical; especially since all attempts at change foreshadow bloodshed, exile and other 
horrors of war.”155   Sallust’s understanding of tyranny and the bloodshed accompanying its 
ending reflected the events that followed Caesar’s assassination, including the proscriptions 
and the deaths of the conspirators at Philippi, as well as providing a warning of what might 
occur when the rule of the current ‘few’ – the triumvirate - came to an end.     
In Sallust’s understanding of the constitution of the res publica, power should be balanced 
between the Senate, who had power through their authority to guide the people; and the 
people, who had power through their participation in political affairs.  This balance was 
undermined by divisive and factional behaviour, which itself originated in the failure of good 
citizenship, the rise of ambition and avarice and the decline of the vera vocabula.   Sallust’s 
depiction of the multiple understandings of nobilitas and the rhetorical construction of such 
political elements as the pauci and the plebs-as-the-people shows the importance of speech in 
Rome’s political culture and of good speech to the stability of the constitution.   With speech 
being the medium of political communication in Rome the different understandings of political 
concepts and key political terminology created problems for Rome’s decision-making 
processes and affected the Roman understanding of the constitution as it was renegotiated 
                                                             
154 Cic., Phil., 13.18. 
155 Sall., Iug., 3.2-4, 27.1, 30.3; Cf., Cat., 20.7, 39.1. Syme (2002) p.218. 
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and constructed through discourse.156 We have already seen that Sallust’s description of the 
res publica shows the existence of different understandings of various political concepts at 
Rome and their impact upon the res publica. Sallust links this issue to a discussion of vera 
vocabula and the role of language-use in the decline of the Republic.  
 
3. Vera Vocabula: The Problem of Speech 
Writing under the second triumvirate, Sallust’s presentation of the state of the res publica 
and its constitution is bleaker than that of Cicero.   Whilst Cicero sought to reclaim Rome’s 
political vocabulary and re-establish the constitution, arguing that the res publica, as he 
thought it should be, could be restored if a few bad citizens were removed from Rome, Sallust 
presented the decline as deeply rooted and irresolvable and sought to explain it.  One of the 
major factors in the decline of the res publica according to Sallust’s historical narratives was 
the disappearance of a vera vocabula at Rome: the loss of the true understandings of political 
terms and concepts such as virtus, gloria and nobilitas.   This loss manifested in the 
misunderstanding, misuse and abuse of political terminology made it impossible to ensure a 
unified understanding of the nature of the res publica and to determine the best course of 
action for Rome.   Sallust made the importance of vera vocabula explicit in the Bellum 
Catilinae, where Cato says that, “In very truth we have long since lost the true names for 
things.  It is precisely because squandering the goods of others is called generosity, and 
recklessness in wrong doing is called courage, that the res publica is reduced to extremities.”157    
In Sallust’s depiction of the late Republic this is a problem that affects every citizen, even those 
he describes as ‘good’ men, such as Caesar and Cato, and the theme appears throughout his 
work as he undermines the words of all of his speakers and reveals the problems this loss 
caused the res publica.158  In Sallust’s historiography the loss of vera vocabula and the 
corruption of citizenship appears to be a chicken-and-egg situation: the decline of language 
meant that citizens did not understand the true nature of the qualities they should seek to 
                                                             
156 Sallust and Cicero both suggest that these different understandings were ‘misunderstandings’ that 
led to the ‘misuse’ of language.  This interpretation of the history of Rome in the first century B.C. is 
influenced by their own perspectives and understandings of the constitution.  These different 
understandings are, rather, part of the natural instability of language that can create problems in all 
political systems, particularly if the participants in the discourse are unaware of or exploit the issue.  
157 Sall., Cat., 52.11-12.  
158 McGushin (1992-94) 1.14 notes the ironic gap between the speaker’s point of view and the situation 
Sallust’s narrative, see also Batstone (1988a) p.8, 17-23, 27; Grethlein (2006a) pp.141-143; Batstone 
(1990) p.129.  Leach (1989) p.202 notes that irony as a tool the author could use to make words signify 
something other than what they appear to say was an established concept in ancient theory.   
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possess or their proper relationship to the community. At the same time, the decline of 
citizenship contributed to the decline of language as some citizens deliberately misused key 
political terms for their own advantage.159  This section will examine the way in which Sallust 
showed that none of his characters knew Rome’s vera vocabula, revealing the falseness their 
various understandings of the nature of Roman political ideas and the constitution of the res 
publica, and explaining the problems this caused Rome.  
It has been argued that the first speech of Catiline contributes to a rounded portrayal of the 
character as a citizen struggling for social and political economic reform as well as for power: 
not undercutting the negative elements of Sallust’s description, but foreshadowing the Catiline 
of the finale, dedicated and determined to resist oppression.160   However, when we set 
Catiline’s expressions of the concepts of libertas and virtus against those of Sallust and against 
his own actions, it becomes clear that his words are the expression of his character as an 
embodiment of danger to the res publica through the misapplication of political vocabulary.   
Catiline’s demand for libertas is linked to the desire for the power and riches that Sallust cites 
as objects of Rome’s failing virtus and decline, and resembles the abuse of libertas by the plebs 
discussed above.161      Catiline’s employment of virtus is similarly deceptive: his emphasis upon 
dignitas and nobilitas distinguishes his concept from that of Sallust, and makes his speech 
questionable.  When set alongside his activities, even before his resort to armed rebellion, the 
gulf between Catiline’s concepts and those of Sallust is made plain.  Catiline’s self-
identification as a man of ingenium and virtus supporting libertas is undermined: his ingenium 
is not shown in bonae artes leading to virtus but in cunning and tricks that aim to fulfil his 
ambitions and earn him gloria by a false path.   Indeed, his concept of virtus is openly 
challenged in the Senate; his attack upon Cicero as inquilinus civis urbis Romae shouted 
down.162   Through a depiction of Catiline as a man who misapplies words to concepts that he 
understands in terms of his own self-interest rather than the welfare of Rome, Sallust was able 
to show that he was a threat to the res publica even whilst he was still campaigning for the 
                                                             
159 Derrida (2001) questioned the relationship between structure and genesis (pp.193-211), arguing that 
the complexity of origins destabilises both the idea of origin and of structure, leading to his process of 
deconstruction. Sallust’s ‘lack of clarity’ on the issue has led Batstone (2008) to employ Derrida’s ideas 
for a study of Sallust’s use and discussion of political language in the Bellum Catilinae, arguing that the 
text shows language to be thoroughly unstable and unreliable, a problem that Sallust argues had a 
knock-on effect upon Roman politics and the reproduction of the constitution.  
160 Wilkins (1994) pp.53, 137-9. 
161 Sall., Cat., 39.1.  
162 Sall., Cat., 31.5-9. Ramsey (2007a) p.149 notes that inquilinus properly refers to a lodger in a house 
that he does not own. Cicero is thus accused by Catiline of not being Roman and therefore not having 
the right to defend Rome.  
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consulship.  After his outburst in the Senate this danger is seen openly in Catiline’s deeds as he 
resorts to armed insurrection.   The risk of misunderstanding and misusing words is thus 
revealed though actions that imperil the res publica.  Despite his ‘brave’ ending on the 
battlefield, Catiline’s words and deeds are ultimately misapplied, serving only himself, and not 
Rome.     
Marius and Memmius also lack vera vocabula and have a flawed understanding of the res 
publica.  Theirs is a less self-centred understanding than that of Catiline, but in the emphasis of 
their speeches on the presence of division and factio in Rome they stir up further discord in 
the res publica.  Sallust used their speeches to show that the libertas, virtus and nobilitas 
incorporated in their arguments are not the true forms of concepts, for they do not contribute 
to the concordia of the res publica.     Although both men claim to support the rights of the 
plebs against the nobilitas in their speeches the historian contested their stance, showing the 
danger their arguments pose to the constitution because they contribute to factional 
behaviour.  Although Marius claims that, “As the whole res publica is of more value than a 
consulate or a praetorship, so much greater ought to be the care with which it is governed 
than that which is shown in seeking those offices,” his own campaign for the consulship is 
shown to have contributed to the growth of civil strife in Rome.163   And while Memmius 
argues that he is defending the libertas of the people from the domination of a few, Sallust’s 
revelation of the his misunderstanding of libertas and his misunderstanding of the role of the 
people in the res publica, shows that he was damaging Rome by misleading his audience about 
their role in politics and undermining the proper balance of the constitution. 
Marius’ expression of nobilitas, too, is shown to contribute to discord at Rome.  There is a 
certain irony in Sallust giving Marius the presentation of this concept of nobilitas based on 
virtus, as the historian refused to accord virtus to the character and also indicated that Marius 
fails to enunciate the true nobilitas in its fullest form.  As he unfolds his conception of vera 
nobilitas, Marius notes the elements of virtus that he claims are nobilitas’ requirement: the 
activities of the military man - experiences that he denies the current nobilitas posses.164  His 
concept of virtus is narrower than that of Sallust, which focuses on the expression of ingenium 
in bonae artes, and which can be expressed in civil and private life, as well as in military roles, 
and although he is shown in his campaigns to possess all the qualities that he lists, he does not 
possess all the historian's requirements, being flawed by political ambition.   Although his 
                                                             
163 Sall., Iug., 85.2.   
164 Sall., Iug., 85.11, 31-37. 
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refusal to root nobilitas in family status and office holding chimes with Sallust’s understanding 
of nobilitas, Marius’ conception is more limited.  It also creates problems for Rome, through 
Marius’ opposition to the vetus nobilitas, those who based their claim to nobilitas on their 
ancestry.165  Marius’ emphasis on the opposition of the plebs to this group seeks to evoke it 
amongst his audience, creating a factio and contributing to discord at Rome.  
Sallust’s focus on the speeches of Marius and Memmius shows the falsity of the political 
concepts attached to the plebs.  This is balanced by his critique of the concepts held by the 
self-identifying nobilitas (particularly their understanding of their own nobilitas) through the 
narrative’s focus on their behaviour in Rome and Numidia.   The main political strategy of this 
group is shown to be the maintenance of the nobilitas, both as the appropriate holders of 
power in the res publica, and in terms of their own dignitas and wealth.  However, their 
concept of nobilitas reflects a misunderstanding of the term, as Sallust shows in his description 
of their avarice and self-interest.  Even the actions of Metellus, which reveal a personal desire 
to act in the best interests of the res publica, are undermined by his pride as a member of the 
nobilitas and his rejection of Marius’ consular ambitions.   By focusing a large part of the 
narrative on the campaigning nobilitas commanders in Numidia, and the two major speeches 
to those rousing the plebs at Rome, the historian balanced the two ‘sides’ in his representation 
of factional strife at Rome, clearly showing that both groups had lost the vera vocabula and 
both contributed to the decline of the res publica.   The Bellum Jugurthinum’s focus on 
individual characters and speakers on each ‘side’ also enabled Sallust to reflect upon the part 
played by the failure of the virtus of individual citizens in the decline of the res publica.   The 
potential of Memmius, Marius, and Metellus for virtus is countered by their failure to posses 
vera vocabula and their consequent contributions to factional strife at Rome.  
Even Sallust’s, “Men of ingens virtus,” are shown to have lost the understanding of the true 
nature of Rome’s political vocabulary.  Sallust used the speeches of Caesar and Cato to show 
the way in which two well-intentioned speakers could argue from the same pool of political 
concepts and examples, and use the same words to make two different cases.  Moreover, 
although he called both speakers the best Romans of his lifetime, the synkresis undermines 
their virtus, tying their flaws into the narrative of decline by showing that vera vocabula had 
been lost even by these men.   This revelation occurs through Sallust’s use of terms employed 
by Caesar and Cato in their speeches in the synkresis, his application of them revealing the 
flaws in the speakers’ understandings of these concepts.   Their misunderstandings of Roman 
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political concepts creates problems for their speeches and allows Sallust to show that even 
those seeking to do the best for Rome could not because their understanding of Rome’s 
vocabulary failed them.  
Sallust’s use of the terms mansuetudo, misericordia and dignitas with regard to Caesar are 
important in his revelation of the failure of vera vocabula at this point.  Although Sallust 
showed Caesar using the concept of dignitas in his speech, as he had used it as justification for 
his actions in the civil war, he went on to apply the term as a description of Cato, whose fame 
is increased by his severitas and dignitas.166    Sallust’s concept of virtus does not, as we have 
seen, take dignitas as an object.   Sallust’s refusal to grant Caesar dignitas contrasts with 
Caesar’s own use of the term, and must lead the reader to suspect that the historian believed 
that Caesar did not understand the true meaning of the term.   If Caesar did not possess 
dignitas, then his understanding of the concept and his appeal to it in his speech become 
suspect and a potential danger to the res publica.   
  However, it is not only Caesar whose understanding of political terminology has failed.  
Sallust’s use of mansuetudo and misericordia (gentleness and compassion) in the synkresis 
echoes Cato’s employment of it in his speech, but with a significantly different tone.  Here it is 
not scorned as weakness or appeasement, but is applied to Caesar as a positive aspect of his 
virtus, making it clear that his proposal for compassion towards the conspirators was not made 
out of self-interest or some misplaced clementia or compassion, but in the best interests of the 
res publica.   Simultaneously, he shows that Cato misuses words: employing mansuetudo and 
misericordia inaccurately in order to sway the Senate away from Caesar’s proposal.    The man 
who complained of the loss of vera vocabula and who had to appeal to the Senate’s self-
interest because they had lost the understanding of citizenship is shown either to have lost the 
meaning of mansuetudo and misericordia, or to have laid it aside in order to achieve victory in 
the Senate debate.167  
Caesar and Cato are both guilty of adding to the problems at Rome through the misuse of 
political vocabulary.  Their misunderstanding of the key political ideas in the Roman 
constitution leads to conflict within the Senate, while their arguments add to the archive of 
Roman political knowledge about the constitution, corrupting it with false understandings of 
these ideas and about the constitution and fracturing Rome’s constitutional knowledge.  
                                                             
166 Caes. B Civ., 1.7.1, 7; 1.9.2; Sall., Cat., 51.6-8, 51.27, 54.2.   
167 Sall., Cat., 52.5. Drummond (1995) pp.50-55 notes the way Cato’s speech plays upon the self-interest 
of the Senate, Cf., Cat., 52.5-9, 12, 18. 
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However, there is an element of the victim in their positions as well.   By describing them as 
the men with the greatest virtus in their time directly following their speeches, Sallust made it 
clear that they both wished to speak in the best interests of the res publica but that they could 
not escape the problem of their era.  Words have been misused and perverted to the extent 
that the descendant of Cato the Elder, who had argued for compassion for the Rhodians, 
scorned compassion as dangerous to the res publica; whilst Caesar overestimated the 
importance of dignitas to the security of Rome.  They were unable to interpret the constitution 
properly because the archive of political knowledge out of which they constructed their 
understanding of it had already begun to fracture.  This created problems for the res publica as 
it led to the misinterpretation of the constitution in political discourse, the proposal of actions 
that were not necessarily in the best interests of Rome and, finally, the establishment of these 
misinterpretations as part of the nexus of authorities guiding the reproduction of the 
constitution as they became precedents to be called upon in Rome’s decision-making 
processes.  
In addition to offering an explanation for the events being narrated and for the decline of 
Rome, Sallust’s theme of vera vocabula and the decline of the res publica also responded to 
the events that followed Caesar’s death.  This theme allowed the historian to critique the 
discourse of Cicero, reacting to his expression of good citizenship and the role of the people in 
the res publica, and to his use of language and rhetoric after the assassination of Caesar.   In 
this way, he made Cicero as complicit in the failure to re-establish the Republic after Caesar’s 
death as Antonius, Octavian or the conspirators.  
In Sallust’s presentation of Catiline’s misappropriation of virtus to his cause, the historian 
comments on the way virtus was used as a tag to identify positive behaviour and good citizens 
in political discourse.168  As we saw in chapter three, this was the way in which Cicero 
expressed virtus in the Philippics, employing it to legitimise the actions of Decimus Brutus, 
Octavian, Marcus Brutus and Cassius.   Through Catiline, however, Sallust showed that the 
term might be used to authorise actions and individuals that might unbalance the constitution 
and endanger the res publica.  Cicero’s legitimisation of Octavian in this way was particularly 
problematic for Sallust, given Octavian’s subsequent establishment as a triumvir, a position 
that allowed him (along with Antonius and Lepidus) to dominate Roman politics in a manner 
                                                             
168 Sall., Cat., 20.2-17. 
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that Sallust thought unconstitutional because it undermined the proper roles of the Senate 
and people in the res publica.  
Sallust also reacted to Cicero’s arguments about the law in the Philippics through the 
argument made by Cato in the Bellum Catilinae.  Replying to Caesar’s argument that the 
Senate follow the letter of certain laws, Cato declares that the security of the res publica as a 
whole is paramount.   If Catiline were allowed to win there would be no way of proceeding 
against these conspirators in law, so Cato recommends that the Senate do not worry about the 
legal niceties but focus on the security of Rome.169   In this establishment of a ‘state of 
exception’ Cato’s argument is reminiscent of that of Cicero as he sought to have Antonius 
declared a hostis in the way that it privileges the ultimate good of the res publica (or his 
understanding of it) over the letter of the law.170    However, Sallust made it clear in the Bellum 
Catilinae that Cato’s arguments regarding the conspirators and understanding of the res 
publica are suspect because of the way in which he misuses Rome’s political vocabulary and 
plays upon the fears of the Senate to convince them of his argument.   Through the theme of 
vera vocabula, Sallust was able to raise questions about the validity of this line of argument 
and suggest the negative impact had upon the res publica. 
A further criticism of Cicero’s behaviour in 44-43 is raised through Caesar’s speech in his 
expression of concern about what might happen if a man of lesser quality than Cicero should 
be consul, command an army and draw his sword in accordance with a decree of the Senate. 171     
Both McGushin and Ramsey posit an allusion to the behaviour of Octavian at this last point, 
the young man having had his army legitimised by the Senate, in large part through the 
arguments of Cicero, before he marched on Rome with his army to demand the consulship. 172   
The activities of the second triumvirate, too, were undertaken with the backing of a law 
authorised by the Senate.  The lex Titia made Antonius, Lepidus and Octavian tresviri rei 
publicae constituendae, in order that they might ‘arrange’ the res publica.173  In enacting the 
proscriptions Antonius and Octavian could be said to be literally drawing their swords in 
obedience to a decree of the Senate.    Sallust’s-Caesar’s remark suggests that the decision 
                                                             
169 Sall., Cat., 52.3-4.    
170 See chapter 3.2(c); Agamben (2005) pp.23-25.  
171 Sall., Cat., 51.1, 5-6, 35-6.    
172 McGushin (1977) p.253; Ramsey (2007a) p.207.  It also reflects on the fact that Caesar, too, led an 
army against Rome, fracturing Sallust’s apparently positive portrayal of Caesar as a younger man.  
173 MRR 2.337; Rawson (1992b) p.486. It is worth noting that Sulla may well also have been appointed 
dictator rei publicae constituendae (see App., B Civ., 1.99 and MRR 2.66) making him a premonition for 
the second triumvirate.  
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made in 63 and Cicero’s behaviour as consul provided a precedent that could be employed by 
later magistrates to justify the removal citizens whose opposition they did not appreciate and 
criticises his role in legitimising Octavian’s place in Roman politics.  For Sallust, Cicero was as 
implicated in the decline of Rome as any other political figure, for his words had misidentified 
Octavian as a man of virtus and gained him imperium, and had encouraged the people to direct 
the Senate’s action through their condemnation of Antonius, driving Antonius out of Rome and 
inspiring his violent response.    Sallust’s engagement with Cicero’s political vocabulary and 
ideas shows that Cicero’s representation of the res publica, particularly as expressed in his 
oratory, was one understanding of the constitution amongst many, and that his pursuit off it 
misused language and contributed to Rome’s return to civil war and the failure of the 
constitution of the Republic that came with the second triumvirate.  
 
In Conclusion 
Sallust’s depiction of the constitution of the res publica in the last century of the Republic 
reflected his understanding that the constitution no longer existed in its proper form, the res 
publica having become a polity dominated by three powerful men.  His attempt to explain this 
decline through the writing of history was shaped by Caesar’s dictatorship, its aftermath and 
the governance of the second triumvirate both in his formulation of the res publica and its 
decline and in his choice of genre, as he masked his critique of the ‘tyranny’ of a few men – as 
he understood the triumvirate to be – by narrating the story of two major crises in Rome’s 
recent history.   His historiography explores Roman ideas about good citizenship, the political 
structures of the res publica and the importance and problems of language as he reveals the 
multiple understandings of elements of Rome’s constitution that signalled the fractured nature 
of Roman knowledge about the nature of the constitution.   
Sallust presented an understanding of the constitution as he thought it should be, 
contrasting it with those held at Rome in the late Republic, which he revealed through his 
historical narratives.  He cited the growth of ambition, avarice and self-interest combined with 
the loss of the vera vocabula as causing the decline of good citizenship and the rise of different 
understandings of citizenship and the relation of the citizen to the res publica, damaging 
Rome’s political culture.  For Sallust, as for Cicero, the good citizen ought to uphold the 
constitution of the res publica through their words and deeds.  The failure of good citizenship 
undermined the roles of the Senate and the people in the constitution, as Sallust understood 
it.  The loss of vera vocabula created further problems as it gave rise to misconceptions of the 
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nature of the nobilitas and the place of the people in the constitution and thence to a rise in 
factionalism and civil strife, as these ideas were expressed in Rome’s political discourse.  
Sallust’s historiography reveals the damage inflicted by this fracturing of Rome’s knowledge 
about the constitution upon the constitution and the polity.  The enunciation of these various 
flawed understandings of political concepts in Roman discourse led to increased discord at 
Rome and, in time became part of Roman understandings of the res publica.  As arguments 
and proposals based on these understandings were successful and accepted at Rome they 
became part of the nexus of statutes, decrees, judgements and precedents that provided 
authorities for future debates over constitutional action.   It was in this way that the Senate’s 
decision that the consul be empowered to act in the best interests of the res publica against 
Catiline and Cato’s argument that the conspirators should be executed without trial for the 
good of Rome became precedents for the Senate’s action against Caesar in 49, Cicero’s 
arguments against Antonius in 44-43, and the proscriptions of the second triumvirate.   
Sallust’s historiography explains the process by which the constitution of the Republic 
developed into the constitution of Rome under the second triumvirate, showing the fracturing 
of Roman knowledge of the constitution and the impact of the pursuit of these different 
understandings of the constitution by various citizens.  
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Conclusion: Fractured Knowledge 
 
The preceding chapters have proposed a new way of looking at the constitution of the 
Roman res publica and employed it in an examination of the political situation at Rome after 
the assassination of Julius Caesar in order to suggest an explanation for the failure of the 
restoration of the Republican system of government, arguing that the constitution of the 
‘Republic’ could not be restored because there was no single understanding of the nature of 
that constitution.      
The Roman constitution was not a static body of institutions and rules within which politics 
happened, but rather a flexible entity comprising both Rome’s political institutions and the 
culture within which they existed, the proper nature of which was interpreted, established and 
reproduced through discourse.  In this discourse understandings of and arguments about the 
nature of the constitution were constructed and debated from a nexus of authorities including 
Senate decrees, statutes, legal judgements and precedents.   These authorities were 
interpreted by the participants in Roman political life to form their understandings of the 
constitution, which acted as a guide upon their actions and their speech within the res publica.  
The actions undertaken and arguments expressed became, in turn, the authorities that shaped 
future interpretations of the constitution and arguments for constitutional action.  This 
discursive process created flexibility in the constitution and enabled the res publica to adapt 
and respond to changing situations.  However, it also meant that different understandings of 
the nature and processes of the constitution became established in the discourse, fracturing 
Roman knowledge about the constitution and leading to conflicts in the political process.   
By adapting and employing theoretical ideas about the nature of discourse and political 
knowledge it has been possible to break down Rome’s political discourse and describe the way 
in which Roman knowledge about the constitution was formulated.   Applying this 
methodology to the political discourse of Rome after Caesar’s death, it is possible to see the 
multiple versions of the constitution and the various understandings and expressions of the 
political concepts that underlay them.   As chapter two showed, these understandings ranged 
from Antonius’ argument that the res publica ought to protect the citizen and his position to 
Brutus’ emphasis on the importance of the Senate as the chief council and guide of Rome, the 
populus’ understanding of their own importance in Roman ideology and the constitution and 
Octavian’s recognition of a flexibility in the political relationship between the Senate and 
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people that allowed him to interact with them both to his own benefit.   These multiple 
understandings were a result of the fracturing of Roman political knowledge about the 
constitution and they were contested in public life in a struggle for the future of the res 
publica, as through the words and deeds of all the participants.    
As a major player on the political stage in 44-43 B.C., Cicero gives us a particular insight into 
the process by which such an interpretation of the constitution was formulated, expressed and 
contested in Rome’s political discourse.  De Officiis and the Philippics offer a detailed 
presentation of Cicero’s understanding of the constitution: the way its expression was shaped 
in response to the situation at Rome, the concepts upon which it was founded, and the impact 
it had upon the formulation of the constitution at that time.   Cicero recognised that the 
Roman constitution had evolved over time but, as he had argued in de Republica, he believed 
that it had reached its perfected form and argued that it must be preserved.1  His 
understanding of the constitution emphasised the importance of the political culture and its 
role in ensuring the stability of the res publica as he focused on the character of the good 
citizen and the citizen’s behaviour in the polity, citing the examples of men like Regulus to 
support his argument.   Good citizens maintained the constitution, allowing Rome’s institutions 
to function effectively by understanding and pursuing the best interests of the res publica in 
their actions and speech.  In his interpretation of the constitution Cicero presented law not 
only as a collection of statues, judgements and precedents,2 but also as a standard of right 
action – constitutional action – that was a higher kind of law and one that could be invoked 
when man-made law failed.  This concept shaped his arguments against Antonius and his 
defence of the actions of D. Brutus, Octavian, M. Brutus and Cassius.  It was in the expression 
of this concept of law in particular that Cicero’s understanding of the constitution clashed with 
those others held at Rome, most notably those of his fellow consular Calenus and of Antonius, 
although it was also countered by M. Brutus.   The conflict between Cicero’s understanding 
constitution and those of his opponents affected events at Rome particularly through his 
establishment of Octavian in a legal position as propraetor and in the way his comments 
provoked Antonius to respond and express his own understanding of the constitution. In this 
way Roman political discourse about what the constitution ought to be shaped the 
reformulation of the constitution of the res publica after Caesar’s death.  
                                                             
1 Cic., Rep., 2.63. 
2 To name just three of the elements he cited as sources of the ius civile at Topica 28.  
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While Cicero’s discourse gives us access to the formulation of one specific understanding of 
the constitution, Sallust’s historiography describes several of the multiple understandings of 
the constitution and also reveals the impact that the fracturing of Roman knowledge about the 
constitution had upon the stability of the res publica.   Through his historical narrative Sallust 
was able to enunciate his own understanding of the proper nature of the constitution and to 
show how the understandings of his characters differed from this.  Sallust’s own presentation 
of the constitution was drawn against a picture of a declining res publica, in which the rise of 
avarice and ambition led to a decline in Roman citizenship.  This undermined the political 
institutions and processes of the res publica, destabilising the constitution and damaging 
Rome.  In narrating Rome’s decline and crises, Sallust explored the way in which his characters 
words and deeds reflected their understanding (or misunderstanding) of the nature of the 
constitution of the res publica.  From this he could show the way in which misunderstandings 
of the constitution, in particular of the concept of citizenship, led Roman citizens to act in ways 
that damaged the constitution and caused the decline of the res publica.  
In many ways Sallust’s understanding of the constitution of the res publica echoed that of 
Cicero.  They expressed similar understandings of the concepts that they saw as being key 
elements of the constitution, especially in the relation of these concepts to the good of the res 
publica, although the concepts are expressed differently in Sallust’s historiography than in 
Cicero’s philosophy and oratory. Their employment of the same key terms, such as virtus, 
gloria and libertas shows the existence of a political ideology at Rome, in which these terms 
had value.   That both emphasised the power of the people in the res publica, the role of the 
Senate as a voice of authority and a counsel to the people and magistrates, and the 
importance of good citizenship in the effective functioning of both of these bodies in the 
constitution also suggests a common understanding of the way in which the political system of 
the res publica ought to function.  At the same time the discourse of both makes clear that 
their understandings of these political concepts and of the constitution as a whole were not  
the only ones in currency in Rome, and argue that other understandings  - misunderstandings 
from their perspective - were damaging to the stability of the constitution.   Sallust took this 
further than Cicero, clearly describing some off the different understandings of the 
constitution and their impact upon the res publica and indicting Cicero’s expression of his own 
understanding of the constitution as a part of the problem.  
Cicero and Sallust both made clear the importance of speech to the maintenance of the 
constitution: it was a key part of the political culture of Rome and the medium through which 
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political decisions were made and the constitution interpreted and reinforced or altered.    
Cicero’s understanding of the constitution made clear the importance of speaking in the best 
interests of Rome and of using words properly, in their true meanings, as he sought to reclaim 
key terms in Rome’s political vocabulary from those he claimed misunderstood and misused 
them to the detriment of the res publica.   In this, his presentation of the constitution was 
influenced by the ongoing discourse as he countered the other understandings of such 
concepts as dignitas and gloria and sought to incorporate them into his res publica.   In 
discussing Rome’s political language, Cicero established himself as the arbiter of what was 
‘right’, presenting himself as a good citizen, possessed of wisdom and virtus, speaking in the 
best interests of the res publica.   However, from an examination of Cicero’s discourse about 
the constitution in 44-43 it becomes clear that Cicero was not an innocent in the problems of 
Rome where language was concerned.  Cicero’s oratory exploited terms such as virtus and 
libertas as ideological and descriptive tags, using them to defend the actions and individuals he 
approved of against those he did not.  In addition he displayed a willingness to exploit the 
flexibility inherent in the power balance in the relationship between the Senate and the 
people; the stability of which he himself suggested depended upon good citizenship and good 
speech.  In the Philippics however he encouraged the Senate to take the lead in guiding the 
people and the people in directing the Senate.  Cicero would no doubt have argued that this 
was the behaviour of a citizen acting in the best interests of the res publica, persuading both 
the political bodies at Rome to cast out an enemy: but his behaviour was based on his personal 
understanding of the constitution and was not accepted by all at Rome.  His refusal to accept 
the potential legitimacy of other views of the constitution and his rejection of compromise led 
to further discord rather than unity.   
Sallust’s presentation of the problems of language and speech in the res publica responded 
to Cicero’s discourse, criticising his expression of his understanding of the constitution and 
pursuit of it in discourse as an abuse of language that increased conflict in the res publica. Like 
Cicero, Sallust argued that language was an important part of the constitution and claimed 
that without the proper understanding of Rome’s key political terminology the discourse 
through which Rome’s political processes functioned and the constitution was reproduced 
would be undermined.   However, while Cicero sought to reclaim and redefine Rome’s political 
vocabulary in his bid to establish his understanding of the constitution, Sallust presented Rome 
as having lost its vera vocabula and being beyond ‘saving’ in this way.  By establishing his own 
understanding of the constitution and contrasting it with those expressed by his characters, he 
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made it clear that none of his speakers understood the true meanings of Rome’s political 
terminology.  Instead, their speeches and proposals expressed and established conflicting 
understandings of the constitution and constitutional action in Roman discourse and its 
archive.   In his explanation of Rome’s decline he argued that the loss of vera vocabula had led 
to the misinterpretation and misrepresentation of the constitution in various proposals for 
action; this then destabilised the constitution as these decisions became part of Rome’s 
constitutional archive, fracturing Rome’s knowledge about its constitution. Cicero’s 
constitutional discourse both reflected and contributed to the fracturing of Rome’s 
constitutional knowledge, as it employed different conceptions of the Senate-people 
relationship depending on the audience.    
For Sallust, the establishment of the second triumvirate was the end point of his narrative 
of decline, the result of years of a failing political culture undermining the ability of the political 
institutions and processes to uphold the constitution of the res publica.     Through the period 
of history Sallust’s monographs describe and in which Cicero participated, the discursive 
processes of Roman political life allowed the constitution to be adapted in order to meet the 
demands of the day as it was reproduced.  However, these changes did not always have a 
positive long-term effect upon the stability of the polity as they altered the balance of power 
between Rome’s political bodies and changed and fractured the understanding of what that 
power balance should be.    Over time, as Rome’s empire grew and the prizes of political life 
increased the interpretation of Rome’s constitution in discourse, the basis for decision-making 
and political action, became a more fraught affair as citizens and groups sought to possess the 
benefits of this growth.   Different understandings of various elements of the constitution 
emerged at Rome, debating the nature of citizenship, the role of Rome’s political bodies and 
the relationship between the citizen, these structures and the res publica.   These debates 
created a fracturing of Roman political knowledge, multiple understandings of the constitution 
being formulated, expressed and enshrined as constitutional precedents in response to the 
different pressures Rome faced.   
Caesar’s dictatorship created a rupture in the res publica, establishing the possibility of a 
different kind of polity.  After his assassination, the fractured nature of Roman constitutional 
knowledge meant that the restoration of the ‘Republic’ as a political system was not 
inevitable.  The constitution had to be renegotiated and reconstructed in order to stabilise the 
res publica for the future.   However, there were multiple understandings of what that 
constitution should be, from those of Antonius and Octavian, who saw the potential for the 
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dominance of a powerful individual, to those of Cicero, Cassius, and Brutus, who rejected the 
idea of any such dominance in a free res publica.   The validity of these different 
understandings of the constitution was contested in Roman discourse in 44-43 B.C., each 
argument provoking and shaping the succeeding responses, and pursued with such force that 
they were soon reflected in individuals’ willingness to take military action as well as in their 
words.   This process led eventually to the establishment of the second triumvirate, but this 
was not the end of the renegotiation of Rome’s constitution.  The triumvirs’ understanding of 
the res publica continued to clash with that of the conspirators until Brutus and Cassius were 
defeated at Philippi, and then with that of Sextus Pompeius and those of each other.   Even 
after Actium and the establishment of the principate under Augustus, the Ciceronian and 
Sallustian understandings of the constitution as that of a free political community remained, a 
‘subversive’ strand of knowledge under the principate.  
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